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Is Ethnoracial Residential Integration on the Rise?

Evidence from Metropolitan and Micropolitan America Since 1980

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The United States has a well-earned reputation as a nation of immigrants. This tradition is eloquently conveyed by the Emma Lazarus sonnet that appears on a plaque enshrined in the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty: "Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free…" From the colonial era through the mid-twentieth century, the vast majority of people heeding Lady Liberty's call came from Europe, a fact that facilitated their eventual incorporation (or their descendants') into the societal mainstream (Alba & Nee 2003). However, another significant group of newcomers—Africans victimized by the slave trade—was forced to move here, facing more difficult circumstances upon arrival and across subsequent generations than their European-origin counterparts (Lieberson 1980). A variety of fateful consequences followed from these distinct migration streams.

Part of the legacy was demographic: a racial and ethnic landscape painted in two colors. As recently as a half-century ago, whites were still numerically dominant, making up over four-fifths of all U.S. residents. Blacks constituted the only large minority, with a population roughly double that of Hispanics and Asians combined (Hirschman 2005). Because of the symbolic and instrumental barriers posed by the color line, black and white Americans for the most part led separate lives (Myrdal 1962). They held different kinds of jobs, attended different schools, and worshipped at different churches. Of greatest relevance for our purposes, they were concentrated in different regions, communities, and neighborhoods.

Obviously, much has changed during the last 50 years. The civil rights movement, fair housing legislation, and declines in discrimination and prejudice have increased opportunities for blacks, reducing their social and economic distance from whites (Farley & Allen 1987). Another aspect of ethnoracial transformation can be traced to critical shifts in immigration policy. The bracero program, implemented as a temporary fix for agricultural labor shortages during World

War II, lasted into the 1960s and strengthened the tradition of Mexicans heading northward in search of work. With the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965 (also known as the Hart-Celler Act), exclusionary quotas were replaced by a system that gave preference to applicants who possessed desired skills or who had relatives already living in the United States. Once the door was opened to the world beyond Europe, large flows of immigrants began arriving from Asia as well as Latin America and the Caribbean (Daniels 2004; Lee 2004). These immigrants have done more than alter the dichotomous black-white composition of the host country. They are dramatically affecting all of its major institutions.

Education represents an institutional domain where the impact of the new racial-ethnic order is often visible. One need only pay a visit to Queensborough Community College (QCC) in Queens, New York, for a vivid illustration. A two-year open-admissions school in the CUNY system, QCC has a student body that comprises nearly equal shares of whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians and boasts a major immigrant presence: one-third of its students are foreign born, drawn from 129 countries and speaking 99 different languages.[1] Of course, schools such as QCC—not to mention workplaces, religious congregations, civic and political organizations, and the like—are influenced by the community contexts surrounding them. Queens ranks as the most ethnoracially diverse county in the nation[2], and it is part of a metropolitan area (New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island) that has long been a gateway for immigrants and home to a number of sizeable minority groups. However, while these groups (along with whites) share the

[1] The many ethnic heritage-oriented clubs and events on the QCC campus reflect this diversity, as does a busy immigration center that provides legal advice and a range of other services. In addition to the standard curriculum, QCC offers ESL and remedial skills courses to help students build a foundation essential to later academic and career success. More information about the school is available at its website: http://www.qcc.cuny.edu/.

[2] This rank is based on a 2010 standardized entropy index score of 92.5 (with scores ranging from 0 to 100), which means that Queens County has very similar proportions of white (28%), black (18%), Hispanic (28%), and Asian (23%) residents. We provide a fuller introduction to the entropy index later in the chapter.

same metropolis, they are less likely to reside in the same neighborhoods; New York is highly segregated compared to other areas (Iceland et al. 2010; Logan & Stults 2011). Even when members of different groups do live side by side, their neighborhood-level mixing could be temporary. Gentrification, succession, and other forms of neighborhood change have continuously reshaped the racial and ethnic geography of New York (Alba et al. 1995; DeSena & Shortell 2012; Lobo et al. 2002).

The New York case raises the more general issue of just how common intergroup residential proximity has become. Here we tackle this issue in comprehensive fashion. Rather than focus exclusively on a single mega-metropolis, we include all metropolitan areas (large, medium, and small) and their nonmetro cousins, micropolitan areas, in our study. Both the panethnic populations (e.g., Hispanics, Asians) and the detailed groups (e.g., Mexicans, Chinese) inhabiting these areas are examined.[3] The temporal window of interest to us extends from 1980 through 2010, when the interplay of race, nativity, and residence may have produced less uniform outcomes than in the previous black-white era. Our approach is anchored in a broadened conceptualization of *integration*, a term we use to indicate the sharing of residential environments by multiple racial-ethnic groups at different community-oriented geographic scales (i.e., in neighborhoods and places as well as areas). Our analysis addresses the following three questions about key manifestations of integration:

[3] We refer to the Hispanic and Asian populations (and to their black and white counterparts) as *panethnic* because they each span multiple subpopulations that qualify conceptually as ethnic groups. Members of an *ethnic group* recognize a common ancestry, history, and cultural tradition although the strength of identification with this shared background varies across individuals and over time. In the case of a *racial group*, people are less able to choose membership; instead, they tend to be assigned to it by outsiders based on perceived physical attributes (e.g., skin color, hair type, facial features) that are considered inherent (Cornell & Hartmann 1998). The socially constructed nature of race and ethnicity contributes to an overlap in definitions; some groups can be both racial and ethnic in nature. Indeed, many of the panethnic populations—and the detailed groups comprising them—that are covered by our analysis have this dual character. For that reason, we use the terms ‘ethnoracial’ and ‘racial-ethnic’ interchangeably throughout the chapter.

1. Which metropolitan and micropolitan areas have experienced increasing overall (area-wide) ethnoracial diversity during the last three decades?

2. To what extent has residential segregation declined across all types of areas for panethnic populations and their component groups?

3. How prevalent and stable over time are neighborhoods with racially diverse or mixed compositions?

Although we pose these questions in an optimistic, pro-integration direction, the theoretical perspectives framing our research disagree about which answers seem most reasonable. Moreover, the answers could depend upon the history and attractiveness of areas as destinations for immigrants, a possibility considered throughout the chapter.[4]

Living Together, Living Apart

In a fundamental sense, residential integration—expressed either as high diversity or as low segregation—is about physical proximity among the members of different racial-ethnic groups. Despite this unifying thread, however, diversity and segregation are not identical concepts. The former refers to the overall composition of a community (e.g., its percentages of white, black, Hispanic, and Asian inhabitants). The latter reflects the degree to which two or more groups are differentiated across spatial subunits composing some larger unit (in our case, how groups are spread across the census tracts that make up a metro or micro area). Following these definitions, a diverse area may be more or less segregated if members of various races live in isolation or share the same neighborhoods. Diversity and segregation thus remain distinct, a point reinforced by the modest empirical association between the two (Defina & Hannon 2009; Farrell 2005; Iceland 2004).

[4] Our chapter builds on previous Russell Sage-sponsored contributions on related topics that were prompted by the release of a new decade's worth of decennial census data (e.g., Chiswick & Sullivan 1995; Farley & Allen 1987; Farley & Haaga 2005; Frey 1995b; Harrison & Bennett; Lieberson & Waters 1988; Myers & Wolch 1995; White 1987). For a long-range perspective on these topics, see Fischer and Hout (2006).

Though conceptually distinguishable, ethnoracial diversity and segregation are both consequential features of community sociospatial organization. The implications of diversity have been examined not only for educational institutions but for the economy, housing market, health care, human services, and taxes (Bean & Stevens 2003; Borjas 1999; Smith & Edmonston 1997). Research also analyzes the relationship between city or neighborhood diversity and social capital, trust, place attachment, crime, and intergroup relations (Hou & Wu 2009; Lee & Bean 2010; Putnam 2007). Overall, the empirical record concerning these issues is mixed, leading to positive, neutral, and negative assessments of diversity's impact (for overviews, see Lichter 2012, 2013; Lindsay & Singer 2003). In the case of segregation, the evidence is less equivocal. When minority groups (especially African Americans and Hispanics) are concentrated in neighborhoods separate from those occupied by whites, group members tend to suffer from deficits in health, safety, school performance, and employment, among other outcomes (Acevedo-Garcia et al. 2003; Card & Rothstein 2006; Peterson et al. 2009). Simply put, their spatial isolation heightens exposure to problems and reduces access to resources and opportunities.[5]

Theoretical Perspectives

This range of effects justifies our task of documenting the direction and pervasiveness of trends in diversity and segregation over an extended period and for different types of communities. Two theoretical perspectives drawn from the racial segregation and locational attainment literatures can be used to formulate expectations about what kinds of trends we will

[5] Despite general agreement about the disadvantages of segregation, the relevant literature occasionally identifies benefits. In immigrant-heavy enclaves, for example, Hispanics may experience reduced crime (Kubrin & Ishizawa 2012) and lower levels of morbidity and mortality (Eschbach et al. 2004; Klinenberg 2002) than their co-ethnics living outside of such settings. Similarly, residence in segregated Chinatowns can provide social and organizational support and adult supervision, boosting children's academic performance (Zhou 2000).

find. The *spatial assimilation* model holds that as minority groups become more socially and economically integrated, their likelihood of sharing residential environments with whites and each other will increase. With upward mobility and—for immigrants—increasing acculturation, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians are predicted to pursue better-quality housing and communities (Alba & Logan 1991; Massey 1985; Rosenbaum & Friedman 2007; South et al. 2008). Evidence of the kinds of advancement believed to drive spatial assimilation is abundant. Numerous investigations document that, over time and across generations, most ethnoracial groups have registered gains in educational and occupational attainment, earnings, citizenship status, English language proficiency, voting participation, and rates of intermarriage (Alba & Nee 2003; Bean & Stevens; Clark 2003; Myers 2007; Park & Myers 2010; White & Glick 2009; Xie & Goyette 2005).

The assimilation model has been employed primarily to understand spatial integration and group dispersion across neighborhoods, but it is germane to the residential options available to minority groups at higher geographic scales. Assimilation logic implies a future in which all groups are widely and similarly distributed across metropolitan and micropolitan areas and places in addition to neighborhoods. Over time, then, the racial-ethnic diversity of most community units should rise while segregation declines. That logic is qualified in the segmented variant of the assimilation model, which maintains that chances for minority immigrant incorporation vary by attributes such as race (dark skin tone), national origin, or age at arrival (Portes & Zhou 1993; Zhou 1999). All else equal, groups falling on the ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ sides of the color line should exhibit different residential patterns, with those on the wrong side unable to climb the socioeconomic and locational ladders of American society.

The *ethnic stratification* model goes farther, citing significant barriers to spatial assimilation across the board. Audit studies show that minority homeseekers still face pernicious housing market discrimination (Pager & Shepherd 2008; Turner & Ross 2005). Another barrier is density zoning—also known as 'snob' zoning—which can make it prohibitively expensive for minority households of modest means to enter white communities (Rothwell & Massey 2009). Even when they manage to do so, some whites appear sufficiently averse to the presence of other races that they exit in response (Crowder et al. 2011; Frey 1995a). The stratification model also notes that own-group residential preferences, which are strong among newly arrived immigrants drawn to enclave-based resources and support, often persist over time (Charles 2006, 2007; Clark 1992, 2002).

In short, the model casts doubt on the prospects for increasing diversity or decreasing segregation as long as external constraints and self-selective processes operate. It predicts, at the extreme, that ethnoracial groups will live largely apart from each other at the community and neighborhood levels, clustered in different residential environments. We should note that this prediction need not be incompatible with spatial assimilation reasoning. A particular group, for example, may remain over-represented in a handful of traditional metropolitan gateways (consistent with the stratification perspective) but move to a growing number of integrated suburban destinations within those gateways over time (evidence of spatial assimilation).

Previous Research

Neither the assimilation nor stratification models have seen much duty in research on racial-ethnic diversity, perhaps because the varied approaches to diversity obscure their relevance. One approach gauges the spread of a particular racial-ethnic group across locations (e.g., the percentage of all Asians nationally living in each metropolitan area). This research,

which we refer to as *group-centric*, suggests that, despite persistent tendencies toward concentration (Portes & Rumbaut 2006), the dispersion of most groups is underway, with increasing shares of Asians and especially Hispanics residing in rural settings, suburbs, and non-gateway states and metro areas (Durand et al. 2000; Lichter & Johnson 2006, 2009; Massey & Capoferro 2008). Here we take a second, *geocentric* approach that emphasizes the ethnoracial diversification of communities rather than group dispersion. Geocentric studies of large metropolises and cities document changes in racial-ethnic mix due to minority gains and, in some instances, white losses; such changes are now occurring beyond traditional metro 'melting pots' (Berube 2003; Frey 2006, 2011b; Singer 2005; Suro & Singer 2003). Other studies find a rise in black, Hispanic, and Asian proportions—and, by implication, a rise in diversity—in suburban rings and places (Frey 2003, 2011a; Hwang & Murdock 1998; Li 2009; Logan 2001; Wen et al. 2009).

Geocentric researchers often operationalize diversity rather crudely, calculating the proportion of minority residents in a community or employing arbitrary thresholds to establish group presence. We opt instead to highlight the number of racial-ethnic groups that a community population comprises and the sizes of the groups relative to each other (White 1986). Intuitively, a population marked by *evenness*, consisting of many groups of equal size, would be highly diverse. Statistical measures which conform to this refined meaning of diversity are available but rarely used in geocentric investigations (for exceptions, see Allen & Turner 1989; Johnson & Lichter 2010; Lee & Bean 2010). We rely on one such measure (the entropy index) throughout the chapter. However, an evenness-based approach can stress the magnitude of diversity to the neglect of a community's racial-ethnic structure, i.e., the specific groups represented. As a precaution, our analysis incorporates complementary measures to capture both dimensions

(magnitude and structure) over the last three decades. The result is a more thorough and up-to-date portrait of diversity trends than previously provided.

In contrast to diversity, residential segregation has been heavily studied since the mid-twentieth century (Duncan & Duncan 1957; Iceland et al. 2002; Massey & Denton 1993; Taeuber & Taeuber 1965). Investigators now rely on well-established statistical tools such as the index of dissimilarity, the *P** family of exposure measures, and the information theory index to capture distinct aspects of segregation (Massey & Denton 1988; Reardon & Firebaugh 2002). Despite variation in which measures are used and how neighborhoods and groups are defined, research supports a few basic conclusions about post-1980 segregation patterns (Farley & Frey 1994; Iceland 2009; Logan & Stults 2011; Logan et al. 2004; Reardon et al. 2009). Perhaps the clearest conclusion is that blacks continue to be the most segregated minority group and Asians the least; Hispanics occupy an intermediate position. Over time, however, some narrowing of differences among the groups has occurred.

Black segregation declines are apparent in the majority of metropolitan areas, although scholars debate their magnitude (Glaeser & Vigdor 2012; Logan 2013). Average levels of Hispanic and Asian segregation, on the other hand, have held stable or, on the isolation dimension, have risen. The Hispanic and Asian trends appear due to the rapid growth of both groups (through natural increase as well as immigration) coupled with the gradual pace of household or individual assimilation; together, these processes foster the development and expansion of ethnic enclaves. Decreases in African American segregation are partly a function of redistribution dynamics—e.g., black migration to metropolitan areas in less segregated regions of the country (Iceland et al. 2013)—but black segregation tends to be lower in communities with a particular constellation of structural or ecological characteristics. Examples of such

characteristics include small total and black populations, a high minority-to-white income ratio, recent housing construction activity, location in the West or South, and functional specialization as a government or military center (Farley & Frey 1994; Lee et al. 2008; Logan et al. 2004).

Our purpose is to seek to fill some significant gaps in the segregation literature. For example, we move beyond the metropolitan emphasis in that literature, assessing trends in micropolitan areas. Such areas, which consist of one or more nonmetro counties anchored by an urban core, have received scant attention but are assumed to be less segregated than their metropolitan counterparts. This assumption deserves closer scrutiny in light of block-level evidence reported by Lichter and associates (2007) that the levels of black and Hispanic segregation in nonmetro places are on a par with those in metro settings (for contrary Hispanic results, see Wahl et al. 2007). In addition to an expanded geographic scope, we cover a greater number of groups than normal. First, unlike many previous studies, our research explicitly considers the segregation of whites rather than treating them as an unexamined referent. This approach is pertinent to the stratification model, which predicts a lag in white integration compared to other panethnic populations. Second, we analyze detailed ethnoracial groups as well as the broad panethnicities (see Crowder 1999; Galster et al. 1999; Kim & White 2010). That is, we describe segregation patterns for Mexicans, Chinese, and other specific Hispanic and Asian groups across multiple decades to determine how many of them are becoming more integrated.

Increasing integration should produce more neighborhoods with diverse compositions. Several investigators have confirmed this, showing a rise in multiethnic census tracts and a shrinking number of all-white and all-black tracts as a concomitant of Hispanic and Asian growth (Denton & Massey 1991; Farrell & Lee 2011; Holloway et al. 2011; Logan & Zhang 2010, 2011). We focus on the long-term fate of multiethnic or mixed neighborhoods, following

them from 1980 through 2010. Comparative case studies identify the conditions under which mixed neighborhoods are able to preserve their multigroup structures over time (Nyden et al. 1997; Maly 2005), and some tract-based investigations reveal substantial persistence from one census year to the next (Ellen 2000, 2007; Fasenfest et al. 2006). In general, these findings adhere to spatial assimilation logic. Yet the ethnic stratification perspective—not to mention the succession model of racial-ethnic change—suggests that diversity should be considered a temporary phenomenon that occurs as a neighborhood transitions between two homogeneous states. The potentially fragile nature of diversity within neighborhoods is implied by the sensitivity of whites to mixed residential settings, manifested in their exits from such settings, their disinclination to move into them in the first place, and subsequent white population losses (Charles 2006; Crowder et al. 2011, 2012; Friedman 2008).

Perhaps the most compelling recent work on neighborhood diversity has been conducted by Logan and Zhang (2010, 2011), who document a dramatic increase and impressive degree of stability in what they term 'global' neighborhoods, which contain non-trivial proportions of white, black, Hispanic, and Asian residents. It should be noted, however, that they restrict their search for such neighborhoods to a handful of very ethnoracially diverse metropolitan areas. We take the next step, tracing the trajectories of mixed neighborhoods drawn from metropolitan and micropolitan areas throughout the U.S. This more inclusive approach allows us to assess the generalizability of Logan and Zhang's results across a variety of settings. We also operationalize the concept of mixed neighborhood in a couple of different ways. Census tracts are classified separately on the basis of racial-ethnic structure and diversity magnitude, with particular attention paid to those tracts in which no group achieves majority status (Farrell & Lee 2011).

Type of Immigrant Context

No-majority neighborhoods may appear more often in communities boasting a large foreign-born population, especially if the members of that population hail from Latin America or Asia. Community racial diversity and segregation could be shaped by the number and origins of immigrant residents as well (Alba et al. 1995; White & Glick 1999). In recognition of these possibilities—and to gain additional comparative leverage—our analysis considers the kind of context that an area provides for immigrants. We benefit from the efforts of fellow scholars to develop typologies of 'gateway' and 'new destination' communities that take into account historical settlement patterns of all immigrants or of the immigrant segments of selected ethnoracial groups (Hall 2013; Lichter et al. 2010; Singer 2005; Suro & Singer 2003). Some major metropolises such as New York and Chicago constitute what Singer (2005) refers to as continuous gateways. They have long histories of receiving and incorporating newcomers. Other metro areas formerly served that function or are only recently beginning to do so. Of course, the same area can be an established gateway and a new destination, depending upon the group in question (Hall 2013).

Although elaborate typologies offer a valuable degree of precision, we opt to distinguish among three fundamental types of immigrant contexts. *Gateway* areas, marked by a high proportion of foreign born, presumably have local economies, organizational infrastructures, support networks, and traditions that are attractive to immigrants. At the other extreme, we identify *native* contexts with a minimal immigrant presence. The remaining areas qualify as *outposts*, at least in a relative sense: non-trivial shares of foreign-born people live in these settings, but they lack the critical mass of co-ethnics and resources available in gateways. Sticking to fewer, simply-defined types of contexts allows us to classify micropolitan as well as

metropolitan areas as gateway, outpost, or native-dominant communities. The scheme also facilitates the formulation of hypotheses about ethnoracial diversity levels and trends. According to the spatial assimilation model, both community and neighborhood diversity should be highest in gateways but increasing in all types of contexts. From an ethnic stratification perspective, however, fewer mixed neighborhoods should exist, and those in gateway areas are especially likely to become more homogeneous over time.

The implications of the two theoretical perspectives for context-specific differences in residential segregation (as distinct from diversity) are less straightforward. In line with assimilation reasoning, gateways might facilitate the local dispersion of Hispanics and Asians, allowing them to take advantage of enclave resources while living in suburbs and neighborhoods not dominated by co-ethnics (Hardwick & Meachim 2008; Price et al. 2005; Zelinsky & Lee 1998). Whites in gateway areas may also be more willing to share neighborhoods with minority group members, given the blurred ethnoracial boundaries and elevated intergroup exposure common to such areas. Each of these processes could contribute to a decline in segregation. But large concentrations of immigrants in gateway settings could just as easily fuel resistance to integration by native-born whites, which in turn might increase the appeal of enclave residence to Hispanics and Asians. This scenario, consistent with the principles of the stratification perspective, suggests stable or increasing segregation over time.

Following the same principles, it is possible that the arrival of immigrant groups in native contexts threatens incumbent residents. Any negative or hostile reactions from the incumbents may amplify immigrants' tendency to consolidate ethnic resources and band together residentially when they are few in number. Once again, though, a plausible alternative hypothesis can be posited: that the movement of Hispanic and Asian households to outpost and native areas

is the spatial expression of upward socioeconomic mobility and acculturation. Households undertaking this kind of move should thus be the best able to attain favorable residential outcomes, including residential integration with other groups. Suffice it to say that the range of alternative hypotheses available makes the comparison of segregation patterns across types of immigrant contexts a worthwhile objective, both in metropolitan and micropolitan areas. A comparative approach is further recommended by the unsettled empirical record to date. Some investigations document higher segregation levels among Hispanics and Asians in new destinations (akin to our outpost and native contexts) than in gateways (Hall 2013; Lichter et al. 2010). In other analyses, immigrants tend to be more segregated in the gateway areas (Alba et al. 2010; Fischer & Tienda 2006; Park & Iceland 2011).

Groups and Communities

Our assessment of trends in local racial-ethnic integration requires decisions about the groups and communities to be used in the analysis. With respect to groups, we rely on a handful of general categories that are *panethnic* in nature and widely recognized by researchers and the public. The race by Hispanic origin crosstabulation available in Summary File 1 of the 2010 decennial census yields counts of Hispanics of any race and of non-Hispanic whites, blacks, Asians, Pacific Islanders, Native Americans (American Indians and Alaska Natives), multi-race individuals, and those reporting some other race. Small numbers in certain categories and modifications of the census classification scheme over time necessitate some recoding. Specifically, we combine Asians and Pacific Islanders into a single category (hereafter labeled Asians), and we create a combined ‘other’ category made up of Native Americans and multi-race and other-race individuals. These adjustments leave us with five panethnic populations—

Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites, blacks, Asians, and 'others'—that are exhaustive, mutually exclusive, and comparable across censuses from 1980 through 2010.

Though practical, such broadly defined categories can mask variation in the residential experiences of people who belong to the same panethnic population but who differ in their specific ethnoracial identity. Previous investigations, for example, have found nontrivial levels of segregation among specific Asian groups and among specific Hispanic groups (Kim & White 2010; Lobo et al. 2007; Zhou & Logan 1991). In recognition of this heterogeneity, our analysis periodically distinguishes among 13 *detailed* Hispanic and Asian groups. These groups merit attention because they are the largest in their respective panethnic categories (accounting for 85.6% of all Hispanics and 82.1% of all Asians in 2010) and include many recent immigrants, making them of interest from a public policy standpoint. The seven Hispanic groups are Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Dominicans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Colombians. We also examine six Asian groups: Chinese, Filipinos, Asian Indians, Vietnamese, Koreans, and Japanese. Data on each Asian group and on three of the detailed Hispanic groups are available from 1980 forward. (Dominicans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Colombians were not tabulated separately until 1990.)

Both panethnic and detailed racial-ethnic groups must be situated in communities to assess trends in their proximity to one other. Four types of census-recognized community units serve as cases during our analysis. Toward the higher end of the geographic scale, we focus on metropolitan and micropolitan areas. These areas qualify as communities because most of them have achieved a degree of self-sufficiency and approximate functional domains (e.g., housing and labor markets) where people live and work. *Metropolitan areas* contain at least one urbanized population of 50,000 or more, the central county (or counties) in which that population

is located, and any surrounding counties that share strong commuting ties with the central county. *Micropolitan areas* are similar but smaller, comprising at least one urban cluster of 10,000 to 50,000 residents, the host core county, and any contiguous counties linked to the core via commuting (Frey et al. 2006). Although micro areas are core based like metro areas, they are officially considered nonmetropolitan by the Census Bureau.

We impose December 2009 Office of Management and Budget spatial definitions throughout the 1980-2010 period to obtain a constant number of cases with constant boundaries: 366 metropolitan areas and 576 micropolitan areas[6] in each year, together capturing over nine-tenths of the total U.S. population. (The remainder of the population inhabits stand-alone nonmetro, nonmicro counties which are excluded from our study.) Despite the emphasis on areas, we occasionally refer to a third type of community: the *places* that exist within areas. The vast majority of all places are incorporated municipalities (e.g., cities, suburbs, towns, villages), and many coincide with school districts and service delivery zones. As government jurisdictions, they have fiscal and policy responsibility for any issues associated with shifts in racial-ethnic diversity or segregation that occur within their territory.

The last kind of community unit featured here is the *census tract*. Conceptually, tracts are among the census units (along with blocks and block groups) that correspond in a rough way to the popular notion of neighborhood. The U.S. Census Bureau (1997) defines a tract as a relatively compact, recognizable, and homogeneous territorial unit with stable boundaries and an optimum population of about 4,000, but deviations from the ideal exist on each of these criteria (Lee et al. 2008). In particular, boundary changes are common, leading us to impose 2010

[6] The 1980 sample consists of 575 rather than 576 areas because Cibola County—the sole county comprising the Grants, New Mexico micropolitan area—did not exist until 1981.

boundaries throughout the three-decade span.[7] We employ tracts to address two of our guiding questions about trends in residential integration. They serve as building blocks across which dissimilarity and information theory indexes are calculated in order to chart the degree to which metropolitan and micropolitan areas have become less segregated. We also utilize the magnitude and structure of tract diversity to identify ethnoracially mixed neighborhoods in 1980 and 1990 and to monitor their fate during subsequent decades.

Compositional patterns in tracts and places are expected to be contingent on the type of *immigrant context* provided by the surrounding area. As noted earlier, we have developed a simplified alternative to the increasingly complex typologies available. The first step in constructing our own typology involves classifying each metropolitan area as a gateway, outpost, or native context based on its foreign-born population at the end of each decade. The *gateway* designation is reserved for a metropolis with a percentage of foreign-born residents that is at least 1.75 times greater than the mean calculated across all metro areas in a given census year. At the other extreme, the percentage foreign born in a *native* metropolis is one-fourth or less the mean for all areas. *Outpost* metro areas constitute an intermediate type of context, attracting some immigrants but lacking the critical mass present in gateways.[8]

Of the 366 metropolitan areas in our sample, 79% are classified the same way—as a gateway, outpost, or native context—at the end of all three decades. The remaining 21% have a consistent designation for two of the three decades. In these instances, we assign an area to its

[7] We achieve constant tract boundaries with the aid of bridging tools obtained from the US2010 Project's Longitudinal Tract Data Base. For more details about this resource, see www.sr.brown.edu/us2010/Researcher/Bridging.htm.

[8] Following these guidelines, the 1980 foreign-born share needed to qualify as a gateway metro area is 6.83% or greater, the share for a native areas is .98% or less, and the share for an outpost falls between those two cutpoints, based on a 3.9% foreign-born mean calculated across all 366 metro areas. By 2010 the cutpoint for a gateway area rises to 13.65% or greater and the cutpoint for a native area to 1.95% or less.

majority type for the entire 1980-2010 period. Identical procedures are applied to micropolitan areas, but the end-of-decade comparison of an area's foreign-born percentage is to the mean calculated across all micro areas. (The mean micro foreign-born share is only about one-half the size of the metro mean at each time point.) Like their metropolitan counterparts, virtually all of the micro areas (573 out of 576) qualify as consensus or majority types over the three decades of interest. The overall classification of the three micro areas that fall in a different category each year (e.g., 1990 native, 2000 outpost, 2010 gateway) is based on their most recent (2010) type.

Table 1. Mean Population Characteristics of Metropolitan Areas in 1980 and 2010, Total and by Immigrant Context

	1980 Mean	2010 Mean	1980-2010 Difference
All Areas (N = 366)			
Population	499,907	705,786	205,879
% Foreign Born	3.9	7.8	4.0
% White	83.3	71.5	-11.8
% Black	9.4	10.5	1.1
% Hispanic	5.4	12.4	7.0
% Asian	0.9	2.8	1.9
Gateway Areas (N = 53)			
Population	1,422,882	2,166,926	744,044
% Foreign Born	10.8	21.6	10.8
% White	69.3	45.4	-23.9
% Black	6.3	6.4	0.1
% Hispanic	19.9	37.9	18.0
% Asian	3.1	7.2	4.1
Outpost Areas (N = 110)			
Population	479,332	690,436	211,104
% Foreign Born	4.1	8.7	4.6
% White	84.6	71.3	-13.3
% Black	8.3	9.3	0.9
% Hispanic	5.2	13.5	8.3
% Asian	0.8	3.0	2.2
Native Areas (N = 203)			
Population	270,081	332,624	62,543
% Foreign Born	1.9	3.7	1.8
% White	86.2	78.4	-7.8
% Black	10.8	12.2	1.5
% Hispanic	1.7	5.1	3.4
% Asian	0.4	1.5	1.1

The potential utility of the immigrant context typology can be seen in Table 1. Although just 53 metropolises are defined as gateways, their average proportions of foreign-born, Hispanic, and Asian residents dwarf the proportions in outpost and native contexts. Moreover, these three groups exhibit high degrees of gateway concentration: among metropolitan dwellers nationally, three-fourths of all foreign-born persons, Hispanics, and Asians now live in gateway settings. What distinguishes the 110 outpost and especially the 203 native areas are their robust shares of whites and blacks. Similar differences by type of context occur for micropolitan areas (not shown), but the average micro foreign-born percentages lag well behind the metro percentages. As in the metro case, the distribution of micro areas across contexts is skewed toward the outpost (N = 162) and native (N = 338) types, with the remaining 76 areas meeting the gateway criterion.

A Rainbow Society

Local trends in diversity and segregation are embedded within a larger national landscape. One cannot help but be impressed by the extent to which the racial-ethnic composition of that landscape has been transformed. In 1900, only one in eight U.S. residents claimed non-European origins. Today nearly four in ten do, and by 2043 people of color are projected to exceed non-Hispanic whites in number (Passel and Cohn 2008; U.S. Census Bureau 2012a). Some of the key forces fueling minority gains include higher fertility rates, youthful age structures, intermarriage (and the ensuing multiracial offspring), switches in racial-ethnic identity, and, of course, large-scale immigration (Lee & Bean 2010; Lichter 2013). Our preliminary empirical objective here is to briefly describe the cumulative demographic impact of these forces for American society as a whole. The 2010 decennial census allows us to update the story about compositional change, focusing on the three most recent decades.

At a panethnic level, the story's central theme concerns the rise of non-black minorities since 1980. As Figure 1 indicates, blacks' share of the population 'pie' has remained nearly



Figure 1. U.S. Racial-Ethnic Composition, 1980 and 2010

stable but the Hispanic, Asian, and 'other' slices have tripled in size. Hispanics now constitute the largest minority group, surpassing African Americans and comprising one of every six members of the population. In contrast, whites are the only racial-ethnic category to lose ground in relative terms. Their share of the total has declined from four-fifths to less than two-thirds over the last 30 years. Given the nation's size, the compositional shifts underway are rather dramatic by demographic standards.

To better understand these shifts, we unpack the broad Hispanic and Asian panethnicities into their detailed-group components, for which full data are available since 1990.[9] Of particular interest is whether certain groups have contributed more than others to increasing Hispanic and

[9] Although 1980 data can be obtained for all of the detailed Asian groups, four of the Hispanic groups do not appear in census tabulations until 1990 (see Table 1). To maintain temporal comparability, we focus on the 1990-2010 window at various points in the analysis.

Asian dominance. The changes conveyed in Figure 2 are subtle but significant nonetheless. Mexicans modestly increase their substantial majority in the Hispanic population between 1990 and 2010, yet two other groups with lengthy histories of U.S. mainland settlement—Cubans and Puerto Ricans—have shrunken in proportional terms. At the same time, three smaller, more recently arrived groups from Central America and the Caribbean are expanding. Together, Guatemalans, Salvadorans, and Dominicans constitute a little over 8% of all Hispanics, up from 6% 20 years earlier.



Figure 2. Representation of Detailed Groups in Hispanic and Asian Populations, 1990 and 2010

Among Asians, the proportions of Chinese, Filipinos, Koreans, and Japanese all decline, from a collective 68% to 55%. Japanese residents experience by far the greatest drop; they now account for only one of every 20 Asian households nationally. A quite different scenario is apparent for Asian Indians, who have nearly doubled their slice of the pie—from roughly one-tenth to two-tenths—during recent decades. Vietnamese and 'other Asian' categories also exhibit increases, although not to the same extent as Indians. Overall, the geographic roots of the Asian-origin panethnic population are gradually moving southward.

In theory, the representation of panethnic as well as detailed groups could change in response to various combinations of absolute population gains and losses. However, the evolution of the United States toward a rainbow society is due to gains across the board, with some racial-ethnic categories simply growing faster than others. For example, whites' decreasing share of the total population and blacks' stable share are a function of their slow-to-moderate 1980-2010 growth rates when compared to the tripling or quadrupling in size of the Hispanic, Asian, and 'other' panethnic groups (Table 2). Similarly, those detailed Hispanic and Asian groups that have enlarged their slices of the pie (e.g., Dominicans, Salvadorans, Asian Indians, Vietnamese) have done so by outgrowing their regional counterparts, who also register population gains but at a slower pace. The Japanese are the only exception to the growth rule: since 1990 they have recorded losses in both absolute and proportional terms.[10]

[10] We should emphasize, however, that the counts in Table 2 refer to monoracial Asians choosing a single identity. If multi-race and Hispanic Asians who identify as Japanese are included, then the Japanese population actually registers absolute gains throughout the period (see Logan & Zhang 2013).

Table 2. Population Size and Change of Panethnic and Detailed Groups, 1980-2010							
	1980	1990	2000	2010	% change 2000-2010	% change 1990-2010	% change 1980-2010
Total	226,545,805	248,709,873	281,421,906	308,745,538	9.7	24.1	36.3
White	180,256,366	188,128,296	194,552,774	196,817,552	1.2	4.6	9.2
Black	26,104,173	29,216,293	33,947,837	37,685,848	11.0	29.0	44.4
Hispanic	14,608,673	22,354,059	35,305,818	50,477,594	43.0	125.8	245.5
Mexican	8,740,439	13,393,208	20,640,711	31,798,258	54.1	137.4	263.8
Puerto Rican	2,013,945	2,651,815	3,406,178	4,623,716	35.7	74.4	129.6
Cuban	803,226	1,053,197	1,241,685	1,785,547	43.8	69.5	122.3
Dominican	na	520,151	764,945	1,414,703	84.9	172.0	na
Salvadoran	na	565,081	655,165	1,648,968	151.7	191.8	na
Guatemalan	na	268,779	372,487	1,044,209	180.3	288.5	na
Colombian	na	378,726	470,684	908,734	93.1	139.9	na
Asian	3,334,429	6,968,359	10,476,678	14,946,700	42.7	114.5	348.3
Japanese	700,974	847,562	796,700	763,325	-4.2	-9.9	8.9
Chinese	806,040	1,645,472	2,314,537	3,137,061	35.5	90.6	289.2
Filipino	774,652	1,406,770	1,850,314	2,555,923	38.1	81.7	229.9
Korean	354,593	798,849	1,076,872	1,423,784	32.2	78.2	301.5
Asian Indian	361,531	815,447	1,678,765	2,843,391	69.4	248.7	686.5
Vietnamese	261,729	614,547	1,122,528	1,548,449	37.9	152.0	491.6
Other	2,242,164	2,042,866	7,138,799	8,817,844	23.5	331.6	293.3

Diversity: Master Trend with Variations

In light of the national transformation underway, the diversity trajectory for communities might seem inevitable. But there are good reasons to reserve judgment. The mixed empirical literature, which shows group-specific patterns of spatial concentration amid dispersion, gives us pause about rushing to local-level conclusions. So does the fact that few studies conceptualize or measure diversity directly or examine its trend line over multiple decades through 2010. Finally, our guiding theoretical perspectives lead to different predictions, one (spatial assimilation) pointing toward diversity increases across communities and the other (ethnic stratification) toward stable or even declining diversity. Thus, a central question is worth asking: in which metropolitan and micropolitan areas are racial-ethnic groups more likely to live together than they were 30 years ago?

We address this question by examining the two dimensions of diversity noted previously. The *magnitude* of diversity is measured with the *entropy index*, symbolized by *E* (for more detail, see Reardon and Firebaugh 2002; Theil 1972; White 1986). The index reflects how evenly members of a population are spread across categories on some variable of interest; in our case, the categories correspond to the five panethnic groups. *E* achieves its maximum value (the natural log of the number of groups) only when all groups are of equal size. Because *E* has no fixed upper limit, a community consisting of more equal-sized groups will produce a higher *E* score than one with fewer equal-sized groups. To standardize the entropy index, we divide it by its maximum (1.609 for five groups) then multiply by 100. Fine-tuned in this way, an *E* value of 100 indicates complete heterogeneity, with each of the five panethnic groups representing one-fifth of the community population. At the opposite extreme, an *E* of 0 denotes complete homogeneity, with all residents belonging to the same group.

The second diversity dimension, *racial-ethnic structure*, refers to the specific groups present. Taking structure into account becomes important when one realizes that a community with equal numbers (thirds) of white, Asian, and Hispanic inhabitants receives the same *E* score as another community where Hispanics, blacks, and 'others' each make up a third of the population. We therefore supplement the entropy index with pie charts, bar graphs, and a 'majority rule' typology (introduced shortly) that summarize the group proportions underlying the magnitude of diversity. Throughout the aggregate parts of the analysis, both group percentages and *E* values are weighted by a community's population size relative to the summed population of all communities with which it is classified (e.g., all micropolitan areas, all gateway metropolitan areas). This weighting procedure generates means depicting the diversity

magnitude and panethnic group proportions experienced by the average resident of a particular class of communities.

The entropy index is put to work in Figure 3, which makes the master trend in one form of residential integration easy to see: just as the United States as a whole has become more diverse, so have its metropolitan and micropolitan areas. The weighted mean metro *E* scores closely shadow the scores for the national population, climbing by over 20 points between 1980



Figure 3. Weighted Mean Diversity of Metropolitan and Micropolitan Areas, 1980-2010

(*E* = 40) and 2010 (*E* = 62). Micropolitan diversity increases steadily as well, although to levels only one-half to three-fifths those for metro areas. Indeed, the magnitude of diversity observed for the average micropolitan dweller in 2010 is less than that to which his or her metropolitan counterpart was exposed three decades prior. Patterns vary a bit by community population size

and region: while diversity gains are widespread, larger, western, and southern metro and micro areas register higher diversity magnitudes at each time point (not shown).

Perhaps the most impressive aspect of the diversification trend is its prevalence: 98% of all metro areas and 97% of all micro areas exhibit upward movement during the 30-year span, their increases in *E* ranging from negligible to extreme. The pervasiveness of this upward shift can be readily seen in Figure 4, which displays scatterplots of 1980 diversity by 2010 diversity separately for individual metro and micro areas. In both plots nearly all of the cases fall above the diagonal line, reflective of diversity's ascent. As anticipated, the concentrations of micro areas in the lower left corner and close to the diagonal highlight their modest levels of and increases in *E* relative to those for metros. The biggest diversity jumps, however, are apparent for the handful of micropolitan areas hugging the Y axis midway up it: they display 2010 *E* values in the 50-60 range, a sharp increase over the single digit *E*s of 1980. Such increases in smaller communities may be driven by the opening of a meat processing operation, a manufacturing plant, or a casino, each of which draws members from a variety of ethnoracial groups in search of employment. No metropolis experiences so substantial a rise during the same period.

Despite the almost universal diversification occurring among areas, a counter-trend is evident for some of the census-defined places (i.e., cities, suburban municipalities, towns) located within them. Lee and Hughes (2013b) have divided places with populations of 1,000 or more from 1980 through 2010 into *peak cohorts* based on the census year of their maximum or peak diversity (highest *E* value). Both the 1980 and 1990 peak cohorts reach mean *E* values of approximately 50 in 1980, then the *E*s for the 1980 cohort decline to 37 by 2010 while those for the 1990 cohort rise to 60 in 1990 before returning to the near-50 level 20 years later. Simply put, the places in these cohorts have become more homogeneous than heterogeneous over an



Figure 4. 1980 and 2010 Diversity of Metropolitan and Micropolitan Areas by Immigrant Context

extended period. They do so when an ethnoracial group already in the majority becomes more dominant, when one majority group succeeds another, or when a complex compositional structure lacking any majority group erodes in the face of a surge by a particular segment of the population, often Hispanics. The key fact about the 1980 and 1990 peak cohorts, though, is how

small they are, together containing less than 6% of all places. By contrast, the 2010 cohort alone captures roughly nine out of ten places. We thus conclude that a counter-trend to diversification exists but, relatively speaking, amounts to a drop in the bucket at present.

How does racial-ethnic diversity differ across our three types of immigrant contexts? The results in Figure 5 best correspond to the expectations of spatial assimilation theory. According to the 1980 mean entropy scores (in the boxes at the left edge of the horizontal bars), the magnitude of diversity diminishes as one moves from gateway through outpost to native metro and micro contexts. This order holds in 2010: outpost and native areas register major percentage changes in *E* but they still lag far behind the gateway settings. The persistent diversity advantage enjoyed by gateways manifests itself in both metropolitan areas (top half of the figure) and micropolitan areas (bottom half). Gateway advantages in diversity magnitude and change are also visible in disaggregated form, via the shading of areas by type of immigrant context in the Figure 4 metro and micro scatterplots.

Gateway communities have especially rich racial-ethnic structures (reflected in the segments of Figure 5's horizontal bars). Compared to outpost and native contexts, the white share of the population in immigrant gateways is lower and has shrunken more substantially, to the point that whites on average comprise less than half of all residents in gateway metropolitan areas. The relative decline of whites can be traced to a major rise in the number of Hispanics, not only in gateways but in outposts as well. As of 2010, Hispanics constitute about three-tenths of both metro gateway and micro gateway populations. Mean Asian representation has also increased in marked fashion in metro gateways and outposts. The percentage of black inhabitants appears fairly stable between 1980 and 2010 across all types of metro and micro contexts. Not



Figure 5. Weighted Mean Racial-Ethnic Composition of Metropolitan and Micropolitan Areas by Immigrant Context, 1980 and 2010

surprisingly, blacks remain the largest minority in native metropolitan and micropolitan areas, which are less likely to host immigrant-rich groups.

The kind of context offered by an area should shape the ethnoracial diversity of the cities, suburbs, and towns within its boundaries. But in what ways? A simple *'majority rule' typology* allows us to shed light on this issue. Table 3 classifies places with at least 1,000 residents in 1980 and 2010 into white, black, Hispanic, Asian, and 'other' majority types depending on which group makes up more than 50% of the local population. White majority places are further

Table 3. Distribution and Diversity of Metropolitan Places by Racial-Ethnic Composition and Immigrant Context, 1980 and 2010				
	% of places		Weighted mean	
	1980	2010	1980	2010
All Metro Places				
White majority	93.8	82.4	35.3	49.3
Dominant	65.6	31.9	13.3	19.9
Shared	28.2	50.6	48.6	54.2
Black majority	2.4	4.1	49.5	55.3
Hispanic majority	2.1	5.9	49.0	50.1
Asian majority	0.3	0.4	60.0	68.2
Other majority	0.1	0.2	18.1	26.4
No majority	1.4	7.2	71.8	78.8
N of places	7,439	10,166		
Places in Gateway Metros				
White majority	87.7	66.1	44.0	55.2
Dominant	49.9	10.5	16.1	21.3
Shared	37.7	55.6	54.1	57.4
Black majority	2.6	4.0	51.3	56.1
Hispanic majority	5.7	14.4	46.5	48.8
Asian majority	0.9	1.1	60.0	68.2
Other majority	0.1	0.1	19.7	26.6
No majority	3.2	14.5	73.2	80.3
N of places	2,351	3,448		
Places in Outpost Metros				
White majority	96.4	88.8	30.3	49.8
Dominant	70.2	31.3	13.0	20.9
Shared	26.2	57.5	44.0	54.1
Black majority	1.6	2.9	50.2	55.9
Hispanic majority	1.0	3.1	56.3	57.7
Asian majority	0.0	0.0	-	76.5
Other majority	0.1	0.1	71.9	5.8
No majority	0.8	5.0	60.9	74.7
N of places	2,199	2,998		
Places in Native Metros				
White majority	96.7	92.4	27.1	43.0
Dominant	74.9	52.1	-	18.9
Shared	21.9	40.4	-	50.7
Black majority	2.8	5.1	43.4	54.3
Hispanic majority	0.0	0.2	-	62.8
Asian majority	0.0	0.0	-	-
Other majority	0.1	0.2	24.2	31.1
No majority	0.3	2.1	49.7	67.0
N of places	2,889	3,720		

subdivided into dominant (90%+ white) and shared (51-89% white) subtypes. Finally, in no-majority communities three or four racial-ethnic groups are present but none achieves more than a plurality.

A comparison of the 1980 and 2010 distributions of all metropolitan places (top panel of the table) reveals three noteworthy patterns: a decline in the percentage of white majority places, an increase in no-majority and minority majority places, and rising diversity levels for every type of place save those with a Hispanic majority, which exhibit stable mean *E* values. These patterns are amplified significantly in gateway metro areas (second panel). As of 2010, two-thirds of all gateway places fall in the white majority category, down from nine-tenths in 1980, and white dominant places drop from one-half to one-tenth of the total. Hispanic majority and no-majority communities, on the other hand, have become much more common, each constituting 14% of the 2010 gateway sample. Moreover, average diversity reaches its highest magnitude in no-majority places located in the metro gateways. A quite different profile emerges for outpost and native metro areas, where both Hispanic majority and no-majority places remain uncommon.

A separate analysis (not shown) suggests that the shift toward diverse types of places is more pronounced in micropolitan gateways than their metropolitan counterparts. White dominant places, for example, make up one-third of the 1980 micro gateway sample but only one-twentieth three decades later, while the share of no-majority places climbs from less than 3% to over 20%. However, few micro places are located in gateway settings (one-seventh of the micro total versus one-third of all metro places). Most can be found in native micro areas, where over half of the places still qualify as white dominant and both no-majority and Hispanic majority communities continue to be rare. At the same time, the proportion of black majority places in native micro areas has increased and is greater than in native metro contexts.

The aggregate trends documented so far are important but they mask differences in the diversity dimension of integration across specific communities. We bring the extent of such differences into sharp relief by comparing the most and least diverse metropolitan and micropolitan areas nationally. According to Table 4, metro gateways in the West and South are disproportionately represented among the 25 areas with the highest 2010 *E* scores. Three

Table 4. Population Characteristics of 25 Most Diverse Metropolitan Areas, 2010

	Diversity	% White	% Black	% Hispanic	% Asian	% Other	% Foreign	Immigrant Context
Vallejo-Fairfield, CA	89.3	40.8	14.2	24.0	15.1	5.9	19.9	Gateway
San Francisco-Oakland, CA	85.3	42.4	8.1	21.7	23.6	4.2	29.8	Gateway
Stockton, CA	82.5	35.9	7.1	38.9	14.3	3.9	23.3	Gateway
Washington, DC	80.8	48.6	25.2	13.8	9.3	3.1	21.0	Gateway
New York, NY	80.5	48.9	16.1	22.9	9.9	2.3	28.3	Gateway
San Jose, CA	80.1	35.3	2.3	27.8	31.2	3.4	36.5	Gateway
Las Vegas, NV	79.8	48.0	10.0	29.1	9.1	3.8	22.1	Gateway
Houston, TX	79.6	39.7	16.8	35.3	6.5	1.7	22.0	Gateway
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA	79.6	31.6	6.7	44.4	14.7	2.5	34.4	Gateway
Honolulu, HI	77.6	19.1	1.9	8.1	52.1	18.9	19.5	Gateway
Sacramento, CA	76.9	55.7	7.0	20.2	12.4	4.7	17.2	Gateway
Trenton-Ewing, NJ	76.3	54.5	19.5	15.1	8.9	2.0	19.7	Gateway
San Diego, CA	76.2	48.5	4.7	32.0	11.0	3.7	23.1	Gateway
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX	75.9	50.2	14.8	27.5	5.4	2.1	17.3	Gateway
Fayetteville, NC	75.3	46.4	35.3	9.8	2.3	6.2	5.7	Outpost
Miami-Fort Lauderdale, FL	74.9	34.8	19.7	41.6	2.2	1.7	37.8	Gateway
Killeen, TX	74.9	54.0	18.6	20.3	3.2	3.9	7.7	Outpost
Orlando, FL	73.9	53.3	15.0	25.2	4.0	2.5	16.2	Gateway
Lawton, OK	73.9	58.9	16.8	11.2	2.7	10.5	5.3	Outpost
Chicago, IL	73.7	55.0	17.1	20.7	5.6	1.7	17.5	Gateway
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA	73.5	36.6	7.1	47.3	6.2	2.8	22.0	Gateway
Fresno, CA	73.2	32.7	4.8	50.3	9.4	2.7	21.7	Gateway
Atlantic City, NJ	73.0	58.6	14.9	16.8	7.5	2.2	15.4	Gateway
Yuba City, CA	73.0	54.0	2.3	27.1	11.2	5.3	18.3	Gateway
Atlanta, GA	73.0	50.7	31.9	10.4	4.8	2.2	13.5	Outpost

California metro areas—Vallejo-Fairfield, San Francisco-Oakland, and Stockton—sit atop the list, which includes seven other areas from the Golden State. The California areas typically have higher proportions of Asian residents than do other metropolises, accompanied by sizeable white and Hispanic populations. Blacks are more prominent than Asians in areas outside of California, with the exception of Honolulu. The distinctive racial-ethnic structure of Honolulu features an Asian majority and a substantial percentage of 'others' (primarily mixed-race individuals).

Consistent with their gateway status, most of the metropolitan communities in the table house large shares of immigrants, led by Miami-Ft. Lauderdale (38% foreign born), San Jose (36%), and Los Angeles (34%).

Contrary to popular perception, high levels of diversity are not limited to metropolitan America. The 25 most diverse micropolitan areas (not shown) have 2010 entropy scores in the 63 to 84 range. Hawaiian micro gateways Hilo, Kahului-Wailuku, and Kapaa rank first, second, and fourth respectively, and their multigroup compositions and large numbers of foreign-born residents resemble what we have described for metropolitan settings. But Lumberton, North Carolina, the third most diverse micro area, illustrates another common pattern: few immigrants but a high percentage of 'others', typically Native Americans. Diverse micropolitan areas similar to Lumberton are found in Alaska, California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma. These communities highlight the distinction between a very diverse population and a large foreign-born population: it is possible to have the former without the latter.

The latter can also exist without the former, as an inspection of the *least* diverse metro and micro areas demonstrates. Laredo, Texas, exhibits the lowest *E* score (13) of any metropolis, thanks to an overwhelming Hispanic majority (96%) that contains many immigrants; a few other Texas areas are homogeneously Hispanic as well. Usually, however, the most homogeneous metropolitan and micropolitan communities are all-white and qualify as native contexts. They tend to be concentrated in the Midwest and Northeast, although five of the 25 least diverse metro areas fall wholly or partly within the state of West Virginia. Pennsylvania stands out with five of the least diverse micro areas and three of the least diverse metro areas nationally. Maine, Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin are among the other states containing multiple areas of high homogeneity.

The extremely diverse and homogeneous communities just identified anchor the upper and lower portions of hierarchies that have remained quite stable in recent decades. Little shifting is apparent between 1980 and 2010 in where all 366 metropolitan areas rank with respect to the magnitude of racial-ethnic diversity (Spearman r = .89). A comparison of 1980 and 2010 diversity ranks for all micropolitan areas reveals an equally impressive degree of stability (Spearman r = .88). Among subsets of metro and micro areas distinguished by type of immigrant context, rank-order correlations are weaker (in the .60 to .62 range) for gateways, presumably due to the compositional effects of differential Hispanic and Asian growth rates in the more dynamic gateway settings. For the most part, though, the near-universal increases in diversity experienced by communities of every type have only minimally altered the relative positions of these communities, i.e., how they stack up against each other over time.

Given the parallel paths followed, it seems reasonable to speculate that the community characteristics associated with ethnoracial diversity might also be temporally robust. Elsewhere we have confirmed that speculation, estimating 1980 and 2010 cross-sectional regression models for metropolitan areas, micropolitan areas, and places of 10,000 or more (Lee et al. 2012, 2013a). A consistent profile of the correlates of diversity emerges, irrespective of year or census geography. In general, more diverse areas and places tend to be located in coastal or southern border states and have larger populations, lower minority incomes (relative to whites), plentiful rental-occupancy housing, higher rates of government or military employment, and smaller proportions of retirees. Many of these correlates are identified as theoretically or empirically relevant in the diversity literature (Allen & Turner 1989; Farrell 2005; Hall & Lee 2010), for reasons discussed in our recent papers (Lee et al. 2012, 2013a).

Immigrant context matters as well. In a re-specification of the original models for this chapter, we use dummy variables to capture type of context for areas (not shown). The 2010 metro and micro equations reveal that the gateway and outpost indicators exhibit significant positive associations with ethnoracial diversity (compared to the native reference category) even when controlling for other characteristics of areas. Similar but weaker findings for immigrant context can be observed in 1980, with only the metro gateway type achieving statistical significance. The continued growth of supportive institutions, networks, and enclaves across both gateway and outpost areas may partly explain the more prominent role of immigrant context in 2010 than 1980. Another possibility is that the shifting origins of immigrants in recent decades—most now come from Latin America and Asia—have increased the empirical overlap between foreign-born and minority populations, which are captured in our immigrant context and diversity measures respectively.[11]

Overall, the results in this section provide a tentative answer to our initial question about trends in residential integration. Consistent with the spatial assimilation perspective, virtually all communities have changed in the same direction as the nation has over the last 30 years, becoming more diverse due to Hispanic and Asian growth. Levels of and gains in diversity are greater in metro than micro areas and in gateway settings than other types of immigrant contexts. Marked differences also exist in diversity magnitude and racial-ethnic structure across individual areas. However, the 2010 diversity hierarchy—where communities rank in relation to each other—looks much like it did in 1980. So do the community characteristics associated with diversity.

[11] Despite this overlap, a non-trivial proportion of immigrants to the U.S. still originate in Europe. As of 2010 nearly one of every eight foreign-born residents hails from a European nation (U.S. Census Bureau 2012b). Moreover, a conceptual distinction remains between nativity and race.

Segregation: Pervasive Decline?

Diversification in metropolitan and micropolitan areas across the country does not necessarily mean that people of different ethnoracial groups are now more apt to share neighborhoods. It could be that whites continue to prefer to live with other whites, and minority group members likewise feel more comfortable living with co-ethnics. According to the spatial assimilation perspective, however, we should expect to see diminishing residential segregation over time as minority residents experience socioeconomic gains and—in the case of immigrants—become more acculturated. Both of these processes are anticipated to result in improved housing and neighborhood outcomes, including closer proximity to members of other racial-ethnic groups. In contrast, the ethnic stratification model emphasizes the continuing salience of race and discrimination. It predicts that high levels of segregation, even in the face of nationwide increases in diversity, will remain pervasive or rise further. Here we evaluate the relevance of each perspective to our second guiding question: whether integration, broadly construed, manifests itself as declining segregation.

To address this question, we spatially disaggregate the racial-ethnic compositions of metro and micro areas, examining how different groups are distributed across the census tracts that make up an area. Only tracts that approximate residential neighborhoods (i.e., that have at least 100 residents, less than one-fourth of whom occupy institutionalized groups quarters such as prisons or hospitals) are eligible for the analysis. The areas in which the tracts are located also have to meet certain eligibility criteria. For a metropolitan area, the rule is simple: its population must contain 1,000 or more members of the ethnoracial group of interest in a given year. Due to the smaller size of micropolitan areas, we set the group bar lower, requiring a minimum of 100 members. But each micro area still needs to be substantial overall, with 10 or more tracts and a

total population of 10,000+. Because much micropolitan territory was untracted in 1980, the temporal window on micro areas is limited to the 1990-2010 period.

Our examination of census data for eligible areas, tracts, and groups indicates that, consistent with the assimilation perspective, increasing diversity has been accompanied by steady declines in residential segregation. Figure 6 illustrates these declines in metropolitan and micropolitan areas using the multigroup *information theory index* (or Theil's *H*), which measures how evenly multiple ethnoracial groups are distributed across neighborhoods within the broader area. More specifically, *H* reflects the extent to which the diversity of census tracts (measured by the entropy index *E*) differs from the diversity of the area as a whole (for more detailed treatments, see Farrell 2008; Reardon & Firebaugh 2002). If every tract is about as diverse as its metro or micro area, then segregation will be very low. Conversely, if every tract is homogeneous (containing just one group), then segregation will be very high. The information theory index varies from 0 to 100, with higher numbers indicating greater segregation. The mean *H* values in Figure 6 are weighted by the population size of metro areas (upper set of curves) or micro areas (lower set). They thus can be interpreted as the magnitude of multigroup segregation that the average resident of each type of area experiences in a particular year.

The upper portion of the figure shows that *H* has declined substantially in metropolitan areas, from 34 in 1980 to 23 in 2010. That is, metro residents now live in census tracts that, on average, are 23% less diverse (or more segregated) than the metropolis as a whole, down from 34% less diverse three decades earlier. This decline can be seen in all immigrant contexts, but it is a little less pronounced for gateway metro areas. By 2010, the highest average *H* values are evident in gateway metro areas and the lowest in native areas. The bottom portion of Figure 6 documents quite modest levels of multigroup segregation (*H*s in the 9 to 11 range) for

micropolitan areas throughout the 1990-2010 period, indicating small differences between mean tract diversity and micro-wide diversity. This pattern is consistent with previous work finding lower racial-ethnic segregation in smaller metro areas and places than in larger ones (Farley & Frey 1994; Iceland et al. 2002; Logan et al. 2004). Not much change occurs during the two



Figure 6. Weighted Panethnic Multi-Group Segregation (*H*) in Metropolitan and Micropolitan Areas by Immigrant Context, 1980-2010

decades, just slight decreases in *H*. Neither do overall levels and trends vary much by type of immigrant context. Native micro areas are about as segregated as micro outposts and gateways, and all experience minimal changes. In general, then, different ethnoracial groups live in fairly similar census tracts across micropolitan America.

One concern with multigroup segregation measures such as *H* is that they can mask the variation in segregation experienced by specific groups. To guard against this possibility, we turn to the popular *index of dissimilarity*, symbolized by *D* (Massey & Denton 1988). The dissimilarity index, like the information theory index, is a measure of evenness. It describes the proportion of a group's population that would have to change residences for each neighborhood (census tract) to have the same ethnoracial composition as the metropolitan or micropolitan area as a whole. The scores in Table 5 reveal the segregation of metropolitan whites, blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and 'others' from all non-group members over the last 30 years. A common rule of thumb is that dissimilarity scores exceeding 60 are high, those from 30 to 60 are moderate, and those below 30 are low. The *D*s in the table are weighted by the metro or context-specific population size of the group in question, capturing the magnitude of segregation experienced by the average group member who lives in that type of setting. The results in each row are based on a constant sample of metro areas that satisfy our eligibility criterion: namely, they contain 1,000 or more members of the group at every time point.[12]

According to the top panel of the table, average white segregation from all non-whites declines from 56 to 46 between 1980 and 2010. White segregation remains moderate across all kinds of immigrant contexts, although it is slightly higher in metropolitan gateways. Declines in these gateways are larger for whites than any group save blacks, and white declines reach double digits in outpost and native areas. Blacks (second panel) represent the most segregated group in each year; at the same time, they undergo the greatest decreases over the three-decade period. In

[12] The white, black, Hispanic, Asian, and 'other' segregation scores in Table 5 are based on the same 330, 281, 253, 166, and 159 metro areas, respectively. Context-specific Ns range from 42 (for 'other' segregation in gateway metros) to 181 (for white segregation in native metros). The general patterns reported in the table hold when the number of metro areas is allowed to vary from one year to the next.

Table 5. Weighted Mean Dissimilarity Indices for Panethnic Groups by Metropolitan Immigrant Context, 1980-2010					
	1980	1990	2000	2010	2010-1980 Difference
White					
All Metros	56.3	52.5	49.2	45.5	-10.8
Gateway Metros	57.3	52.9	51.5	49.0	-8.3
Outpost Metros	56.1	52.0	48.5	44.2	-11.9
Native Metros	55.4	52.5	47.4	42.9	-12.5
Black					
All Metros	71.5	66.0	61.1	55.0	-16.5
Gateway Metros	74.6	67.2	61.7	55.6	-19.0
Outpost Metros	71.9	67.2	61.7	54.8	-17.1
Native Metros	66.4	62.9	59.4	54.3	-12.1
Hispanic					
All Metros	47.6	46.2	46.3	43.5	-4.1
Gateway Metros	49.3	47.6	47.7	45.2	-4.1
Outpost Metros	44.0	42.4	42.7	39.7	-4.3
Native Metros	30.4	31.9	34.7	34.9	4.5
Asian					
All Metros	38.1	39.1	39.3	39.2	1.1
Gateway Metros	38.6	39.4	40.2	40.3	1.7
Outpost Metros	34.9	37.0	36.1	35.4	0.5
Native Metros	37.7	39.3	37.1	36.9	-0.8
Other					
All Metros	32.1	31.4	25.5	23.6	-8.5
Gateway Metros	30.6	29.5	26.0	24.8	-5.8
Outpost Metros	32.2	30.0	22.7	19.6	-12.6
Native Metros	36.5	37.1	28.4	26.5	-10.0

1980 mean black segregation from nonblacks is quite high in absolute terms (D = 72), but by 2010 segregation falls in the more moderate range (D = 55). The largest decline in black segregation takes place in gateway metro areas (19 points) and the smallest in native metros (12 points). This finding aligns with previous research showing that growing diversity is associated with declines in black segregation, particularly in metro areas of the South and West (Iceland 2004; Iceland et al. 2013). In such areas other groups—Hispanics in particular—may soften

color lines and serve as buffers between historically separate white and black populations, resulting in less segregation of blacks from non-blacks (Frey & Farley 1996).[13]

The rest of Table 5 shows that metropolitan Hispanics and Asians are moderately segregated from all others in 2010 (D = 44 for Hispanics and 39 for Asians). However, modest declines occur in Hispanic segregation during the preceding 30 years while Asian segregation remains essentially stable. Among both groups, average D scores tend to be higher in gateway metros than in other immigrant contexts. Hispanic segregation declines in gateway and outpost metro areas by about 4 points but increases in native areas by nearly 5 points. We are not certain what explains this pattern, but it does have the effect of narrowing the differences in Hispanic segregation across the three types of immigrant contexts over time (see Park & Iceland 2011). Finally, the 'other' racial-ethnic group (bottom panel) exhibits a low level of segregation in 1980, and that level decreases over time for all immigrant contexts.

Micropolitan residential segregation resembles its metropolitan counterpart in some respects but diverges in others (Table 6).[14] As was the case with the information theory index, mean segregation levels for whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians are lower in micro areas than metro areas. One also observes declines in black and white segregation in almost all immigrant contexts; micro gateways constitute the lone exception, where white D values are basically constant from 1990 to the present. In contrast, black declines are once again largest in gateway

[13] The buffering mechanism can take several forms. For example, Hispanics could adopt a spatially intermediate position between whites and blacks at the neighborhood level and thus increase intergroup exposure. The presence of Hispanics might also alert real estate agents, lenders, and residents to a new, more diverse housing market in which discriminatory practices that target any single minority group are less likely to have the intended impact. Finally, the presence of multiple groups may serve to reduce black-white tensions in what had been rigidly divided black-white cities.

[14] Of the 576 total micropolitan areas, 328 meet our eligibility requirements at every time point for the estimation of white D values, 276 for black Ds, 325 for Hispanic Ds, 273 for Asian Ds, and 235 for other Ds. As with the metro results, the micro findings reported here parallel those obtained when area eligibility is determined on a year-by-year basis (i.e., when variable samples of micro areas are substituted for constant ones).

areas. Unlike the metro case, Hispanic segregation increases, if slightly, in micro areas in general and in gateway and outpost settings in particular, while Asian segregation decreases across most types of contexts. Non-trivial declines in micropolitan segregation are apparent for the 'other' group, similar to the metro trend in the previous table.

Table 6. Weighted Mean Dissimilarity Indices for Panethnic Groups by Micropolitan Immigrant Context, 1990-2010

	1990	2000	2010	2010-1990 Difference
White				
All Micros	31.5	28.7	28.3	-3.2
Gateway Micros	30.0	29.5	29.9	-0.1
Outpost Micros	29.6	28.4	28.3	-1.3
Native Micros	32.7	28.7	28.1	-4.6
Black				
All Micros	40.0	38.1	37.1	-2.9
Gateway Micros	42.8	35.8	32.3	-10.5
Outpost Micros	37.6	35.5	35.5	-2.1
Native Micros	40.8	39.4	38.4	-2.4
Hispanic				
All Micros	28.3	30.1	30.2	1.9
Gateway Micros	28.5	29.7	30.7	2.2
Outpost Micros	28.7	32.4	31.2	2.5
Native Micros	27.3	27.6	27.8	0.5
Asian				
All Micros	30.6	28.6	27.8	-2.8
Gateway Micros	28.6	28.1	28.4	-0.2
Outpost Micros	34.8	28.0	26.4	-8.4
Native Micros	35.2	30.8	27.9	-7.3
Other				
All Micros	46.2	37.7	36.1	-10.1
Gateway Micros	34.9	22.5	23.6	-11.3
Outpost Micros	45.2	35.1	35.4	-9.8
Native Micros	48.0	42.0	38.7	-9.3

Beyond the mean patterns just described, progress toward residential integration can be inferred from how widespread declining segregation is geographically. Figure 7 summarizes the percentage of metropolitan areas experiencing declines in segregation overall and for each panethnic population. Slightly more than four-fifths of metro areas undergo declines in multigroup *H* from 1980 through 2010, and such declines are most prevalent in the last decade.



Figure 7. Metropolitan Areas Experiencing Declining Segregation, 1980-2010

Shifting to *D*, four-fifths of metro areas also witness a drop in white segregation, and black segregation decreases in virtually all metro areas (96%) during the past 30 years. The percentage of metro areas with downward-trending Hispanic and Asian segregation is closer to half.

Though not presented in tabular form, micropolitan patterns parallel those for metropolitan areas. Substantial majorities of micro areas experience a 1990-2010 decline in multigroup (73%), white (69%) and black (82%) segregation. Roughly one-half of all micro areas exhibit a decline in Hispanic segregation (49%), but decreases in Asian (82%) and 'other' (91%) segregation are apparent for many more over the past two decades.

Examining residential segregation for Hispanic and Asian panethnic populations ignores potential differences among the specific groups that make up these populations. In Table 7 we drill below the panethnic level. The left half of the table reports the average extent to which detailed Hispanic groups are segregated from non-group members in metro areas as of 2010. Dominicans, many of whom have at least partial African ancestry, are the most segregated group (D = 57), followed by Guatemalans and Cubans (both around 50) and Salvadorans (49). Mexicans (42), Puerto Ricans (41), and Colombians (40), on the other hand, have the lowest dissimilarity scores. There is no uniform pattern across groups by type of immigrant context. Among many groups (Colombians, Dominicans, Guatemalans, and Salvadorans) segregation is highest in native metro areas, but two of the more prominent groups (Cubans and Mexicans) are most segregated in gateway contexts. Mirroring general declines in panethnic Hispanic metro segregation, every detailed Hispanic group experiences decreasing segregation from 1990 through 2010 (not shown).[15] The decrease is smallest for Mexicans (only 2 points) and in the 13-19 point range for every other group except Cubans (8-point drop). Declines tend to be larger in outpost metropolises than elsewhere, although this pattern does not hold across all groups.

[15] The over-time patterns for Colombians, Dominicans, Guatemalans, and Salvadorans should be interpreted with caution because the constant samples employed in the calculation of D score differences consist of fewer than 25 metro areas for each of these groups. However, the directions in which their segregation levels have changed remain the same irrespective of whether constant or variable samples are used.

Table 7. Weighted Mean Dissimilarity Indices for Detailed Hispanic and Asian Groups by Metropolitan Immigrant Context, 2010					
	Dissimilarity	N		Dissimilarity	N
Colombian			**Asian Indian**		
All Metros	39.6	66	**All Metros**	47.9	170
Gateway Metros	39.9	24	**Gateway Metros**	47.4	40
Outpost Metros	37.5	33	**Outpost Metros**	47.5	66
Native Metros	42.4	9	**Native Metros**	52.6	64
Cuban			**Chinese**		
All Metros	50.2	77	**All Metros**	47.4	160
Gateway Metros	52.9	23	**Gateway Metros**	48.8	40
Outpost Metros	36.5	37	**Outpost Metros**	40.6	71
Native Metros	42.2	17	**Native Metros**	44.2	49
Dominican			**Filipino**		
All Metros	56.8	62	**All Metros**	36.2	161
Gateway Metros	57.4	20	**Gateway Metros**	37.5	47
Outpost Metros	50.6	31	**Outpost Metros**	30.4	66
Native Metros	63.9	11	**Native Metros**	29.8	48
Guatemalan			**Japanese**		
All Metros	50.4	91	**All Metros**	33.8	98
Gateway Metros	49.2	31	**Gateway Metros**	34.4	37
Outpost Metros	53.8	37	**Outpost Metros**	29.6	41
Native Metros	60.3	23	**Native Metros**	35.3	20
Mexican			**Korean**		
All Metros	41.8	309	**All Metros**	47.4	125
Gateway Metros	42.5	51	**Gateway Metros**	49.7	33
Outpost Metros	40.5	96	**Outpost Metros**	41.5	54
Native Metros	36.5	162	**Native Metros**	40.3	38
Puerto Rican			**Vietnamese**		
All Metros	40.9	164	**All Metros**	50.9	126
Gateway Metros	39.0	39	**Gateway Metros**	52.0	34
Outpost Metros	43.9	63	**Outpost Metros**	48.1	48
Native Metros	41.7	62	**Native Metros**	49.0	44
Salvadoran					
All Metros	48.7	77			
Gateway Metros	48.1	34			
Outpost Metros	51.6	31			
Native Metros	58.1	12			

Among Asian ethnic groups (right half of Table 7), 2010 segregation is lowest for the Japanese (*D* = 34), who have not been replenished by recent immigration flows. Mean *D* scores are also low for Filipinos (36) and in the 47 to 51 range for the rest of the Asian groups. Again, differences by immigrant context are inconsistent, with segregation being higher in gateway metro areas for some groups but higher in native metros for other groups. The magnitude of metropolitan segregation declines for most groups since 1990 (not shown).[16] Exceptions to this rule include Asian Indians, who experience a 2-point increase in dissimilarity, and Koreans, whose segregation level remains stable. Among all of the detailed groups, declines are most prominent in native metro areas, reflecting the pattern for Asians as a whole.

To further enrich our results for specific ethnic groups, we examine segregation in six large metro areas located throughout the United States: New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington, DC, Atlanta, and Denver.[17] The first two, New York and Los Angeles, are high-profile immigrant gateways that rank among the 10 most diverse metropolises nationally (see Table 4). New York has traditionally had high levels of black and white segregation and—despite declines in recent decades—both of these groups remain highly segregated (in the 60-65 range) in 2010, as Table 8 documents. Hispanic and Asian *D* scores (49 for both groups in 2010) are also above their respective national averages. All of the detailed Hispanic groups become less segregated between 1990 and 2010 except Mexicans, who are relative newcomers to metropolitan New York. The patterns for Asian ethnic groups appear more mixed, with some experiencing increasing segregation (Asian Indians, Chinese, and Koreans) and others declines (Filipinos, Japanese, and Vietnamese).

[16] The constant samples underlying these trends range in size from 57 metro areas (for Japanese segregation) to 91 (for Chinese segregation).

[17] New York has the greatest number of census tracts that satisfy our eligibility requirements in both 1980 and 2010 (N = 4,308). Tract sample sizes are also impressive for Los Angeles (2,798), Chicago (2,123), Washington (1,218), Atlanta (805), and Denver (546).

Table 8. Dissimilarity Indices for Panethnic and Detailed Groups in New York and Los Angeles, 1990-2010						
	New York			Los Angeles		
	1990 D	2010 D	Difference	1990 D	2010 D	Difference
White	66.4	60.3	-6.1	55.4	54.9	-0.5
Black	72.7	64.7	-7.9	65.0	53.8	-11.2
Hispanic	55.4	49.3	-6.1	50.5	51.6	1.1
Colombian	61.8	47.3	-14.5	55.9	31.0	-25.0
Cuban	50.9	36.7	-14.1	37.9	30.0	-7.8
Dominican	70.9	59.7	-11.1	89.3	50.2	-39.1
Guatemalan	78.8	55.9	-22.9	55.9	45.3	-10.6
Mexican	50.4	54.4	4.0	49.6	48.0	-1.5
Puerto Rican	56.9	43.3	-13.6	23.8	22.6	-1.2
Salvadoran	74.7	62.1	-12.6	56.5	45.0	-11.5
Other Hispanic	40.0	38.7	-1.3	24.8	21.1	-3.7
Asian	45.9	48.9	3.0	40.1	43.7	3.6
Asian Indian	47.5	50.0	2.6	39.4	43.5	4.1
Chinese	56.4	58.6	2.1	53.7	58.4	4.7
Filipino	49.3	43.1	-6.2	42.8	37.5	-5.3
Japanese	63.7	52.9	-10.8	43.7	42.6	-1.1
Korean	58.2	59.6	1.4	52.4	56.5	4.1
Vietnamese	62.7	50.3	-12.3	54.5	61.8	7.3
Other Asian	52.8	48.6	-4.2	47.1	55.7	8.6
Other	37.4	31.9	-5.4	17.7	18.9	1.2

Los Angeles provides an interesting contrast to New York in that white, black, and Hispanic segregation levels are all similar in 2010 (*D*s between 52 and 55), but only black segregation decreases over the preceding two decades. Asian segregation is lower than among other groups ($D = 44$), but it increases by a small amount. Two Hispanic ethnic groups in Los Angeles, Colombians and Dominicans, experience dramatic downturns in segregation. However, the small size of these groups may make their results prone to large fluctuations associated with random data variability.

Another pair of diverse gateway metropolises, Chicago and Washington, DC, is featured in Table 9. While Chicago (like New York) has a history of very high black and white

segregation (Taeuber & Taeuber 1965), we find substantial declines (10-12 points) in the *D* values for both groups from 1990 to 2010. Chicago has also had a large Hispanic presence for years, and segregation levels for this panethnic population and its component groups are moderate and declining. Asian segregation is moderate and declining as well. The nation's

Table 9. Dissimilarity Indices for Panethnic and Detailed Groups in Chicago and Washington DC, 1990-2010

	Chicago			Washington, DC		
	1990 D	2010 D	Difference	1990 D	2010 D	Difference
White	66.5	54.9	-11.6	52.3	46.2	-6.1
Black	82.2	72.0	-10.2	63.9	55.6	-8.3
Hispanic	59.6	54.0	-5.6	38.3	40.3	2.0
Colombian	75.9	41.3	-34.6	60.7	32.1	-28.6
Cuban	52.1	36.2	-15.9	33.9	24.4	-9.5
Dominican	92.4	55.0	-37.4	78.5	42.8	-35.7
Guatemalan	81.2	50.9	-30.3	69.6	50.2	-19.4
Mexican	59.4	55.1	-4.3	30.4	33.9	3.5
Puerto Rican	66.9	44.9	-22.0	27.3	24.0	-3.3
Salvadoran	88.3	53.6	-34.7	66.6	51.0	-15.6
Other Hispanic	40.8	32.8	-8.0	37.5	35.2	-2.3
Asian	50.2	47.3	-2.9	35.9	36.3	0.4
Asian Indian	56.6	55.3	-1.3	40.0	40.1	0.1
Chinese	58.1	53.9	-4.2	41.6	41.2	-0.4
Filipino	51.4	40.9	-10.5	34.8	27.0	-7.8
Japanese	55.9	44.8	-11.1	38.0	31.7	-6.3
Korean	58.6	53.2	-5.4	45.9	46.3	0.4
Vietnamese	67.8	53.0	-14.8	51.7	45.9	-5.8
Other Asian	56.0	36.2	-19.8	40.0	28.9	-11.1
Other	32.2	20.1	-12.1	21.2	15.3	-5.9

capital, Washington, DC, is another city with a longstanding black-white divide. Yet in recent decades it has become among the most diverse metropolitan areas in the U.S. (see Table 4), thanks to an influx of immigrants from many different Latin American, Asian, and African countries (Price et al. 2005). The segregation magnitudes of white and black Washingtonians fall in the moderate range by 2010 (*D*s = 46 and 56, respectively) after declines during the previous

two decades. Hispanic segregation has inched up slightly from 38 in 1990 to 40 in 2010. Asian segregation is lower and fairly stable over time. Most but not all of the specific Hispanic and Asian ethnic groups in metropolitan Washington have experienced segregation declines since 1990.

The final two case study sites qualify as outposts in our immigrant context typology (Table 10). Atlanta is a southern metropolitan hub in which white and black segregation levels have decreased markedly between 1990 and 2010 (by 11 and 14 points). Meanwhile, Hispanic segregation climbs by 13 points during the same period. Mexicans appear to be responsible for this trend; they are the lone Hispanic ethnic group with a rise in *D*, and their numbers increase

Table 10. Dissimilarity Indices for Panethnic and Detailed Groups in Atlanta and Denver, 1990-2010

	Atlanta			Denver		
	D 1990	**D 2010**	**Difference**	**D 1990**	**D 2010**	**Difference**
White	61.9	50.8	-11.1	42.7	42.7	0.0
Black	68.1	54.5	-13.5	63.8	55.2	-8.7
Hispanic	30.9	43.4	12.5	44.9	45.4	0.5
Colombian	69.3	42.7	-26.7	na	33.7	na
Cuban	35.9	23.4	-12.6	37.0	27.3	-9.7
Dominican	na	38.2	na	na	na	na
Guatemalan	na	62.9	na	na	44.9	na
Mexican	42.9	51.1	8.2	45.8	47.2	1.4
Puerto Rican	29.9	20.6	-9.4	32.5	22.9	-9.7
Salvadoran	87.7	56.5	-31.2	na	50.9	na
Other Hispanic	29.6	31.9	2.3	38.9	27.6	-11.3
Asian	40.7	43.4	2.7	26.4	26.3	-0.1
Asian Indian	45.3	47.3	2.0	43.2	41.7	-1.5
Chinese	48.5	46.7	-1.7	36.5	30.7	-5.8
Filipino	37.1	25.3	-11.8	33.4	24.3	-9.1
Japanese	47.3	37.1	-10.2	22.0	17.9	-4.0
Korean	47.2	56.0	8.8	39.8	38.0	-1.7
Vietnamese	60.9	55.3	-5.7	51.6	43.1	-8.5
Other Asian	53.0	35.3	-17.7	50.7	45.3	-5.4
Other	21.2	16.8	-4.4	26.0	14.6	-11.4

from roughly 22,000 to 289,000. Shifting from the South to the Mountain West, Denver exhibits rather low levels of white and black segregation (*D*s = 43 and 55) compared to other large metro areas, and black segregation declines significantly during the 20-year observation window. Hispanic and Asian panethnic *D* scores remain stable in Denver, despite a majority of specific groups undergoing segregation declines.

Several important messages emerge from the foregoing analysis. One is that the dominant trend in multigroup residential segregation has been downward during the last few decades, driven mainly by declines in black and white segregation. For most of the period Hispanics and Asians are less segregated than whites and blacks, although levels for the former two groups change little over time. By 2010, Hispanic and white segregation levels have nearly converged. Among Hispanics we see small declines in metropolitan segregation and increases in micropolitan segregation. Among Asians the pattern is reversed, with small increases in metro segregation and declines in micro segregation. While there is significant variation in segregation magnitudes and trends among detailed Hispanic and Asian ethnic groups, their dissimilarity scores tend to be in the moderate range. For some groups segregation is higher in metro gateways, yet for others it is higher in native metro areas, making generalizations difficult about how type of immigrant context shapes segregation patterns.

We conclude that growing ethnoracial diversity across metropolitan and micropolitan America does *not* go hand in hand with consistently high (or rising) levels of neighborhood segregation, as anticipated by the ethnic stratification perspective. In fact, greater diversity may help soften the traditional black-white color line, rendering housing market dynamics more complex and ultimately reducing segregation for these two groups in many communities.[18] Nor

[18] Although our analysis covers black-nonblack and white-nonwhite patterns of segregation, we do not directly examine segregation between blacks and whites. However, studies that do document gradual but

do diversification and immigration appear to be elevating segregation to a notable extent among Hispanics and Asians. Even as immigrant newcomers settle in enclaves, it is likely that ethnic group members and their children who have been in the United States for longer periods of time are living in more integrated settings, consistent with the logic of spatial assimilation (Iceland 2009; Iceland & Scopilliti 2008; White & Glick 2009).

The Fate of Mixed Neighborhoods

Rising metropolitan and micropolitan diversity confirms that the members of different ethnoracial groups are not averse to sharing residential environments at a macro-geographic scale. Moreover, recent segregation trends point to increasing similarity in how these groups are distributed across neighborhoods. In this section we consider a third and final question about integration broadly construed: what happens to individual neighborhoods inhabited by multiple groups? Such neighborhoods, though historically a small proportion of the total, deserve attention because of theoretical disagreement about their prevalence and future. Namely, is racial and ethnic mixing at the neighborhood level becoming more common over time (as predicted by the spatial assimilation perspective), or is it still rare and temporary, giving way to greater homogeneity (as predicted by ethnic stratification)? We bring new evidence to bear on this debate by considering the universe of all metro and micro neighborhoods (i.e., census tracts) in the U.S. The tracts that first achieved a mixed state in 1980 or 1990 are featured to take advantage of the longer period over which their trajectories can be observed.

We operationalize mixed neighborhood in two ways. Within our majority rule typology, *no-majority tracts* qualify as mixed. These tracts, which lack any group that constitutes more than 50% of the population, tend to have very diverse racial-ethnic compositions. The second

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steady declines in black-white dissimilarity and isolation measures over multiple decades (Logan & Stults 2011; Marsh et al. 2010).

definitional strategy entails identifying mixed tracts based on their *diversity magnitude*. If the range of possible standardized entropy index values is divided into quintiles (0-19, 20-39, 40-59, 60-79, 80-100), mixed tracts are those with *E* scores that equal or exceed 60. The 60+ standard means that a tract is at least as diverse as the average metropolitan area in 2010 (see Figure 3). Both the majority rule and diversity magnitude approaches have been successfully employed in a recent study of neighborhood change in the 100 largest metropolises (Farrell & Lee 2011).

Our presentation of results emphasizes the no-majority version of a mixed neighborhood. Not only does the no-majority empirical story closely correspond to the story for high-diversity tracts, but the categories in the majority rule typology convey more information about ethnoracial structure than do *E* score quintiles. We take one other shortcut here, focusing on metropolitan rather than micropolitan tracts. As pointed out in the segregation analysis, the large portion of micropolitan territory not tracted in 1980 constrains the period during which mixed tracts can be observed. More important, however, is the fact that mixed neighborhoods are few and far between in micropolitan America. Of the 5,361 eligible census tracts, only a relative handful satisfy either the no-majority (N = 63) or high diversity (N = 75) definition of a mixed neighborhood in 1990, although their numbers do climb modestly by 2010 (to 165 and 340, respectively). This paucity of mixed tracts in micro areas is a significant substantive finding in its own right.

The transition matrix in Table 11 classifies all metropolitan census tracts by their majority rule type in 1980 (rows) and 2010 (columns). One clear lesson from the matrix concerns the dramatic increase in the prevalence of no-majority tracts. As reported in the table marginals, some 1,461 tracts (out of 53,644) lack a majority racial-ethnic group in 1980, but their number more than quadruples to 6,295—or approximately 12% of all metro tracts—three decades later.

Hispanic and Asian majority neighborhoods also become much more common; indeed, by 2010 Hispanic majority tracts outnumber those with a black majority. At the other extreme, white dominant neighborhoods (in which the white share of residents equals or exceeds 90%) experience a precipitous decline. Only 9,308 tracts qualify as white dominant in 2010, compared to three times that many—and over half of all tracts—at the beginning of the period.

Table 11. Transitions in Racial-Ethnic Structure of Metropolitan Tracts, 1980-2010

	2010 Type of Structure							
1980 Type of Structure	**White Dominant**	**White Shared**	**Black Majority**	**Hispanic Majority**	**Asian Majority**	**Other Majority**	**No Majority**	**N of Tracts**
White Dominant	31.4	60.5	1.9	1.1	0.1	0.0	5.0	29,045
White Shared	1.1	48.2	8.3	16.7	1.9	0.0	23.8	16,947
Black Majority	0.0	3.7	80.1	8.0	0.2	0.0	8.0	4,079
Hispanic Majority	0.1	2.8	0.5	91.2	0.7	0.0	4.7	1,901
Asian Majority	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.0	94.7	0.0	4.3	187
Other Majority	0.0	4.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	87.5	8.3	24
No Majority	0.0	8.4	12.3	43.4	8.9	0.3	26.9	1,461
N of Tracts	9,308	26,061	5,436	5,838	674	32	6,295	53,644

Another key finding speaks to the persistence of no-majority neighborhoods: whether they remain mixed or shift to a different type of ethnoracial composition. The seventh row of Table 11 captures tracts meeting the no-majority definition in 1980; entries indicate the percentage of the tracts in each majority rule type 30 years later. Just over one-fourth (26.9%) of the tracts in the 1980 no-majority cohort are still mixed (i.e., no majority) as of 2010. Most of the rest (43%) transition to the Hispanic majority type while others wind up in black majority, Asian majority, and white shared (50-89% white) 'destinations'. At first glance, then, mixed neighborhoods appear fairly unstable. This point is reinforced by the high persistence of the other neighborhood types. As the diagonal percentages show, four-fifths or more of the 1980-defined black, Hispanic, and Asian majority tracts retain the same classification over an extended time. When Hispanic and Asian majority tracts do change, their most likely 2010 destination is

the no-majority type. Black majority tracts are equally likely to become no-majority or Hispanic majority in composition.[19]

To develop a fuller picture of mixed neighborhoods, we examine their prevalence and persistence across our three kinds of immigrant contexts. Table 12 summarizes 1980-2010 transitions in majority rule type for no-majority tracts located in gateway, outpost, and native metropolitan areas. Younger cohorts of no-majority tracts, which first satisfy the definitional criterion in 1990 or 2000, are included along with the 1980 cohort for comparative purposes. According to the final column of the table, cohort size increases each census year. One can also see that no-majority neighborhoods are far more prevalent in gateway metro areas than other contexts. Of the 23,374 total gateway tracts, 1,232 (or a little over 5%) qualify as no-majority in 1980, compared to 154 (.9%) and 75 (.5%) in outpost and native areas, respectively. The gaps between contexts widen for the 1990 and 2000 cohorts.

Gateway no-majority neighborhoods are distinctive in three additional ways. First, the 1980 and 1990 gateway cohorts exhibit somewhat greater persistence than their outpost and native counterparts. That is, they are more likely to sustain their no-majority racial-ethnic structures for multiple decades. The second difference has to do with the destinations of tracts that lose their no-majority status. Nearly half of the tracts in the 1980 and 1990 gateway cohorts change to majority Hispanic and another tenth to majority Asian. In outpost metropolises, the most common destinations are (in order of frequency) Hispanic and black majority and white

[19] In the rows of Table 11 above the diagonal, 1980 white dominant and white shared census tracts are especially likely to change to another racial-ethnic structure. Three-fifths of the white dominant tracts become white shared; that is, their white residents remain a majority in 2010 though a smaller one than three decades prior. Among white shared neighborhoods, nearly three in 10 wind up in the no-majority category, but non-trivial percentages shift to Hispanic majority (17%) and black majority (8%) as well. Aside from the volatility of the 1980 no-majority tracts (discussed in the text), few transitions are apparent below the diagonal.

shared types. Roughly one-half of the 1980 and 1990 no-majority tracts in native metro areas become black majority neighborhoods by 2010.

Table 12. Transitions in Racial-Ethnic Structure for Cohorts of Metropolitan No-Majority Tracts, Total and by Immigrant Context

	2010 Type of Structure							Mean Diversity		
Context/Cohort	White Dominant	White Shared	Black Majority	Hispanic Majority	Asian Majority	Other Majority	No Majority	Time 1	2010	N of Tracts
All Areas										
1980	0.0	8.4	12.3	43.4	8.9	0.3	26.8	69.7	59.5	1,461
1990	0.0	4.5	10.5	44.2	9.6	0.2	31.0	70.2	63.7	1,817
2000	0.0	4.8	8.5	28.9	3.2	0.1	54.6	73.4	70.9	3,266
Gateway Areas										
1980	0.1	7.0	8.6	46.1	10.4	0.1	27.8	71.3	60.4	1,232
1990	0.0	3.1	5.6	47.9	11.6	0.1	31.7	71.7	64.2	1,477
2000	0.0	4.3	3.8	32.5	4.4	0.0	54.9	75.0	72.0	2,338
Outpost Areas										
1980	0.0	16.2	24.7	36.4	1.3	1.3	20.1	62.7	55.2	154
1990	0.0	10.3	24.6	33.7	1.2	0.4	29.8	65.3	62.5	252
2000	0.0	4.7	16.2	23.4	0.1	0.0	55.5	71.4	69.5	679
Native Areas										
1980	0.0	14.7	46.7	13.3	0.0	1.3	24.0	58.0	54.1	75
1990	0.0	10.2	53.4	12.5	0.0	1.1	22.7	57.6	57.8	88
2000	0.0	9.6	31.3	9.6	0.0	0.8	48.6	64.4	64.6	249

The third thing to note about the gateway no-majority neighborhoods is that they stay racially and ethnically diverse despite rather low persistence rates. Mean diversity levels (*E* scores) in the far right columns of Table 12 decrease by 2010, but the 1980 and 1990 gateway cohorts manifest higher diversity at the beginning and end of their observation periods than do no-majority tracts in other kinds of immigrant contexts. We should stress, though, that mixed neighborhoods in all contexts manage to maintain complex albeit evolving multigroup compositions over a long time span. The pie charts in Figure 8 document this fact in a visually compelling manner. Each pair of pies provides a comparison between the average 1980 and 2010 racial-ethnic structures of gateway, outpost, or native tracts defined as no-majority in 1980.



Figure 8. Mean Racial-Ethnic Composition of 1980 No-Majority Metropolitan Tracts in 1980 and 2010, by Immigrant Context

Once again the variation by immigrant context is striking. Tracts in the gateway metro areas approximate Logan and Zhang's (2010) global neighborhoods, in which the four principal panethnic groups constitute non-trivial shares of the population. Their four-group structure is the result of marked gains in the size of the Hispanic and Asian slices and a substantial shrinkage of the white slice over time. Outpost and native 1980 no-majority tracts also experience Hispanic expansion and white contraction. However, the Asian share remains small in the outpost and native tracts, and the black share—larger to begin with than in the gateway areas—stays the same or increases. In outpost settings, these shifts erode whites' plurality and produce a composition that is roughly one-third Hispanic, one-third black, and one-fourth white. The mean composition of no-majority neighborhoods in the native areas changes from primarily white and black to a three-group structure that includes Hispanics and is dominated by blacks.

The group-specific population gains and losses underlying these compositional transformations are fairly intuitive. The number of whites, for example, decreases by three-fifths or more during the study period in 1980 no-majority tracts located in each type of immigrant context. Also as expected, Hispanic populations exhibit 80-100% growth rates across all three contexts. Asian growth is most impressive in outpost no-majority neighborhoods, doubling the Hispanic rate, but it operates on a small 1980 base and thus boosts Asians' proportional representation only modestly by 2010. Black populations in no-majority tracts are far more stable than those of the other panethnic groups. Yet the greatest average 1980-2010 black decline (-11.9%) occurs in native areas where African Americans increase their proportional share of no-majority neighborhood residents from two-fifths to one-half between the two census years.

In sum, the results for no-majority neighborhoods are consistent with aspects of both spatial assimilation and ethnic stratification. The rising number of such neighborhoods and their

greater persistence in gateway areas than other kinds of immigrant contexts aligns with expectations based on the assimilation perspective. Yet the low overall persistence rate for the 1980 cohort of no-majority tracts conforms to ethnic stratification reasoning, as does the loss of white residents from these tracts as they transition to Hispanic, Asian, or black majority types (also see Holloway et al. 2011). Our assessment of the evidence favoring stratification should be tempered by the conservative approach taken here, i.e., defining mixed neighborhoods in no-majority terms. When mixing is operationalized as a high level of diversity (a tract *E* score in the 60+ range), the 1980 high diversity tracts are more likely than the no-majority tracts to retain a mixed status through 2010.[20] Nevertheless, the changes in the racial-ethnic structure of the former are similar to those occurring in no-majority neighborhoods, most notably a substantial decline over three decades in the proportion of high diversity tracts that exhibit white majority or plurality compositions. The potential for long-term stability in neighborhoods with mixed racial-ethnic compositions thus remains far from certain. An obvious next step involves looking beneath the panethnic level to see if particular combinations of detailed groups make such stability more or less likely.

Conclusion

Viewed in its entirety, the evidence presented here offers an affirmative response to the question posed in our chapter's title. Integration—a concept we define as the likelihood of different ethnoracial groups sharing the same residential environments—has increased in important respects since 1980. A near-universal trend toward greater diversity is underway across metropolitan and micropolitan areas as their racial-ethnic structures become more

[20] Roughly three-fifths of all 1980 high diversity tracts still have *E* scores of 60+ three decades later, and a similar degree of persistence occurs for diverse tracts located in metropolitan gateway, outpost, and native contexts.

complex due to Hispanic and Asian growth. During the same period multigroup segregation has decreased, fueled by substantial declines in the extent to which whites and blacks live in separate neighborhoods. Indeed, the proliferation of mixed, no-majority neighborhoods constitutes one of the most striking changes documented, and it accompanies a sharp contraction in the number of white dominant tracts. These results suggest a shift from homogeneity to heterogeneity at both macro and local geographic scales.

From a theoretical vantage point, our findings seem most consistent with the spatial assimilation perspective. This perspective predicts rising community diversity as minority households gradually translate socioeconomic mobility and acculturation into desirable residential outcomes, achieving closer proximity to whites (and to other groups) with the passage of time. There are, however, reasons to be cautious about unconditionally embracing assimilation. One concern centers on group-specific patterns that diverge from the hypothesized path, such as the minimal changes in segregation experienced by Hispanic and Asian panethnic populations over the last three decades. Another concern is that support for the assimilation perspective varies by scale. In the smallest environments that we examine (tracts), three or more groups are often present. The most diverse of these settings, no-majority neighborhoods, have become relatively common in metropolitan gateways. Yet their distinctive racial-ethnic compositions appear fragile, presumably because of whites' distaste for integration. As the number of white residents dwindles, no-majority neighborhoods move toward a minority majority structure, in line with the logic of the ethnic stratification model.

At the opposite end of the scale continuum, marked differences in integration exist between metropolitan and micropolitan areas. Micro areas lag 30 years or more behind metro areas in average diversity magnitude, and micro segregation levels are lower and exhibit smaller

gains and losses over time. One also struggles to find mixed, multigroup neighborhoods in micropolitan America. Additional differences occur by type of immigrant context, with metro gateways standing out as more diverse, more segregated, and more likely to contain no-majority census tracts than their outpost or native-dominated counterparts. We conclude that, despite the recent outpouring of research on minority dispersion to new destinations, New York, Los Angeles, and other large gateway metropolises with a history of incorporating ethnic newcomers will remain attractive for a long time. Not coincidentally, Hispanics and Asians will continue to concentrate in these locations.

Gateway residential patterns raise a final issue, about the pace of integration. On one integration dimension (diversity), impressive increases are apparent across the board. But declines in segregation have been more modest and uneven, and relatively few no-majority neighborhoods remain stably mixed for as long as 20 years. Some scholars warn that this combination—rapid ethnoracial diversification coupled with stubborn segregative tendencies—portends a troublesome future for American communities, which will have to confront problems ranging from minority disadvantages in education and economic opportunity to decreasing social cohesion and stressed municipal budgets (Clark 1998; Lichter 2013; Oliver 2010; Putnam 2007). Such problems make it tempting to propose a comprehensive plan, bridging numerous policy domains, which would accelerate integration. Possible elements of the plan include improved employment options, stronger enforcement of fair housing and lending laws, steps to promote English language proficiency, feasible pathways to citizenship, and reductions in immigration flows. Perhaps if these elements could be implemented immediately, spatial and other forms of assimilation might begin to catch up with rates of Hispanic and Asian growth.

In reality, however, there is no easy solution. Just as individual or family assimilation may take generations, the process of ethnoracial residential integration will unfold over many more decades than the three we focus upon. Keeping the need for patience in mind, some social and demographic trends can be discerned that offer reasons for optimism. Cohort succession, in which older, more prejudiced whites are replaced by younger people with greater exposure to members of other groups, bodes well for racial attitudes in general and residential preferences in particular. Persons still resistant to integration will find fewer homogeneous (i.e., all-white) neighborhoods and communities that constitute suitable 'escape' destinations. The growth of interracial households is another potentially consequential trend. Such households, whether formed through intermarriage, adoption, or other means, create residential diversity at an intimate scale. This fact, complemented by household members' preferences for multiethnic environments, may serve to reduce segregation and increase the frequency and persistence of mixed neighborhoods (Ellis et al. 2012). Moreover, the offspring of interracial unions blur the color lines that underpin residential manifestations of inequality. So do the descendants of immigrants who see themselves—and who are seen by others—in a less distinctively ethnic light. We suspect that the rate at which integration proceeds will ultimately hinge on the salience of traditional racial-ethnic categories. As these categories and their associated identities soften over time, the impediments to living side by side will further diminish.

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