

**Population Displacement and Post-Katrina Politics:
The New Orleans Mayoral Race, 2006**

**John R. Logan
Director, American Communities Project
Brown University**

Revised June 1, 2006

New Orleans' first election after Hurricane Katrina was conducted under unusual conditions. A large share of the population remained displaced outside the city, and the majority of displaced persons were living outside the State of Louisiana. The foreseeable result was that the electorate was much smaller than in prior elections, and the political voice of black neighborhoods – the ones most affected by flood damage – was much diminished.

This report reviews what was known about displacement prior to the election and analyzes its impacts on the results. The major findings are:

1. It was well known in the weeks leading up to the April 22 primary that the majority of New Orleans voters were living outside the city, and the greater share of these was living outside of Louisiana. Displacement was not random in terms of race or social class. Those living away from home were disproportionately black residents and among blacks they were disproportionately low-income. Among displaced persons, blacks were considerably more likely than white to be living outside the metropolitan area and outside the state.
2. Total voter turnout in the primary (110,000) and in the runoff election (114,000) was predictably below previous elections – more than 10% less than the usual turnout in a mayoral election (represented by the March 2002 mayoral race) and more than 40% less than the potential turnout (represented by the November 2004 national election). Even this level of participation depended on the unprecedented number of absentee ballots and votes at satellite centers around the state (nearly 25,000 in the runoff).
3. More significant than the number of votes is the shift in the composition of the electorate, whether 2002 or 2004 is used as the point of comparison. Though blacks still are a majority of voters, black neighborhoods suffered a loss of 6-7 points in their share of the electorate, from about 63% in 2002 and 2004 to about 57% in 2006.
4. There was also a dramatic shift in the relative political weight of specific neighborhoods. Turnout was actually greater in 2006 in some relatively undamaged, predominantly white neighborhoods of the city than in 2002. This is the case, for example, of the French Quarter and Garden District. In predominantly black and middle class New Orleans East, turnout for the runoff fell by 23% and in the less affluent Lower Ninth Ward it plummeted by nearly 40%.
5. Although Hurricane Katrina reshaped the political map of the city by suppressing the vote in the poorest and blackest neighborhoods, the dynamics of the mayoral campaign represent a more

remarkable shift in the composition of support for the winning candidate, Mayor Ray Nagin. Having been elected in 2002 on the basis of his strong showing in white and more affluent neighborhoods, the Mayor has been re-elected with his main edge among neighborhoods with predominantly black and low to middle income residents. A key question for the future is how development policy in his second term will respond to the needs of his new constituency.

Long-term displacement by Hurricane Katrina

Because so many questions about the future of New Orleans and its neighborhoods will be influenced by the political leadership elected in 2006, there was considerable controversy about the electoral process and especially over the participation of displaced residents.

There is no single authoritative source of information on the location and composition of the 485,000 people who lived in New Orleans in August 2005. The most telling data, which turn out to be highly correlated with levels of voter participation, are about the population that was at risk of long-term displacement because their neighborhoods were heavily flooded for days or weeks in September. I draw here in part on the analysis of the population in flooded and unflooded areas of the city that I reported in January 2006 (<http://www.s4.brown.edu/katrina/report.pdf>).

Because this report focuses on electoral results, it has been necessary to align census data for block groups (the smallest unit for which Census 2000 reports key variables such as the income of residents) with precinct boundaries. These units do not match perfectly. I have used GIS methods to determine what share of the area of each census block group lies within each voting precinct. Then I apportioned the population (by race, income, and homeownership) accordingly. All census data are from summary files of the 2000 Census of Population. Information on the composition of the population by race comes from full-count census returns. Race is defined in this report in the following way. “Whites” are non-Hispanic persons who identified themselves only as white race. “Blacks” are non-Hispanic persons who identified themselves as black or black in combination with another race. Some tables also show the composition of precincts by homeownership and categories of income within race. These data are from sample counts reported in Summary File 3. In these tabulations, the black race category is defined differently. It includes black Hispanics and counts no persons who reported being black in combination with another race. Fortunately this has little effect in the case of New Orleans, where there are few black Hispanics or persons reporting mixed race.

1. The population at risk

The figure below shows flooded and non-flooded areas of Orleans Parish along with the racial composition (percent black) of precincts. This map shows that the undamaged areas of the city were mainly in two areas. One is just north of the Mississippi River in a zone extending westward from downtown. The other is across the river on the West Bank, in a district known as Algiers. The map shows that some predominantly white neighborhoods in the northwest part of the city were entirely flooded. However almost all of the neighborhoods that were in the range of 75% to 100% black at the time of Census 2000 were flooded.

Separate analyses demonstrate that damaged areas were also disproportionately composed of renters and lower income residents. However it is the division by race that stands out most strongly, because the most damaged black neighborhoods had varying class composition, ranging from predominantly middle class New Orleans East to the much less affluent Lower Ninth Ward, to neighborhoods with public housing projects where a majority of residents were below the poverty line.

Precincts in Orleans Parish by race and flood damage




Table 1 presents the population totals by race in flooded and non-flooded areas. Within Orleans Parish, the damaged areas were 75.0% black, compared to 46.2% black in the rest of the city. This means that black residents of New Orleans were more likely than white residents to face long-term displacement from their previous homes, and therefore one would expect them to be less likely to participate in the election.

	Total population	Non-black	Black	Percent black
Flooded	354,045	68,261	265,388	75.0%
Non-flooded	130,629	60,610	60,287	46.2%

2. Estimates of displaced population

The figures above represent the numbers of persons who can be considered to have been at great risk of being displaced. What is known about the actual long-term displacement of population? I summarize here the evidence from four different sources. Each source has its own limitations, but taken together the four sources offer a consistent picture: the majority of the city's population is still living elsewhere, of these the largest share is living outside the state, and black residents (especially poor black residents) are disproportionately found at the greatest distance from their prior homes.

One of these sources is population estimates of Louisiana parishes developed by the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH). Their estimate for Orleans Parish is based on a survey of neighborhoods by the City of New Orleans Emergency Operations Center (Rapid Population Estimate Survey, December 3, 2005). Their estimate for other parishes is based on data about school enrollment, based on the assumption that there is a fixed relationship between school enrollment and total population at the parish level.

Table 3 summarizes the DHH estimates of parish populations. By these estimates, the largest losses of population occurred in Orleans Parish (302,000), Jefferson Parish (94,000), and St. Bernard Parish (60,000). Parishes outside the New Orleans metropolitan region gained 83,000 (of which 31,000 was in East Baton Rouge Parish). Displacement out of the state, then, can be calculated at 385,000.

Note that displacement from the metropolitan region immediately after Hurricane Katrina as estimated from this source was much greater than the current figure: the estimate was about 615,000 as of October 2005. This earlier figure is consistent with the number of persons living in damaged neighborhoods, if we include not only Orleans Parish but also neighboring suburban Jefferson and St. Bernard Parishes. There is evidence here of population recovery especially in Jefferson Parish, where the initial loss is estimated at about 200,000, but the net loss as of January 2006 is less than half that amount. In contrast there is little evidence of population recovery in Orleans Parish or St. Bernard Parish. Since this January 2006 estimate, DHH has noted little change in parish populations. However the most recent (January 2006) estimate of the Orleans Parish population, published by municipal authorities, showed a rise to 181,400. According to this survey, the West Bank section of Algiers and the unflooded sections of the rest of the city had returned to nearly their pre-Katrina population, but less than 15% of residents of damaged areas were living in the city.

		Imputed	DHH Population Estimates				Census
		net loss 1/06	1/06	12/05	11/05	10/05	estimate
							7/05
New Orleans metro total		468,715	871,982	848,751	818,600	725,704	1,340,697
City of New Orleans:							
	Orleans	302,253	156,140	138,681	138,681	138,681	458,393
Suburban parishes:							
	Jefferson	94,720	363,309	354,337	328,223	258,128	458,029
	Plaquemines	12,123	17,309	15,984	14,671	5,794	29,432
	St. Bernard	60,520	6,899	13,111	13,111	13,111	67,419
	St. Charles	-3,471	51,830	52,137	52,205	52,492	48,359
	St. James	-905	21,747	21,981	21,975	22,317	20,842
	St. John the Baptist	-4,696	49,286	49,983	51,065	54,668	44,590
	St. Tammany	8,172	205,461	202,536	198,668	180,513	213,633
Other Louisiana parishes		-83,002	3,265,933	3,288,580	3,298,325	3,328,817	3,182,931
State total		385,713	4,137,915	4,137,331	4,116,925	4,054,522	4,523,628
Imputed out of state total			385,713	386,297	406,703	469,106	

A second source is postal change of address data in the post-Katrina period, tabulated by the U.S. Postal Service (see Gordon Russell, "Address changes offer insight into city," *Times-Picayune*, February 5, 2006). These data identify the original pre-Katrina 3-digit zip code (origin) and current 3-digit zip code (destination) of households that filed changes of address. Table 4 tabulates the destinations of households who filed a change of address since 9/1/05 and their reported address on 10/13/05 and 3/31/06. There was an increase in the number of address changes between October and March. I interpret this primarily as an indication that many displaced people were delayed in finding a stable address for mail forwarding.

By this indicator, at the end of March more than 160,000 households were relocated from their original address in Orleans Parish. Of these, about 17,000 were at a new address within Orleans Parish. About 21,000 were elsewhere in the metropolitan region; 15,000 in Baton Rouge; and 12,000 in other parts of Louisiana. Close to two-thirds were out-of-state, most prominently in Texas (52,000). The most common out-of-state destinations were Houston (27,000), Dallas (14,000), and Atlanta (8,000).

Additionally, 93,000 households were displaced from their homes in Jefferson and St. Bernard Parishes. These households were more likely, however, to have resettled within the metropolitan region (26% elsewhere in these two parishes, and more than 40% within the metropolis). Still, considerable numbers were relocated in Baton Rouge and other parts of Louisiana (17%), Texas (16%), or other states (26%). The most prominent out-of-state destinations from these two parishes are Houston (7,800), Dallas (2,900), Hattiesburg, MS (1,900), and Atlanta (1,200).

Table 3. Household change of address filings from Orleans Parish zip code		
	3-digit zip code of origin: 701	
<u>Destination, 10/13/05</u>		
Orleans	2,401	1.8%
Jefferson/St. Bernard	6,036	4.5%
St. Tammany/Northshore	4,971	3.7%
East Baton Rouge	17,047	12.7%
Other Louisiana	15,329	11.4%
Texas	46,347	34.6%
Other states	41,822	31.2%
Total	133,953	100.0%
<u>Destination, 3/31/06</u>		
Orleans	16,703	10.1%
Jefferson/St. Bernard	14,895	9.0%
St. Tammany/Northshore	6,321	3.8%
East Baton Rouge	14,576	8.8%
Other Louisiana	12,263	7.4%
Texas	51,929	31.5%
Other states	48,173	29.2%
Total	164,860	100.0%

Note that the average household size in the New Orleans metropolitan region in 2000 was 2.59. This statistic allows me to translate households roughly into numbers of persons, contingent on the assumption that displaced households were of similar size as all pre-Katrina households. By this approach, the number of persons still displaced at the end of March from Orleans Parish to a location outside of the metropolitan region can be estimated at 329,000 (consistent with the number of persons previously living in flooded neighborhoods in the city). Of these the total displaced to an out-of-state location is 259,000.

A third source is FEMA's tally of the reported addresses of area residents who had applied for assistance. This information was prepared in mid-February 2006 and made available in the federal court case that challenged election procedures (Wallace v. Blanco). Table 4 shows that a total of nearly 400,000 persons initially living in Orleans Parish had applied for assistance. Of these, 154,000 were living within Louisiana, including a number of persons who had suffered relatively minor damage and returned to their original homes. But over 100,000 reported addresses in Texas and a larger number were living in other states. These numbers are smaller than those reported above. They represent adult applicants for assistance rather than all persons in affected households. However they reinforce previous conclusions about the significance of displacement outside of Louisiana, especially to Texas.

Table 4. Current state of residence by parish of origin based on addresses given by FEMA applicants, 2/06				
Parish	FEMA Total	LA	TX	Other states
Orleans	388,630	154,103	108,471	126,056
Jefferson	296,591	201,061	41,788	53,742
Plaquemines	20,169	14,459	2,084	3,626
St. Bernard	45,176	26,461	5,815	12,900
St. Charles	23,802	21,559	1,007	1,236
St. James	7,111	6,899	80	132
St. John the Baptist	20,320	18,725	737	858
St. Tammany	112,610	90,627	5,840	16,143
Total metro	914,409	533,894	165,822	214,693

The impacts of displacement depend not only on its volume but on who has returned to the city or metropolitan region and who continues to live farther away – and the furthest away turn out to be African Americans, especially those with the lowest incomes. The only public source of information about the racial composition and income levels of displaced persons is the Current Population Survey (CPS), conducted by the U.S. Department of Commerce. CPS is collected monthly for a national sample of 60,000 households. It is designed to be representative of the civilian non-institutional population age 16 and above. Beginning in November 2005 CPS has included a question to identify persons who were evacuated as a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Its principal limitations are its relatively small sample size and its exclusion of persons living in shelters, hotels, or other forms of group quarters. A relatively small sample of persons is used to represent the full population. However the sample weights provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics allow the sample to be used to produce population estimates. Only large differences between groups should be treated as meaningful.

Its advantages are that it makes possible a description of the demographic and socioeconomic composition of displaced persons and comparisons of persons who have returned to their original homes with those who have not. To the extent that population estimates from this source (based on sample weights provided by the Department of Commerce) are consistent with estimates from other sources, it also provides a basis for comparing the current location of displaced persons by race.

Here I use the sample data from December 2005 to evaluate the racial composition and income levels of displaced persons. In December, evacuees identified in CPS-sampled households represented about 1.1 million persons aged 16 and over who had evacuated from where they were living in August. Just over half of these persons had returned to the home from which they had evacuated. Using survey data it is possible to select those persons in the population who are most relevant to the political process: persons aged 18 and above who are citizens of the United States. There is not information in this data source on voter registration. I have selected only persons whose original pre-Katrina residence was in the State of Louisiana. I focus only on non-

Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks. The number of evacuees identified as Hispanic, Asian, or other race is too small to permit analysis.

		Number	Percentage
Non-Hispanic whites:			
New Orleans metro	Returned home	251,530	58.8%
Rest of Louisiana	Returned home	36,439	8.5%
New Orleans metro	Displaced	67,781	15.8%
Rest of Louisiana	Displaced	24,076	5.6%
Other states	Displaced	48,310	11.3%
Total		428,136	100.0%
Non-Hispanic blacks:			
New Orleans metro	Returned home	71,823	32.5%
Rest of Louisiana	Returned home	15,897	7.2%
New Orleans metro	Displaced	13,965	6.3%
Rest of Louisiana	Displaced	17,088	7.7%
Other states	Displaced	102,154	46.2%
Total		220,927	100.0%

Note: Data in this table are based on sample weights to represent the full population of citizens aged 18 and above (potential voters). Unweighted sample sizes are white (123) and black (70).

Table 5 shows estimates of the current location of whites and blacks who lived in Louisiana and who were evacuated due to Hurricane Katrina. It distinguishes between persons who have already returned to their original place of residence and those who have not. According to this source, 428,000 whites were evacuated, of whom 290,000 (67%) have returned home. Among blacks, 221,000 were evacuated, of whom 87,000 (or less than 40%) have returned home. Of those who have not returned home, nearly two-thirds of whites are in Louisiana, while three-quarters of blacks are out of state.

The exact statistics are subject to error, but these differences in current location are robust. Note that based on this source a total of 273,000 citizens above age 18 are still displaced and 150,000 of them are out of state.

Table 6 selects the same set of citizens aged 18 and above and shows the income levels of whites and blacks, comparing those who have returned home and those who have not. White evacuees are estimated to have similar income levels regardless of their current location, with a median just under \$50,000 and less than 15% in households with income under \$20,000. Black evacuees who have returned home have somewhat lower incomes than whites. Blacks who remain displaced have much lower incomes, with a median of under \$15,000 and more than 60% below \$20,000.

These figures are consistent with what is known about the relative income levels of whites and blacks in the New Orleans metropolitan region. Based on what neighborhoods were damaged, most displaced blacks are from the City of New Orleans, where black median income in 2000

was \$25,017. This figure matches very closely the estimated \$25,214 median income of black evacuees. By contrast, most displaced whites are from the New Orleans suburbs, especially St. Bernard and Jefferson Parishes. White median income in these parishes in 2000 was \$42,277 and \$37,093, respectively. This figure is somewhat below the estimated \$46,633 median income of white evacuees. We would expect those persons with the most financial resources to be more likely to be early returnees. However the CPS data suggest that this differential is found only among blacks.

Table 6. Income level of evacuees by race and current location (Louisiana residents)

	Median household income	Percent under \$20,000	Weighted number	Unweighted sample size
Non-Hispanic white:				
Returned home	\$46,049	14.2	205,188	57
Displaced	\$48,829	11.5	115,135	36
Total	\$46,633	13.3	320,323	93
Non-Hispanic black:				
Returned home	\$38,860	23.1	75,645	23
Displaced	\$13,329	61.7	119,563	37
Total	\$25,214	46.8	195,208	60

Note: Data in this table are based on sample weights to represent the full population of citizens aged 18 and above (potential voters).

Voting in the Primary and Runoff Elections

The State of Louisiana provides comprehensive information about precinct geography and results of past elections, and results of this primary election were posted within hours of the closing of the polls. Electoral information used in this report is available at the website of the Secretary of State: <http://sos.louisiana.gov>. Information on the population composition of the city by voting precinct has been assembled from Census 2000, based on intensive geographic analysis of the overlap between voting precincts and census block groups. Data about people living in specific block groups has been allocated to precincts according the share the block group that lies within each precinct. Because most people think about the city in terms of neighborhoods rather than precincts, I have taken the additional step of determining which neighborhood (using designations employed by local authorities) and larger planning district each precinct lies within. In cases where a precinct crosses over into two neighborhoods, it has been allocated to the neighborhood in which the larger part of its area falls.

A detailed, high-resolution map of the election precincts in Orleans Parish is available at <http://www.nocitycouncil.com/content/districtmaps.htm>.

What was the turnout in spring 2006, and how did it compare to prior elections? I use two reference points. One is the election conducted on March 2, 2002, when the current Mayor, Ray Nagin, defeated Richard Pennington. This was a routine municipal election, and it stimulated a

modest turnout of 130,000 voters (out of a total pool of registered voters that has remained close to 300,000 for the last several years). Another reference point is the Presidential election of November 2, 2004, when few local positions were at stake but there was considerable interest in the contest between President George Bush and challenger John Kerry. There was a turnout of over 197,000 in the 2004 race.

Analysts will differ about which of these is a more appropriate comparison to 2006. In terms of what New Orleans residents perceived to be at stake in the choice of public officials and the rebuilding of the city, one could have expected the potential turnout to be even higher than 2004, and certainly greater than 2002. By either standard, participation in 2006 was depressed, with a total of under 115,000 votes cast. I will use both as a way to show the impact of post-Katrina displacement on the actual turnout. I will refer to the 2002 results as the “usual turnout” for a local election, and the 2004 results as the “potential turnout” in an election of greater significance.

1. Absentee voting

Absentee voting turned out to be greater than usual, with a total of just over 21,000 absentee ballots counted in the primary and nearly 25,000 in the runoff. Given that that were likely well over 200,000 registered voters living outside the city, and probably the majority of these lived outside the state, the number of absentee ballots is not impressive.

At this time it is possible to calculate the distribution of absentee votes across precincts in the primary election by comparing the precinct-level vote tally on the day after the election (which did not include absentee ballots) with the currently available precinct totals (including all votes). “Absentee” ballots by this measure include both true absentee ballots or those cast at satellite voting centers and at the city registrar of voter’s office prior to election day. I must estimate the distribution of absentee ballots across precincts in the runoff election by assuming it has the same geographic distribution as in the primary.

The addresses to which people requested their ballots be sent offer some information about the location of displaced residents. This list is available at this website: <http://www.sos.louisiana.gov/elections/Spreadsheets/MailBallotsWeb.xls>. All persons who requested an absentee ballot for the primary were also sent an absentee ballot for the runoff election. New requests added about 3,000 to the list. Table 7 aggregates absentee requests by specific cities and by state. Houston is by far the most common destination, followed by Baton Rouge and much smaller numbers in New Orleans itself, Dallas, San Antonio, Metairie (in Jefferson Parish), and Atlanta. A similar picture emerges at the state level: most ballots were sent to Texas, followed by Louisiana and Georgia.

Table 7. Addresses to which absentee ballots were requested to be sent, primary and runoff elections

City	Primary		Runoff		State	Primary		Runoff	
	Number	%	Number	%		Number	%	Number	%
Houston, TX	2,808	16.9%	3,555	18.1%	Texas	6,112	36.8%	7,457	38.0%
Baton Rouge, LA	849	5.1%	917	4.7%	Louisiana	3,870	23.3%	4,491	22.9%
New Orleans LA	439	2.6%	675	3.4%	Georgia	1,430	8.6%	1,653	8.4%
Dallas, TX	429	2.6%	516	2.6%	Mississippi	807	4.9%	890	4.5%
San Antonio, TX	312	1.9%	355	1.8%	Alabama	501	3.0%	585	3.0%
Metairie, LA	265	1.6%	292	1.5%	Tennessee	499	3.0%	583	3.0%
Atlanta, GA	255	1.5%	276	1.4%	Florida	393	2.4%	450	2.3%
Memphis, TN	210	1.3%	236	1.2%	Arkansas	333	2.0%	381	1.9%
Austin, TX	196	1.2%	233	1.2%	California	319	1.9%	369	1.9%
Lafayette, LA	164	1.0%	175	0.9%	Virginia	218	1.3%	260	1.3%
Jackson, MS	142	0.9%	155	0.8%	Other states	2,141	12.9%	2,522	12.8%
Slidell, LA	140	0.8%	149	0.8%					
Arlington, TX	132	0.8%	172	0.9%	Total	16,623	100%	19,641	100%
Little Rock, AR	121	0.7%	132	0.7%					
Birmingham, AL	116	0.7%	142	0.7%					
Other cities	10,045	60.4%	11,661	59.4%					
Total	16,623	100%	19,641	100%					

2. Composition of the electorate

Besides noting that turnout in 2006 was depressed relative to either 2002 or 2004, another way to summarize the overall impact of Katrina on voting patterns is to compare the social composition of the electorate in each election year. What precincts, and by implication, what social groups were most prominent in the electorate? This pattern can be estimated by calculating the average social characteristics of precincts, weighting every precinct by the number of persons who voted. This is, in other words, the composition of the precinct of the average voter. Table 8 shows the result of this analysis.

Despite great differences in the level of turnout between 2002 and 2004, the social composition of the neighborhoods represented by the electorate changed by less than a percentage point on any characteristic. In other words there was great stability in the kinds of people who voted, even though many more people voted in 2004 than in 2002. There was a larger change in 2006, reflecting the disruption of the city. There was a clear shift to greater representation of white neighborhoods and a decline in representation of black neighborhoods. There were smaller changes toward lower representation of renters, and a shift toward higher income areas.

Note that the decline in black participation is more pronounced among lower and middle income residents, while the rise in white participation occurred mainly for middle and upper income residents.

Table 8. Characteristics of the precinct of the average voter in three election years


Precinct characteristics:	2002	2004	Primary	Runoff
			2006	2006
Non-Hispanic white	31.0%	30.7%	36.9%	36.2%
Non-Hispanic black	63.2%	63.3%	56.8%	57.5%
Renter households	45.2%	46.9%	44.3%	44.4%
Income below poverty	24.1%	24.9%	22.4%	22.6%
Income over \$60,000	22.8%	22.1%	25.0%	24.9%
Race and income (households)				
NH white under \$20,000	7.6%	7.8%	8.8%	8.6%
NH white \$20,000-\$60,000	14.0%	13.9%	16.3%	15.9%
NH white over \$60,000	12.9%	12.5%	15.6%	15.4%
Black under \$20,000	26.1%	26.5%	22.7%	23.1%
Black \$20,000-\$60,000	25.5%	25.3%	22.8%	23.0%
Black over \$60,000	8.5%	8.3%	7.9%	8.0%
All other households	5.5%	5.7%	6.0%	5.9%

The racial change in the electorate is what many observers were anticipating. It is, however, less dramatic than the racial differences in displacement that were described above. The electorate in 2006 has moved closer to a 50-50 division between black and white neighborhoods, but it has moved only half the distance to that point since 2004. Several forces are in play to limit the changes. An important factor is that some displaced persons were able to vote, either in person in New Orleans or more likely at a satellite voting center or through absentee ballot. Not shown in this table, additional analyses reveal that the precinct of the average absentee voter had an even higher percentage of black residents (but not of lower income or rental households) than represented by the turnout in 2002 or 2004. Absentee voting (including voting at satellite centers) increased the representation of blacks at all income levels in the election. Still, data on turnout by race released by the Secretary of State shows that only 53% were black.

From the perspective of future urban policy, neighborhoods with the highest electoral participation have likely strengthened their hands in the battles over public investment and development planning that are sure to be a major feature of local politics in the next several years. The pattern of this impact is shown in the following figure, in which voter turnout by precinct is displayed as a percentage of the “usual turnout” (2002). This map can be compared to the map of racial composition and flood damage presented above. It clearly demonstrates the depression of turnout in the flooded precincts that had higher shares of black residents. What

neighborhoods' prospects were strengthened by their participation in this election, and which neighborhoods fared less well?

Voter turnout in April 2006 as a percentage of March 2002



The map of turnout also shows (in blue) the boundaries of neighborhoods that are used by the City for planning purposes. New Orleans is divided into 13 planning districts and 72 distinct neighborhoods within these districts. The neighborhood names and boundaries are shown in the map below (for reference, see the website of the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, www.gnocdc.org).

Neighborhoods of New Orleans



To describe the neighborhood pattern of voter turnout in more detail, Table 9 lists the planning districts of the city in descending order of the turnout in the 2006 runoff election compared to 2002 as well as the neighborhoods within every district in the same order. This is the comparison to “usual participation.” The table also lists the ratio between turnout in the runoff compared to the primary election, and also between the runoff and the 2004 Presidential election. As contextual features that may help to interpret these results, the table also lists the percentage of land area in each area that was flooded after Katrina, and the composition of the population by race, housing tenure, and poverty status.

The neighborhoods with the largest declines in turnout are in the Lower Ninth Ward, New Orleans East, and parts of Mid-City and Bywater. These are all predominantly black neighborhoods, but they have widely varying class composition. In Mid-City and Bywater it is especially the public housing projects whose former residents have been barred from returning to the city up to now. The Lower Ninth Ward is a mixed income area with many working class homeowners. These are both areas where the loss of public infrastructure and government restrictions on entry have seriously delayed recovery efforts. New Orleans East, in contrast, has been an important base for the black middle class. All these areas suffered close to 100% flooding, and displacement is the most obvious explanation for low turnout. Future studies of the participation of black neighborhoods may reveal other issues.

Among white neighborhoods there is generally a positive correlation between voter turnout and extent of flood damage. For example, the Uptown/Carrollton and Central City/Garden Districts include some neighborhoods with very little flood damage and others that were hard hit. Neighborhoods with no flooding like Uptown and Garden District had considerably higher participation than in 2002, while those with more damage like Broadmoor and Milan suffered a loss. But there are two other significant patterns to point out:

1) Several planning districts show little impact of Katrina. The French Quarter and Central Business District actually had higher turnout this year than in 2002, as did New Aurora and Algiers on the West Bank. These are among the areas of the city with the least flood damage. The surprise here is how much participation declined in comparison to the 2004 Presidential election, with a fall of 25-30% that seems unlikely to be due to population loss. In what may have been the most important election in the history of the city, why was turnout in these areas no more than the usual local standard? There may be evidence here of forces beyond displacement, evidence of surprising apathy, alienation and disaffection from the political process by the residents of these relatively advantaged communities.

2) On the other hand, despite its devastation Lakeview shows an exceptional turnout. The number of Lakeview voters was nearly (94%) as high in 2006 as in 2002. Even more, there are only modest variations within the district between Lake Shore/Lake Vista, which was only partly flooded, and areas like Navarre that were heavily damaged. Lakeview's participation may have been influenced by a special tax measure on the ballot that would increase property taxes in this district for the purpose of improved policing. A greater factor probably was extensive voter mobilization by local civic groups. Lakeview is known to have a strong civic association that has built upon the many smaller neighborhood associations that used to operate in the area, and in this election it translated its affluence and high levels of homeownership into political clout.

Another planning district with a relatively high turnout despite considerable damage is Gentilly, especially the racially mixed neighborhoods of Fillmore (94% as high as 2002) and Gentilly Terrace (88% as high).

Table 9. Voter turnout in 2002-2006 by planning district and neighborhood

Planning district name	Neighborhood name	Runoff votes	In comparison to:			Neighborhood characteristics			
			Primary	2002	2004	Damage	Black	Renter	Poor
French Qtr CBD	Central Business District	462	96.8%	133.1%	67.8%	37.9%	33.6%	79.1%	32.3%
	Vieux Carre	1,645	99.3%	119.8%	68.0%	1.1%	4.5%	75.5%	10.8%
	Total	2,106	98.7%	122.5%	67.9%	12.2%	13.3%	76.4%	16.9%
New Aurora	New Aurora	1,999	103.8%	119.4%	79.6%	1.1%	68.2%	27.0%	24.8%
	Total	1,999	103.8%	119.4%	79.6%	1.1%	68.2%	27.0%	24.8%
Algiers	Algiers Point	515	99.6%	128.7%	90.6%	0.7%	25.3%	51.7%	17.3%
	Algiers Whitney	1,165	105.7%	113.8%	74.1%	7.1%	85.4%	50.0%	29.3%
	Tall Timbers/Brechtel	2,536	102.1%	112.2%	73.4%	1.2%	55.0%	64.6%	19.4%
	Aurora/Walnut Bend/Huntlee Village	5,648	98.9%	110.4%	80.8%	0.9%	31.3%	26.3%	9.9%
	McDonogh	729	108.4%	108.8%	75.4%	0.0%	88.2%	52.9%	48.3%
	Behrman	2,326	103.2%	100.3%	66.7%	0.7%	78.0%	53.1%	33.4%
	Algiers Naval Station	411	101.7%	93.8%	69.4%	2.0%	64.1%	49.4%	21.8%
	Fischer Project	169	121.0%	67.5%	55.4%	0.0%	99.2%	88.5%	88.2%
	Total	13,499	101.6%	108.2%	75.3%	1.2%	56.6%	48.3%	24.1%
Uptown-Carrollton	Uptown	2,774	99.7%	122.1%	77.2%	29.1%	36.3%	56.8%	23.9%
	Audubon/University	5,573	98.5%	118.4%	75.8%	40.8%	5.5%	46.7%	17.9%
	West Riverside	1,621	101.0%	117.8%	77.8%	1.2%	36.7%	57.1%	18.1%
	East Carrollton	1,587	99.6%	113.2%	70.4%	30.0%	31.9%	57.7%	24.5%
	Black Pearl	419	99.1%	111.7%	72.0%	0.0%	36.7%	61.9%	26.4%
	Marlyville/Fontainbleau	1,840	99.3%	107.7%	71.6%	100.0%	28.4%	50.9%	12.9%
	Leonidas/West Carrollton	2,284	104.0%	94.4%	63.3%	70.5%	75.9%	58.3%	31.5%
	Broadmoor	1,774	101.0%	87.4%	56.8%	100.0%	68.9%	51.7%	31.8%
	Dixon	1,239	105.1%	82.5%	60.6%	100.0%	95.0%	57.2%	31.1%
	Freret	454	102.6%	75.6%	51.8%	100.0%	83.4%	64.3%	33.5%
Total	1,126	112.7%	73.2%	54.0%	100.0%	95.4%	45.7%	28.4%	
CC-Garden District	Garden District	925	99.0%	134.4%	88.4%	0.0%	3.0%	51.6%	11.3%
	Touro	1,024	99.6%	128.8%	80.0%	0.1%	18.6%	70.4%	15.5%
	St. Thomas Area	1,496	100.9%	128.2%	67.3%	2.0%	34.8%	73.5%	28.5%
	East Riverside	779	103.5%	116.7%	70.3%	0.0%	64.1%	57.1%	36.9%
	Irish Channel	1,303	101.5%	115.8%	68.2%	0.0%	69.0%	62.9%	41.1%
	St. Thomas Project	286	106.6%	106.2%	66.0%	0.4%	93.3%	93.0%	69.1%
	Milan	1,720	102.3%	86.2%	58.0%	96.9%	74.2%	65.6%	28.6%
	Central City/Magnolia	2,895	104.5%	80.0%	53.0%	79.8%	87.4%	83.7%	49.8%
	Total	10,428	102.2%	101.0%	63.5%	46.8%	67.8%	73.6%	39.7%

Planning district name	Neighborhood name	Runoff votes	In comparison to:			Neighborhood characteristics			
			Primary	2002	2004	Damage	Black	Renter	Poor
Lakeview	City Park	1,001	97.6%	109.5%	75.7%	100.0%	9.9%	58.4%	12.3%
	Lakeshore/Lake Vista	1,881	101.1%	101.4%	84.1%	43.8%	0.7%	14.4%	2.7%
	Navarre	1,367	97.8%	94.0%	70.3%	100.0%	3.4%	45.1%	8.5%
	Lakeview	3,783	96.9%	89.9%	70.1%	100.0%	0.8%	29.4%	4.9%
	Lakewood/West End	1,767	97.4%	86.8%	64.8%	87.2%	1.7%	39.4%	9.1%
	Total	9,799	98.0%	93.6%	71.9%	89.8%	2.3%	33.8%	6.3%
Village de L'Est	Village De L'Est	2,127	105.7%	93.4%	59.2%	10.0%	83.2%	54.3%	7.8%
	Total	2,127	105.7%	93.4%	59.2%	10.0%	83.2%	54.3%	7.8%
Gentilly	Fillmore	1,853	102.9%	93.7%	70.7%	100.0%	57.5%	15.4%	11.6%
	Gentilly Terrace	2,974	103.8%	88.1%	64.3%	100.0%	70.4%	30.4%	16.1%
	St. Anthony	1,424	106.7%	78.8%	52.2%	100.0%	58.9%	40.0%	20.6%
	Dillard	2,428	106.8%	77.7%	54.7%	100.0%	89.7%	43.3%	20.6%
	Milneburg	1,769	104.1%	77.5%	57.7%	100.0%	76.2%	28.7%	14.4%
	Gentilly Woods	2,314	107.1%	77.5%	58.4%	100.0%	69.1%	24.3%	14.4%
Total	12,762	105.2%	82.0%	59.5%	96.5%	69.5%	28.2%	15.3%	
Viavant/Venetian Isles	Viavant/Venetian Isles	110	95.9%	78.7%	47.7%	78.6%	47.8%	48.3%	33.1%
	Total	110	95.9%	78.7%	47.7%	78.6%	47.8%	48.3%	33.1%
New Orleans East	Read Boulevard East	3,613	105.4%	84.3%	60.2%	99.3%	74.2%	11.4%	11.2%
	Read Boulevard West	1,454	103.8%	81.4%	54.8%	98.8%	80.3%	14.9%	10.5%
	Pines Village	1,561	107.0%	76.6%	49.2%	100.0%	87.9%	36.2%	18.3%
	Edgelake/Little Woods	8,130	104.1%	75.3%	51.9%	99.0%	86.8%	48.6%	17.4%
	West Lake Forest	883	104.4%	74.5%	48.9%	100.0%	95.9%	76.2%	27.2%
	Plum Orchard	1,807	109.4%	70.0%	49.3%	99.3%	93.7%	42.3%	33.2%
Total	17,448	105.2%	76.9%	52.9%	99.2%	86.8%	44.7%	18.9%	
Bywater	Marigny	1,043	96.3%	124.0%	68.7%	19.4%	18.3%	66.4%	24.1%
	Bywater	1,068	100.0%	104.1%	58.0%	43.6%	61.3%	61.8%	38.6%
	St. Claude	1,810	114.5%	75.6%	47.7%	94.8%	90.9%	55.7%	39.0%
	St. Roch	2,063	111.7%	68.4%	46.0%	100.0%	92.1%	57.9%	37.1%
	Florida Area	586	112.3%	63.9%	44.5%	100.0%	98.7%	41.6%	36.2%
	Desire Area	629	111.1%	63.4%	42.2%	99.8%	94.5%	52.0%	35.7%
	Florida Project	138	124.5%	50.1%	33.9%	100.0%	98.4%	89.5%	79.6%
	Desire Project	98	119.5%	42.2%	42.2%	100.0%	99.1%	83.8%	62.5%
Total	7,435	108.4%	76.7%	49.3%	85.4%	83.4%	58.4%	38.7%	

Planning district name	Neighborhood name	Runoff votes	In comparison to:			Neighborhood characteristics			
			Primary	2002	2004	Damage	Black	Renter	Poor
Mid-City	Fairgrounds/Broad	881	102.8%	92.5%	62.0%	100.0%	69.5%	54.4%	16.9%
	Bayou St. John	1,185	102.4%	89.1%	59.3%	100.0%	68.1%	67.7%	32.0%
	Mid-City	2,240	101.4%	82.3%	49.7%	100.0%	64.7%	71.7%	32.1%
	Gerttown/Zion City	838	118.2%	77.7%	37.5%	100.0%	95.0%	76.1%	48.6%
	Sixth Ward/Treme/Lafitte	1,229	109.8%	75.9%	46.9%	100.0%	92.8%	78.3%	56.9%
	Seventh Ward	3,454	106.4%	74.8%	50.6%	100.0%	94.1%	67.0%	38.0%
	Tulane/Gravier	534	108.0%	65.2%	42.4%	100.0%	78.4%	81.2%	56.2%
	Calliope Project	556	105.0%	62.6%	34.5%	100.0%	98.7%	94.7%	69.2%
	St. Bernard Area/Project	910	111.3%	57.5%	38.6%	100.0%	97.9%	83.0%	66.0%
	Total	11,826	106.2%	75.8%	47.6%	100.0%	82.9%	72.9%	44.4%
Lower Ninth Ward	Holy Cross	844	106.7%	67.9%	43.9%	74.0%	88.0%	58.0%	29.4%
	Lower Ninth Ward	2,516	109.6%	60.5%	43.9%	99.9%	98.7%	41.1%	36.4%
	Total	3,360	108.9%	62.2%	43.9%	92.6%	95.7%	46.0%	34.4%
New Orleans City		113,591	103.3%	88.8%	59.9%	73.0%	67.2%	53.5%	27.9%


Displacement and the race for mayor

During the campaign my principal interest in the mayoral race was not about personalities but about the impacts of a shrinking and changing electorate. What constituency would the mayor to be elected in the runoff in May –whether Ray Nagin or Matt Landrieu – need to address in anticipation of the next election, and how would it be different from the recent past? The same question could be addressed equally for the two council seats (out of seven) that are elected citywide. Both the Mayor and these council members are formally expected to address the broad public interest of the whole city, but as politicians they cannot avoid looking over their shoulders at who elected them and how they will find a majority in the next race.


In fact, although displacement could have been expected to have a very large effect, it was overwhelmed by a sea change in the composition of support for the incumbent. The following two maps show the extent of support for Nagin in his first race in 2002 and the 2006 primary by precinct.

Comparing these maps to the map of racial composition presented above, in 2002 it is clear that Nagin ran strongest in the neighborhoods with smaller black populations. Reports from the period suggested that in fact his election depended on support from white neighborhoods (and financial backing from people described as the “Uptown white establishment”).

Support for Nagin in the March 2002 mayoral election



Support for Nagin in April 2006 primary election



In a remarkable remaking of the electoral map, Nagin's support in 2006 shifted almost 180 degrees – neighborhoods that had supported him now supported his opponents, and areas where he had found the least votes now constituted his core constituency. Local commentators have offered explanations for this shift, including generalized dissatisfaction with his performance as an administrator since Katrina, a belief among potential candidates that this was an election in which a white candidate could run successfully (and several did), and polarization by race both in the impacts of Katrina and in political rhetoric.

These results show that Mayor Nagin, having been positioned before as an establishment favorite who could draw both white and black votes, now relies primarily on support in the black community. Table 10 quantifies this turn of events by reporting the race and class composition of precincts where the average Nagin voter lived in 2002 and 2006.

White votes (as measured by precinct results rather than from information on how each person voted) constituted nearly 40% of Nagin's support in 2002, double the share among his opponent Pennington. But he ran less well among blacks. In 2006 white support dropped to less than half the level received by Landrieu in either the primary or the runoff election. There are substantial shifts also in support from renters (he ran behind among renters in 2002 but ahead in 2006) and similarly among low-income voters. He ran ahead among the most affluent voters by a margin of nearly 10 points in 2002, but behind by 12 points in the 2006 runoff.

There is more to be learned by examining race and class together. Because black incomes are so much lower than white incomes in New Orleans, any racial difference is likely to imply a difference by social class. Table 10 shows that among whites in 2002, compared to his opponents, Nagin did best among those with incomes in the middle and upper range. Equally his loss of white votes was also greater in this same class segment. Among black voters, he ran best in 2002 in neighborhoods where blacks' incomes were over \$60,000, but he did only marginally better in this segment in 2006. His turnaround among blacks was striking in the lower and middle income range, where he had done badly in 2002 but very well in 2006.

Table 10. Composition of precincts for the average voter for Nagin vs. other mayoral candidates in 2002 and 2006

Precinct characteristics:	March 2002		Primary 2006		Runoff 2006	
	Nagin	Pennington	Nagin	Landrieu	Nagin	Landrieu
Non-Hispanic white	39.8%	18.6%	17.5%	41.2%	22.8%	52.0%
Non-Hispanic black	53.9%	76.4%	77.4%	52.5%	71.8%	40.7%
Renter households	41.9%	49.9%	47.4%	44.4%	46.5%	41.9%
Income below poverty	20.5%	29.2%	27.5%	21.3%	26.2%	18.4%
Income over \$60,000	26.8%	17.1%	17.7%	26.2%	19.8%	30.9%
Race and income (households)						
NH white under \$20,000	9.0%	5.6%	5.5%	10.0%	6.2%	11.4%
NH white \$20,000-\$60,000	17.3%	9.2%	9.2%	18.2%	11.1%	21.7%
NH white over \$60,000	17.1%	6.9%	6.3%	17.0%	9.0%	22.9%
Black under \$20,000	20.5%	33.9%	32.1%	20.2%	29.8%	15.2%
Black \$20,000-\$60,000	22.0%	30.3%	31.6%	20.8%	29.1%	15.8%
Black over \$60,000	8.1%	9.2%	10.4%	7.6%	9.6%	6.1%
All other households	6.0%	4.9%	4.9%	6.1%	5.2%	6.9%

These trends can also be documented in terms of support for Mayor Nagin in specific neighborhoods around the city. Table 11 lists the share of votes in each neighborhood received by Nagin in 2002 and in the 2006 runoff election. In this table the planning districts are listed in declining order of Nagin support, as are neighborhoods within planning districts. The table also provides information on the racial composition and party affiliation of registered voters in 2006.

The planning districts with the highest levels of support for Mayor Nagin are the Lower Ninth Ward (83% in 2006 compared to only 40% in 2002) and New Orleans East (71%, up from 55%). The individual neighborhoods with the highest shares of Nagin votes are Project neighborhoods: above 90% in Calliope Project, Desire Project, and Fischer Project, all areas where he previously received at most a third of votes.

Table 11. Nagin vote share, 2002 and 2006, with composition of registered voters in 2006

		Nagin vote share		Registered voters	
		2002	2006	% Black	% Democrat
Lower Ninth Ward	Lower Ninth Ward	38.8%	83.7%	96.8%	81.7%
	Holy Cross	43.4%	82.1%	87.2%	75.9%
	Total	39.9%	83.3%	94.3%	80.2%
New Orleans East	Plum Orchard	48.1%	78.4%	93.1%	81.0%
	West Lake Forest	48.1%	77.0%	95.4%	80.1%
	Pines Village	49.6%	74.8%	85.5%	77.1%
	Read Boulevard West	52.9%	72.1%	80.5%	79.8%
	Edgelake/Little Woods	55.5%	71.0%	87.0%	79.0%
	Read Boulevard East	61.7%	65.0%	83.0%	79.7%
	Total	54.7%	71.3%	86.9%	79.3%
New Aurora	River Park/Cut Off/Lower Coast	55.3%	69.3%	70.0%	64.9%
	Total	55.3%	69.3%	70.0%	64.9%
Mid-City	Calliope Project	22.3%	90.9%	96.1%	74.3%
	St. Bernard Area/Project	35.8%	82.3%	95.3%	79.5%
	Tulane/Gravier	32.6%	79.7%	84.7%	73.2%
	Gerttown/Zion City	36.6%	78.4%	91.3%	75.0%
	Sixth Ward/Treme/Lafitte	40.4%	75.7%	86.8%	75.4%
	Seventh Ward	46.2%	73.1%	90.0%	79.6%
	Fairgrounds/Broad	62.3%	52.0%	55.8%	70.5%
	Mid-City	58.0%	46.1%	49.5%	62.9%
	Bayou St. John	59.7%	43.0%	57.7%	66.5%
Total	46.0%	65.9%	79.2%	73.6%	
Bywater	Desire Project	34.5%	90.0%	98.7%	82.2%
	Desire Area	36.3%	85.6%	93.6%	79.7%
	Florida Area	35.4%	81.5%	97.1%	80.7%
	Florida Project	30.4%	81.3%	96.8%	75.4%
	St. Roch	40.1%	78.2%	91.6%	79.1%
	St. Claude	36.6%	75.7%	86.7%	76.6%
	Bywater	56.6%	42.2%	49.2%	62.6%
	Marigny	71.2%	24.3%	18.4%	57.3%
Total	42.4%	65.9%	78.4%	74.3%	
Gentilly	Gentilly Woods	53.1%	71.3%	86.4%	79.9%
	Dillard	53.6%	68.7%	90.1%	81.3%
	St. Anthony	61.2%	62.9%	63.8%	71.2%
	Milneburg	61.1%	56.7%	72.2%	76.2%
	Gentilly Terrace	63.3%	55.3%	67.5%	75.1%
	Fillmore	80.2%	28.6%	22.8%	54.8%
	Total	61.0%	57.9%	71.6%	74.9%

		Nagin vote share		Registered voters		
		2002	2006	% Black	% Democrat	
Algiers	Fischer Project	30.7%	94.6%	95.9%	75.1%	
	McDonogh	45.7%	82.8%	85.8%	74.9%	
	Algiers Naval Station	51.1%	73.8%	72.8%	68.8%	
	Behrman	55.1%	71.7%	76.5%	72.1%	
	Algiers Whitney	58.0%	63.5%	66.6%	66.5%	
	Tall Timbers/Brechtel	70.5%	52.7%	54.7%	55.8%	
	Aurora/Walnut					
	Bend/Huntlee Village	77.4%	45.8%	33.6%	52.2%	
	Algiers Point	83.0%	28.5%	12.0%	44.1%	
	Total	67.0%	55.9%	54.8%	60.5%	
CC-Garden District	Central City/Magnolia	36.2%	70.8%	79.5%	72.8%	
	St. Thomas Project	39.0%	68.3%	74.4%	69.6%	
	Milan	48.0%	59.9%	69.1%	70.9%	
	Irish Channel	54.9%	51.2%	51.7%	63.6%	
	East Riverside	53.3%	50.3%	53.2%	65.4%	
	St. Thomas Area	64.0%	32.5%	25.5%	47.7%	
	Touro	81.3%	26.9%	13.7%	46.2%	
	Garden District	85.3%	21.6%	2.3%	37.7%	
	Total	51.6%	50.8%	55.4%	63.1%	
Village de L'Est	Village De L'Est	59.2%	42.9%	57.8%	56.6%	
	Total	59.2%	42.9%	57.8%	56.6%	
Uptown-Carrollton	Hollygrove	40.1%	84.5%	95.8%	82.4%	
	Freret	41.1%	67.6%	79.0%	71.9%	
	Leonidas/West Carrollton	51.3%	62.6%	69.7%	69.4%	
	Dixon	51.4%	58.6%	73.6%	71.2%	
	Broadmoor	53.5%	57.1%	65.0%	69.9%	
	Black Pearl	56.3%	47.6%	44.1%	58.3%	
	Uptown	70.6%	36.3%	31.5%	52.4%	
	East Carrollton	71.3%	35.5%	25.9%	53.4%	
	West Riverside	73.2%	33.6%	25.2%	55.2%	
	Marlyville/Fontainbleau	76.1%	26.9%	21.5%	49.6%	
	Audubon/University	82.9%	20.6%	3.3%	38.5%	
		Total	65.2%	40.5%	39.9%	56.9%
	Viavant/Venetian Isles	Viavant/Venetian Isles	81.4%	26.0%	0.0%	47.5%
Total		81.4%	26.0%	0.0%	47.5%	
French Qtr CBD	Vieux Carre	69.8%	25.9%	27.3%	52.2%	
	Central Business District	73.5%	22.6%	27.2%	48.7%	
	Total	70.5%	25.2%	27.3%	51.0%	
Lakeview	City Park	83.2%	24.2%	7.1%	48.2%	
	Lakeview	87.7%	22.0%	1.2%	36.4%	
	Lakewood/West End	86.8%	21.9%	1.6%	37.7%	
	Navarre	87.2%	20.5%	2.3%	41.9%	
	Lakeshore/Lake Vista	85.5%	19.3%	1.2%	39.5%	
	Total	86.7%	21.5%	2.1%	39.2%	
City of New Orleans	Total	58.7%	52.3%	63.1%	67.1%	

The table also shows that the vote split along racial and party lines. For example, the following neighborhoods have less than half of registered voters listed as Democrats in this heavily Democratic city, listed in the order that they are found in the table:

Algiers Point (12% black registered voters, 83% for Nagin in 2002 and 29% in 2006)
St. Thomas (26% black, 64% for Nagin in 2002 and 34% in 2006)
Touro (14% black, 81% for Nagin in 2002 and 27% in 2006)
Garden District (2% black, 85% for Nagin in 2002 and 22% in 2006)
Marlyville/Fontainbleau (22% black, 76% for Nagin in 2002 and 27% in 2006)
Audobon/University (3% black, 83% for Nagin in 2002 and 21% in 2006)
Viavant/Venetian Isles (0% black, 81% for Nagin in 2002 and 26% in 2006)
Central Business District (27% black, 74% for Nagin in 2002 and 23% in 2006)

All neighborhoods in Lakeview are predominantly Republican/Independent. The district is 2% black. It voted overwhelmingly for Nagin in 2002 (87%) but against him in 2006 (22%).

Conclusion

In its first post-Katrina election, despite the gravity of public policy issues facing New Orleans, voter turnout has been 14% below that of the previous mayoral race in 2002 and a startling 42% below the votes cast in the 2004 Presidential election.

Given the magnitude of population displacement by the hurricane and subsequent floods, lower turnout had to be expected. It was also to be expected that the disproportionate impact of Katrina on the city's black population, both in terms of the number whose homes were ruined and the large share who now live outside the state, would result in a decisive shift in the racial composition of the electorate. Such a shift did occur, with the estimated white share increasing by about 6 percentage points even after taking into account the much heavier black participation in absentee voting.

The new pattern of turnout did not determine the outcome of the race for mayor, although it has certainly altered the constituency that the next mayor will be politically accountable to. The new political geography of the city certainly will be a factor as policy decisions are made in the coming months and years. Where will schools reopen, where will policing and other public services be brought back on line soonest, where will rebuilding be encouraged by city officials and what neighborhoods will have a lower priority? Areas like the Lower Ninth Ward, New Orleans East, and the less affluent and predominantly black sections of Bywater and Mid-City have experienced sharp declines in their participation in the political process. In contrast, Lakeview nearly matched its 2002 vote total despite dislocation of most of its residents, and areas like Algiers, Uptown-Carrollton, the French Quarter, and Garden District see their political influence on the rise in this respect.

But there is also a countervailing force, an unexpected consolidation of voting patterns along racial lines in which a politically conservative black mayor turned successfully to a black and low income constituency that previously had denied him their support. This outcome potentially

diminishes the political losses that this part of the electorate, and the neighborhoods where they are concentrated, seemed sure to suffer. Much now depends on how well groups play their cards and what role the backroom players (the investors and real estate entrepreneurs who eventually once again supported Mayor Nagin's campaign war chest) have in the process. Support from areas like the Projects, Lower Ninth Ward, and New Orleans East was critical, but their voices will have to be heard from a distance. White Republican neighborhoods backed the losing candidate, but the 20% or more of their votes that went to Nagin were indispensable to his victory. This is a situation where a public official will face conflicting pressures, but may also find considerable room to maneuver and provide leadership for a city that has put key decisions on hold for too long.