Unauthorized Mexican Migration and the Socioeconomic Integration of Mexican Americans

Frank D. Bean  
*University of California, Irvine*

James D. Bachmeier  
*Pennsylvania State University*

Susan K. Brown  
*University of California, Irvine*

Jennifer Van Hook  
*Pennsylvania State University*

Mark A. Leach  
*Pennsylvania State University*

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I. Introduction

Nearly 50 years ago, the United States adopted policies that allowed new kinds of immigrants to come to the country (Martin 2011; Reimers 2005). Soon after these changes, immigration began to increase steadily. Now, one in eight U.S. residents is foreign-born, up from one in 20 in 1970 (Gryn and Larsen 2010). The new immigrants also differ from earlier ones. Nine of every 10 come from outside Europe, just the reverse of immigration in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Grieco et al. 2012). They represent a variety of nationalities: more than 20 countries now contribute at least 1 percent each to the total number of new legal permanent residents (Monger and Yankay 2012). But even so, Mexicans predominate heavily among legal and especially among unauthorized flows (Passel, Cohen and Gonzalez-Barrera 2012). As a result, the United States has become more non-European and ethno-racially diverse (Lee and Bean 2010). With Mexican immigrant settlements spreading the past 20 years from the Southwest to the rest of the country (Massey and Capoferro 2008), the country also has become more Mexican, both demographically (Massey and Pren 2012b) and culturally (Arellano 2012; Jiménez 2009).

This chapter seeks to assess the implications of this Mexican migration for the integration of Mexican-Americans. Such migration could be undesirable if it were harming native-born Americans or leading to the formation of a new ethnoracial underclass whose costs outweighed its economic contributions to the country (Bean and Stevens 2003; Douthat 2013). But we know from labor market research that Mexican immigrants do not compete to any substantial degree with less-skilled natives (for reviews, see Holzer 2011; Hamermesh and Bean 1998; Borjas and Katz 2007; Card and Lewis 2007; Ottaviano and Peri 2008). Moreover, even though little research has assessed the sociocultural consequences of this recent Mexican migration for the country (Kasinitz 2012), most studies suggest these effects are actually often positive. For example, Lee and Bean (2010) recently observed that U.S. metropolitan areas with more Latino migrants and greater ethno-racial diversity exhibit greater ethno-racial intermarriage and boundary dissolution than other areas.

The key question remaining is: How well (or badly) are the migrants and (especially) their children and grandchildren faring in the United States? The same labor market research that does not find adverse effects of Mexican migrants on the jobs or wages of natives does overwhelmingly reveal an impact within the population of immigrants: the newly arrived less-skilled Mexican immigrants depress the employment and wages of those Mexicans arriving earlier. Moreover, federal and state legislation has undercut the rights and legal protections afforded to unauthorized Mexican workers and their families, and sometimes curtailed those of legal permanent residents as well (Gentsch and Massey 2011; Massey and Pren 2012a; Kanstroom 2012). This shift accentuates migrants’ social and economic marginality, making life precarious for them and their offspring (Massey and Gentsch 2013; Bean et al. 2011; Yoshikawa 2011). Both competition among migrants themselves and harsh treatment from the host society may handicap Mexican immigrant integration.

At the same time, the nation has gradually been employing ever more unauthorized Mexicans to fill less-skilled jobs (Bean et al. 2012). Rising immigrant marginality, together with the growing U.S. reliance on less-skilled Mexican workers, risks the development of a new
underclass, especially at a time when overall opportunities for socioeconomic mobility are stalling (Massey 2007). If upward mobility among the descendants of Mexican immigrants is to continue, it is imperative to understand why increasing numbers of unauthorized Mexican migrants have come to the country in the first place and how their migration status relates to the most crucial factor affecting mobility among Mexican-Americans – namely the educational attainment of the second and third generations.

Mexicans enter the United States in a multiplicity of ways. As the analyses presented below will show, the degree of success they and their children attain depends on the nature and duration of their entry status. The most “regular” are legal migrants, who have acquired legal permanent residency (LPR status), even after arriving in some other capacity. Some of these enter legally on temporary visas (tourists, students, and temporary agricultural workers) but may overstay them. The numbers of people with such visas have risen sharply over the past half century from Mexico as well as other countries. Those who come via unauthorized land crossings at the southwestern border — often called “illegal,” “undocumented” or “unauthorized” migrants (Bean and Lowell 2007) — have garnered the most media and scholarly attention (Chávez 2012; Massey, Durand and Malone 2002; Dreby 2010). Land-border crossers, overstays, and temporary legal workers all suffer from marginal status. Almost all are unauthorized. Even though some enter legally, they may end up “unauthorized.” We thus use the term “unauthorized” to refer to all of them. The socioeconomic positions and legal rights of these persons are much more limited and tenuous than those of LPRs and especially naturalized citizens (Kanstroom 2012; Gibney 2009; Massey and Pren 2012b).

While past research suggests that the education and earnings of unauthorized Mexican migrants do not measure up to those of legal migrants (Bean, Browning and Frisbie 1984; Sorensen and Bean 1994; Hall, Greenman and Farkas 2011), we know little about how much unauthorized status affects the success of their children and grandchildren, be it through deportations of family members, barriers to social benefits, discrimination, or poverty. Recent research, however, suggests that unauthorized parents pass along disadvantages to their offspring (Bean et al 2011; Gonzales and Chavez 2012; Yoshikawa 2011; Yoshikawa and Kholoptseva 2013). The reason so many unauthorized Mexican parents are here is that the country’s current immigration policies encourage a sizeable less-skilled, marginal migrant workforce (Hanson 2013).

It is important to note that the task of marshaling evidence about such migrants is made difficult by the fact that information on unauthorized migration is regrettably (if understandably) sketchy. This requires that researchers often use less than perfect data and indirect evidence to detect the traces of such migrants and their consequences for the country. Because of the policy significance of the issues, however, it is important to address them with whatever data are available, even if the information is not ideal. This is partly why we concentrate here on Mexican unauthorized migrants. Not only does this group make up by far the largest share (over half) of all unauthorized migrants in the country, the data on Mexican migrants are better and more reliable than the information for other similar groups. Also, because other national-origin immigrant groups are much smaller, and because differences in national-origin dynamics are important in analyzing immigration (e.g., see Bean and Stevens 2003), we do not try to lump these other groups together for purposes of analytic comparison. The picture we provide of Mexican unauthorized migrants undoubtedly provides a glimpse into the situations of similar migrants from other national-origin groups.
The children of these immigrants experience handicaps not only because of their parents’ marginal status but also because little is done to facilitate their integration.

Over the past few decades the United States has experienced widening economic inequality, with the wealthiest tier of Americans reaping the largest gains from economic growth (Stiglitz 2012; Wilkinson and Pickett 2010). The bottom earnings tier increasingly consists of less-skilled Mexican migrants, many of whom compete with one another. Yet, almost all are here because of the availability of work. We present evidence below that the growth of marginal Mexican migration over the past 40 years derives mostly from a decline in the number of less-skilled native-born persons available to do such work, not primarily from push factors in Mexico or from policy changes in the United States, although both of these play a role. We also estimate how much unauthorized Mexican migration status affects educational attainment among the migrants’ descendants. For policy-makers and legislators, our results point to the need for changes in immigration and immigrant integration policies. If the country is to meet its workforce needs without exacerbating inequality and spurring the creation of an entrenched subclass, current (and proposed) policies need better to foster both the legal entry of these less-skilled immigrants and the integration of their children.

We organize our examination into two main sections. First, we chart the trends in Mexican and non-Mexican migration since 1970, explaining how and why marginal migration has expanded so much. We focus both on the policies behind the migration, as well as on the U.S. demographic and educational changes that have reduced the pool of less-skilled native workers, creating a void filled largely by marginal Mexican immigrants. Second, we compare the education and income of Mexican migrants who arrive under different migration statuses, documenting the gaps between unauthorized migrants and legal migrants. Given these first-generation disadvantages, we also assess the implications of Mexican unauthorized (marginal) status for the educational integration of their children and grandchildren. Finally, we synthesize the findings and discuss their policy implications.

II. The Growth of Marginal Mexican Migration and Its Relevance for Mexican-American Integration

Trends in Marginal Mexican Migration

Over the past four decades, the total annual number of new entrants to the United States has risen nine fold. This increase encompasses non-immigrants of all types (students, tourists, business people, exchanges visitors, temporary workers), legal immigrants (including refugees), and unauthorized immigrants from every corner of the world. To a considerable extent, this expansion reflects broader international trends involving flows of people and money as most national economies join the global marketplace. For example, since 1970, the share of the U.S. economy deriving from international trade has increased from 12 to 31 percent (U.S. Department

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2 In 1970, the total number of all such entrants (LPRs, temporary non-immigrants [I-94s], and net unauthorized flows) was about 5 million whereas in 2010 it was about 49 million (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2011; Passel, Cohn and Gonzalez-Barrera 2012).
of Commerce 2012). Greatly improved communication and transportation technologies, throughout the globe, have expanded the potential and actual supply of new migrants (Moretti 2012; Castles and Miller 2009; Hutton and Giddens 2000). Within this overarching trend, Mexicans have predominated, with disproportionate increases of both Mexican-born non-immigrants and unauthorized immigrants (land border crossers and visas overstays).

Figure 1. Legal Permanent Residents (LPR) and Unauthorized Migration from Mexico and from Countries of Next Largest Migration, 1981-2010

A. Legal Permanent Residents by Year

B. Unauthorized Migrants in the United States, by Decade**

* LPRs exclude persons legalized under the provisions of the 1986 Immigration Control and Reform Act (IRCA).
** Annual estimates are shown for Mexicans between 2000 and 2010.

The absolute number of legal immigrants who are Mexican, while not as dramatic, also remains high (Figure 1, Panel A), even though the annual number of Mexican legal permanent residents has declined. In 2000, the number of Mexicans entering legally was about four times as great as that from the second-largest sending country (the Philippines). In 2010, Mexican immigration decreased, but it was still about twice as high as that year’s second-leading country (China). Today’s numbers of Mexican LPRs continue to dominate those from any other single national-origin country. Also, the size of the Mexican unauthorized immigrant net in-flow to the United States dwarfs to an even greater degree the number coming from any other single source country, a pattern that has persisted for several decades (Figure 1, panel B). In short, nearly three in every five unauthorized immigrants here today come from Mexico, a fraction about the same as it was in earlier decades (Passel, Cohn and Gonzalez-Barrera 2012). Moreover, the increasing flow of Mexican non-immigrants during this period has boosted this influx to levels higher than those from any other country (Figure 2), increasing the likelihood that the numbers of Mexican visa overstays have risen both absolutely and relatively (Bachmeier et al 2011). Altogether, of total foreign-born in-flows over the past decade (LPRs, unauthorized entrants and non-immigrants), the Mexican portion has risen from about 13 percent in 2000 to almost 28 percent in 2010.3

Figure 2. Non-Immigrant Admissions (I-94 only) from Japan, Mexico, and United Kingdom, and China-Korea-India, 1993-2009


Over the past twenty years, the number of temporary legal Mexican workers has also climbed. These workers are not readily discernible in statistics on total legal non-immigrant admissions, which consist overwhelmingly of students and tourists. But when we break down the history of non-immigrant admissions by type, in Figure 3, we note they began to increase noticeably in the mid-1990s, coinciding with the high-tech economic boom. Tens of thousands of high-skilled temporary technology workers (H1B visas) began to arrive from India and China, as did larger numbers of less-skilled Mexican seasonal agricultural workers (H2A visas) and non-agricultural (H2B visas) workers. These latter categories of temporary Mexicans reached levels in 2011 that were about 10 times their 1970 levels. In sum, recent marginal migrant flows to the United States (those involving either unauthorized or temporary entrants and temporary workers) are sharply distinctive in two ways – one is their consistent rise; the other is their overwhelming Mexican character. No other country contributes so much to the presence of such migrants in the United States as does Mexico.

Figure 3. Temporary Mexican Worker Admissions to the United States, by Type: 1986-2011

![Graph showing temporary Mexican worker admissions by type from 1986 to 2011](source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics)

**Explaining the Onset and Growth of Marginal Mexican Migration**

Although legal and unauthorized immigrants come from many countries, why have marginal Mexican flows predominated? What accounts for the persistent growth in their numbers, even in the face of strong hostility to unauthorized Mexicans from a vocal minority of
natives? The answers help to pinpoint the reasons the United States immigration needs policies that both ensure the size of its less-skilled workforce and foster the integration of the offspring of Mexican immigrants. If migrants have come only because of "push" factors in Mexico, the United States' main immigration policy challenge would be one of reducing migration. If, on the other hand, the immigrants come also because of strong "pull" factors here, including a dearth of natives available to do low-skilled work, then migrants would be contributing substantially to the country's workforce, and a compelling case exists for doing more to integrate them and their offspring into American society.

Even though the labor market impact research noted above shows that Mexican immigrants for the most part do not take the jobs of less-skilled natives or drive down native wages, a substantial segment of the public seems to think they do. Growth in marginal Mexican migration to the United States is often viewed in crisis terms, the result of uncontrollable natural forces or disasters. The media describe a "floodtide," "rising tide," or "torrent" of migrants (Chavez 2001). The language betrays a presumptive narrative that conditions in Mexico — e.g., population pressure, low wages, unemployment — are driving the migration. In fact, the numbers of migrants have gradually risen along with gradual declines in the numbers of less-skilled natives. The imagery of a "flood" of migrants overlooks the fact that the United States is taking advantage of Mexican labor, a tendency taking place since the expansion of railroads into the American Southwest during the 1880s (Cardoso 1980).

The steady rise in Mexican migration since the late 1970s can be traced in part to the 1965 U.S. immigration reforms that abolished national origins quotas. This set the stage for unauthorized Mexican immigration, although the legislation did not aim to increase Mexican migration in any way (Massey and Pren 2012a; Martin 2011; Bean and Stevens 2003). Indeed, the opposite was true. To understand the unanticipated consequences of the 1965 reforms, it is instructive to recall the context of the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952. In 1924 the country passed quotas based on the size of immigrant-group populations within the country (at that time, Germans were the largest immigrant-group). In the late 1940s and early 1950s, when policymakers sought to implement anti-Communist Cold War foreign policies involving countries favorable to the United States (e.g., establishing air force and naval bases, negotiating trade agreements and admitting persons fleeing communist countries), the 1924 quotas blocked citizens from those countries from entering the United States. Passage of the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act reaffirmed those quotas. Despite numerous attempts, Congress would not reform the immigration system until the presidency of Lyndon Johnson starting in 1963.

With the power of the presidency enhanced in the aftermath of Kennedy's assassination, President Johnson, a master of the legislative process (Martin 2011; Reimers 1983; Tichenor 2002), broke the logjam. In his 1964 State of the Union address, Johnson outlined proposals for pathbreaking civil rights legislation, noting, "We must also lift by legislation the bars of discrimination against those who seek entry into our country" (Tichenor 2013, pp. 213). The following year, the Immigration Reform Act passed both houses of Congress with strong bipartisan support. The Hart-Celler Act abolished national-origins quotas and established a privileged policy of family reunification. As part of a compromise, the law retained many of the other restrictions from McCarran-Walter, as well as adding new ones (Martin 2011). Essentially, the agreement broke a stalemate between conservatives and liberals within both parties: restrictionists acceded to front-door modifications (i.e., changes in the criteria for legal
immigration) in exchange for ostensibly tightened side-door migration (i.e., a ceiling on Western Hemispheric entrants) (Zolberg 2006).^4^

Hart-Celler, combined with the end of the long-standing Bracero program, spurred unauthorized Mexican migration. Hart-Celler imposed caps on entrants, initially 170,000 for the Eastern and 120,000 for the Western Hemispheres, as well as a per-country limit of 20,000 visas for the Eastern Hemisphere. Although the Johnson administration did not support the Western Hemispheric cap, members of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees argued for it both on grounds of fairness (a cap only for one Hemisphere seemed unfair) and out of fear of unregulated spillover from rapid nonwhite population growth in Latin America (Bartlett 1965; United Press International 1965; Zolberg 2006). The legislation made few provisions for low-skilled labor, even though the previous year the United States had ended its longstanding Bracero program, the 1942 contract labor agreement with Mexico that permitted tens of thousands of agricultural and other manual workers to enter the United States annually (Calavita 1992). For many Mexicans, especially circulatory labor-migrants, the most viable option after the Bracero program ended in 1964 was to enter the country illegally, since they could no longer come as contract laborers. As a result, unauthorized migration grew substantially (Zolberg 2006; Massey and Pren 2012b).

The long-term effects of the Hart-Celler Act on legal Mexican migration began immediately. The law’s family reunification procedures allowed for gradual growth in Latin American legal migration that was mostly Mexican (Keely 1971; Ueda 1998). The latter had averaged only about 30,000 per year during the 1950s, but after 1965, legal permanent residents could more easily bring in immediate family members, which led to gradual increases in LPRs from Mexico, especially when employers used Hart-Celler provisions to sponsor workers previously covered as Braceros. These “sponsored” workers were allowed to become LPRs and bring immediate family members. Unauthorized migration also increased because the new ceiling on legal visas was too low to accommodate all the Mexican entrants seeking to re-unite with their families and for whom U.S. work was available. Moreover, the end of the Bracero program had eliminated legal temporary entry for agricultural workers although the demand for them, now growing because of the expansion of California irrigation and agriculture, was stronger than ever. Not surprisingly, during the 1970s the bulk of the unauthorized population, almost all Mexican, settled in California.

^4^ While the broad preference categories that had existed under the McCarran-Walter Act had privileged highly skilled immigrants, the Hart-Celler Act emphasized family reunification criteria as the fundamental bases for immigrant entry. Four of the top five preference categories gave priority to the reunification of families and amounted to nearly three-fourths of the slots (Zolberg 2006). In addition, the law added parents of adult U.S. citizens to the list of immigrants not subject to numerical limitations (Keely 1971). But family-based entries had to occur within the framework of overall limits. Notably, the Western Hemisphere cap of 120,000 was less than the average annual migration then occurring from the region. A ceiling of 120,000 visas per year was placed on the total number of legal immigration admissions, which included legal migrants from Mexico. And further legislation passed in 1976 expressly limited the number of such legal Mexican entrants to 20,000 persons per year (Cerruti and Massey 2004; Fragomen and Del Rey Jr 1979), an extremely low number.
Economic and Demographic Factors Contributing to Growth in Unauthorized Migration

Although the 1965 reforms and the end of the *Bracero* program created an impetus for Mexican migration, they do not fully explain why the numbers of unauthorized entrants steadily rose. Admittedly, the law allowed more immigration through its family reunification provisions (Martin 2011); and the growing social networks of migrants facilitated further migration, in the logic of “cumulative causation” (Massey 1999). But since less-skilled Mexican immigrants, for the most part, do not compete much with less-skilled natives, several American economic and demographic trends merit discussion because they have shrunk the native less-skilled population. These have created a workforce void filled by Mexican migrants. Specifically, 1) U.S. economic growth often disproportionately has often exceeded the population growth, generating “excess” jobs; 2) gains in education have reduced the numbers of less-skilled natives; 3) fertility rates among the native-born have declined, also lowering the relative number of younger natives; and 4) Baby Boomers have been “aging-out” of younger cohorts (e.g., 25-44 year olds). The result: over time fewer less-skilled younger native workers have been available.  

1. **Imbalances in economic and population growth.**

Even allowing for both unauthorized and legal immigration, annual U.S. population growth since 1980 has rarely edged past 1 percent. Since 1999, population growth has fallen below this level, noticeably so since 2000. Economic growth over the overall period, however, has been substantially higher. Until the recent recession, the annual percentage change in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has averaged more than 3 percent annually (U.S. Department of Commerce 2010a; 2010b). Even including periods of recession, each decade since 1970 has averaged job growth at or well above the levels needed to absorb population growth. For example, during the 1970s, economic growth generated more than 1.9 million new jobs per year, or about 50 percent more than the number required to absorb both the Baby Boomers, then coming of age, and the new immigrants. During the 1980s, job growth was almost as high, about 1.8 million new jobs per year, and during the 1990s, considerably higher, averaging more than 2.1 million jobs per year (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011). During the 2000s, until 2008, the economy would have needed to add 1.3 million new jobs each year to keep up with population expansion, a level more than half-a-million per year below actual job creation (U.S. Department of Commerce 2010b; 2010b).

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5 The argument has also been advanced that the unauthorized Mexican population in the country has grown in size after the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986 because that point in time marked the beginnings of substantially increased enforcement at the U.S./Mexico border and that these build-ups have had the effect of encouraging migrants not to return to Mexico (Massey and Pren 2012b; Massey, Durand and Malone 2002). While this undoubtedly has played a role in increasing the stock of migrants in the country, it seems likely that much, if not most, of the growth derives from other sources. For one thing, the increases began before IRCA was passed. For another, research has shown that the border enforcement build-up did not become large enough to become very effective until the mid-2000s, at the earliest (Bean and Lowell 2004), and growth continued before that. For still another, most migrants had been accumulating social and economic reasons not to return to their places of origin for years. This is reflected in the fact the rural to urban migrants in Mexico have been slow to return to their small towns and villages even though no enforcement constraints are present to discourage them from doing so (Villarreal and Hamilton 2012).
Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012; Bean et al. 2012; Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 2012). In short, during most years, job expansion has outstripped the levels needed to keep up with population growth, even though population growth includes components for both legal and unauthorized immigrants.

2. Educational upgrading.

Changes in education have depleted the supply of less-skilled natives. The upgrading that began early in the 20th century with the "high school completion" movement (Goldin and Katz, 2008) continued after World War II with the expansion of public higher education. Notwithstanding debates about why the rate of increase in college attendance slowed in the 1990s and 2000s only to rise recently, the fraction of the population with exposure to post-secondary schooling has steeply risen for most of the last six decades. Adults age 25 and over with more than a high school education now comprise nearly 60 percent of the population, up from 5.3 percent in 1950 (Minnesota Population Center 2011; Current Population Survey 2010).

The number of native-born Americans with a high school diploma or less has fallen in both relative and absolute terms. In 1950, more than 88 percent of U.S. adults ages 18+ (25.7 million) had never finished high school (some 90 million persons). By 2010, only 14.7 percent (35 million) had not. In short, by 2010, there were 62 percent fewer persons in the country than in 1950 without a high school diploma or its equivalent (Ruggles et al 2010). Strikingly, this figure is for the entire adult population, which includes the substantial number of poorly educated immigrants who have come here over the past three decades.6

3. Declining native fertility and cohort change.

Also important, once the Baby Boom (those born between 1946 and 1964) ended in the mid-1960s, U.S. fertility rates sharply declined. As measured by the total fertility rate (TFR), or the average number of children a woman would be expected to have if her childbearing followed

6 A related question is whether the amount of less-skilled work needing to be done has similarly shrunk. In manufacturing, the answer would be yes. Since 1970, the share of manufacturing jobs in the economy has halved, dropping from more than one in four to about one in eight. The drop-off in the share of manufacturing jobs held by persons with a high school diploma or less has been similarly precipitous (also falling from approximately one in four in 1970 to approximately one in eight today). Interestingly, during this same time, the overall number of manufacturing jobs remained approximately 21 million. But because of overall job growth, a relatively smaller share of less-skilled persons works in manufacturing now. Also, many of today’s manufacturing jobs require at least some college. Thus, the relative demand for less-skilled workers in manufacturing has declined. However, during this same period, the share of the less-skilled workforce in service jobs has grown considerably (Freeman, 2007). As a result, from 1980 until today, the number of non-manufacturing jobs held by less-skilled, younger males has held steady at roughly 3.7 to 3.8 million, or approximately 45 percent of the less-skilled, male workforce ages 25 to 44. However, because service-sector work often precludes the same opportunities or pay structure as manufacturing, native low-skilled men have increasingly left the labor force altogether. Nonparticipation in the labor force by men too young to retire more than tripled between the 1960s and 1994, and that increase was concentrated among men with low skills (Murphy and Topel 1997).
the fertility pattern shown during that year, by the mid-1970s fertility rates had dropped by about half, reaching levels below 1.8, considerably below population replacement. Afterward, they inched up, hovering for years around 2.0 - 2.1 children per woman (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2010) before falling again during the recent recession. This fertility decline
induced cohort change among Baby Boomers. From about 1970 until 1990, the numbers of natives ages 25-44 (with high school diplomas or less) grew appreciably, despite educational upgrading (Figure 4). The expansion of the economy, as noted above, more than absorbed the increase. But by 1990, when the earliest Baby Boomers started to reach age 45, the numbers of Baby Boomers ages 25-44 started to shrink. The reason: declining fertility after the Baby Boom led to much smaller cohorts. This tendency became more pronounced through the 1990s and 2000s as the cohorts born after the Baby Boom continued to shrink (Figure 4). In short, there were ever fewer young people to take the less-skilled work the expanding economy was generating.

For a quarter of a century, the "extra" increment of persons entering the labor market from Baby Boomers coming of age has been subsiding; now the oldest Boomers have begun to retire. Today most Boomers are ages 45-64, and the labor market is experiencing the opposite dynamic from the 1970s and 1980s. As the Baby Boomers age, the number of younger natives entering the labor market has plummeted, because the birth rate in the native-born population dropped to 1.7 births per woman by 2010, a level about 20 percent below replacement level (Bean et al. 2012), 7 and because, as noted, the very large younger Baby Boom cohorts of natives (ages 25-44) had aged. Consequently, the younger cohorts (those ages 25-44 in 2010) have become much smaller, consisting of drastically fewer potential less-skilled workers. In short, demographic change has already depressed the numbers of younger less-skilled natives who might be candidates to fill less-skilled jobs. Of course, the impending retirement of Baby Boomers may further help immigrants in the future, opening up jobs and creating opportunities for upward mobility (Alba 2009). Furthermore, retiring Boomers may sell their homes, creating vacancies which may foster spatial assimilation (Myers 2007). These are looming changes. The change discussed here has already occurred.

An important question is whether the decline in the pool of young native workers has coincided with a shrinkage in less-skilled work. Certainly, if we consider only manufacturing, the answer would be yes. From 1970 until today, the share of manufacturing jobs in the economy dropped from more than one in four to approximately one in eight. The drop-off in the share of manufacturing jobs held by persons with a high school diploma or less has been similarly precipitous (also falling from approximately one in four in 1970 to approximately one in eight today) (Bean et al. 2012). Interestingly, over this same time, the overall number of manufacturing jobs remained approximately 21 million. But because of population and job

7 Roughly, a decline of this magnitude implies that every 1,000 native women of childbearing age would need to have about 400 more births per year to reproduce the native population. Over a 10-year period, this would result in about 6 million more births. In other words, after 10 years of current levels of childbearing, the native-born population would contain almost 6 million fewer persons (allowing for some deaths and emigration) than it would if a replacement TFR of 2.1 had been attained over the period. Thus, over the past 30 years, the size of new cohorts born to native-born mothers in the United States has been slowly shrinking. A hint of this is evident in the drop in the inter-decade native growth rate, which was 21.2 percent during the 1950s, but only 7.8 percent from 2000 to 2010 (authors’ calculations from U.S. census data). Even more dramatic, the size of the younger native-born population (ages 25-34) has been shrinking since 1980. This means that the numbers of natives available to meet societal workforce needs are now in both relative and absolute decline, on account of diminished fertility alone.
growth, a relatively smaller share of less-skilled persons today work in manufacturing employment than in the past. Also, many of today’s manufacturing jobs require at least some college (Creticos and Sohnen 2013). Thus, the relative demand for less-skilled workers in manufacturing has declined.

During this same period, however, the share of the less-skilled workforce in service jobs has grown considerably (Freeman 2007). From 1980 until today, the number of jobs held by less-skilled, younger males (of any nativity or ethnic-racial background), the group one might expect to compete most directly with young, male, Mexican labor migrants, has held steady at roughly 3.7 to 3.8 million, or approximately 45 percent of the less-skilled, younger male workforce. Thus, despite a decline in the workforce share of less-skilled manufacturing workers, the share of less-skilled workers in general is as large today as it was 40 years ago because of growth in the share of less-skilled service workers (Bean et al 2012).

4. **Shortfalls in native workers relative to growth in immigration.**

How large is the relative decline in the number of less-skilled natives and how does it compare to the arrival of numbers of comparable immigrants? We start by focusing on males ages 25-44 with less than high school educations. This group might potentially compete the most with less-skilled immigrants, including less-skilled Mexican migrants. In 1970, few such immigrant males were in the workforce; by 2010 they numbered about 2.7 million (Figure 4), many of whom arrived after 1990. The comparable native workforce, however, lost about 4 million workers. Thus, the native male workforce of this age range and skill level shrank considerably more than the immigrant workforce expanded. Note that we are talking about all less-skilled immigrants. The differences would be even more dramatic if we focused on only Mexican immigrants. A similar pattern characterizes the cohort change for females.

Figure 5 shows further evidence in the gains or losses by nativity in the total sizes of this age group (25-44) for males. Among those with less than high school diplomas, a drop occurred in the number of native persons who might be candidates to hold less-skilled jobs every decade, especially from 1970-80 and 2000-2010. The cumulative decline across decades adds up to more than 4 million males. By contrast, the increase in the number of comparable foreign-born males is far less, about 2 million. Among those with only a high school diploma, this deficit does not emerge until 1990, primarily because of the large numbers of Baby Boomers coming of age. But once that demographic tidal wave subsided, the numbers of natives holding only high school diplomas also declined. Again, the shrinkages substantially exceeded the growth in the numbers of comparable foreign-born males.

Although these figures illustrate workforce shifts for younger (ages 25-44) males, similar trends exist for other age groups and for females, although not quite so large. In any case, the pattern is clear — cohort change from the aging of Baby Boomers, educational upgrading, and lower fertility in the native-born population have led to large declines in the pool of natives with high school diplomas or less, the native-born group most likely to fill less-skilled jobs. In an economy that was expanding, especially during the 1990s, this has left a workforce-void; and immigrants, mostly from Mexico, have filled that void. This helps to explain both the persistence of unauthorized Mexican migration and its growth over this period. Mexican immigrant workers have filled the jobs that there are not enough native-born workers to do. Increasingly, most of these immigrant workers are unauthorized because they have few alternative ways to enter the country legally.
III. Migration Status, Labor Market Outcomes, and Second and Third-Generation Educational Attainment

As unauthorized Mexican workers become more integral to the country's less-skilled workforce, understanding the degree to which they resemble other Americans in regard to schooling, work and income takes on greater importance. To address the impact of their legal
and citizenship status, we compare the labor-market positions of unauthorized Mexican migrants to those of Mexican LPRs and naturalized citizens, as well as to those of all U.S.-born workers. Research based on interviews with circular migrants who have returned to Mexico indicates inferior outcomes for unauthorized migrants compared to legal immigrants (Massey and Gentsch 2013; Donato et al 2008; Donato, Aguilar and Wakabayashi 2005). Small-scale surveys and qualitative studies done in the United States also suggest that marginal migrants (the unauthorized in particular) face hardship and insecurity in the labor market, which affect their children’s cognitive and socioemotional development (Yoshikawa 2011; Abrego and Gonzales 2010; Brabeck and Xu 2010; Potochnick and Perreira 2010; Orteg et al 2009). Unfortunately, there is little up-to-date empirical evidence of educational and labor-market disadvantages for unauthorized Mexican migrants at the national level, owing to a dearth of survey data that include indicators of immigrants’ legal status. One exception that uses an imputation of status (the basis for which is not fully described) comes from Passel and Cohn 2009; another, based on data collected prior to the harsher climate of the past few years, is Hall, Greenman, and Farkas 2010).

**Education and Labor Market Outcomes among Mexican Immigrants**

Here we present results using data from the 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to assess these outcomes in the immigrant generation (U.S. Census Bureau 2008). All foreign-born respondents from the 2008 SIPP were asked whether they were U.S. citizens, and if so, how they obtained citizenship (e.g., through naturalization, military service, etc.). The foreign-born were subsequently asked whether they were legal permanent residents upon arriving in the United States; subsequently, those non-LPR, non-citizen arrivals were asked whether their status has been adjusted to LPR status since immigrating to the U.S. Though the survey allows non-LPR arrivals to specify their arrival status (e.g., refugee, temporary worker, etc.), the specific non-LPR codes are suppressed in the publicly released data we use here. Thus, we are able only to distinguish between naturalized citizens, LPRs, and “others.” While the “other” category consists of both unauthorized and legal temporary migrants, Passel and Cohn (2010) estimate that nearly 90 percent of all foreign-born residents who are neither U.S. citizens nor LPRs are unauthorized. Therefore, the labor market outcomes observed below for non-LPRs are overwhelmingly driven by unauthorized migrants.

The public-use 2008 SIPP data also suppress country of birth codes; consequently, we cannot distinguish Mexican from Central American immigrants. Thus, our examination includes all immigrants from Mexico and Central America (largely Salvadoreans and Guatemalans) but excludes those from other regions of the world (“Caribbean” and “South American” are separate

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8 Certain SIPP panels include a series of questions allowing users to separate marginal types of “other” immigrants, LPRs and foreign-born citizens. A SIPP panel is interviewed roughly every four months for about three years. The survey consists of a core set of questions asked each wave as well as topical module questions that vary from wave to wave. We use data from the second wave, carried out between January and April of 2009, which includes topical module questions about immigration and citizenship status.

9 Persons born abroad to U.S. citizen parents are U.S. citizens by birth, and are thus not included in the immigrant population.
from “Central America” in the codes, and are not included in our sample). In the following analyses, “marginal migrants”, “LPRs”, and “naturalized citizens” refer to immigrants born in Mexico and Central America, while “U.S.-born” refers to the total U.S.-born population. Because the vast majority of those in the Mexican/Central American category are from Mexico (about 80 percent according to 2010 ACS data) (Minnesota Population Center 2011), we use the term “Mexican” for this category.

A comparison of marginal Mexican migrants to LPRs and naturalized immigrants permits an assessment of theoretical perspectives on immigrant integration. We consider three perspectives — those of classic assimilation (e.g., Alba and Nee 2003), racialization (including segmented assimilation) (e.g., Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Telles and Ortiz 2008), and marginal membership integration (including "delayed" integration) (e.g. Brown and Bean 2007; Brown 2007; Bean et al. 2012; Waldinger 2011). Broadly speaking, these theoretical perspectives emphasize different dynamics driving the extent to which immigrants (and their children and grandchildren) improve their life-situations after coming here, especially their labor market positions. The perspectives also imply different patterns of mobility across migration statuses as immigrants move toward parity with native majority groups, especially whites.

What are the mobility differences suggested by the perspectives? Roughly, in comparing unauthorized migrants with legal permanent residents and with naturalized citizens, the classic assimilation perspective would predict that a gradient involving more mobility and a smaller gap with natives would emerge, whatever the characteristic being examined (i.e., the unauthorized would fare the worst, followed by LPRs and then naturalized citizens). In short, the longer the exposure to the host society, the greater the assimilation. The racialization perspective, because it emphasizes the discrimination confronted by the members of a given ethnoracial group, would predict that, regardless of legal status, Mexican immigrants would show only partial mobility, all else equal. The marginal membership perspective, because it posits that the lack of social and political membership is the most important barrier to other kinds of integration, would predict little mobility and large remaining gaps only for those migrants who are the most marginal in membership. In other words, the marginal migrants (i.e., those who are unauthorized) would show minimal mobility and sizeable gaps with natives, while the legal permanent residents, or citizens, would exhibit the greatest mobility and small remaining gaps with natives. In particular, it would predict a sharp discontinuity across the migration statuses.

1. Demographic characteristics.

We limit our examination to adults between the ages of 25 and 64. Table 1 compares Mexican unauthorized (non-LPR) migrants to LPRs, naturalized immigrants, and all U.S.-born adults with respect to several demographic characteristics, as well as education, that help to determine labor-market outcomes. Because unauthorized migrants are primarily labor migrants (Portes and Bach 1985; Massey et al. 1987), they are disproportionately male, younger, and less likely to be married relative to other types of immigrants and U.S.-born citizens. Also, these unauthorized Mexican migrants are much less educated than Mexican LPRs and naturalized citizens, other immigrants, and the U.S.-born population. Three-fifths of adult unauthorized migrants have completed eight or fewer years of schooling; 84 percent lack a high school diploma or its equivalent. LPRs fare only slightly better. By comparison, naturalized citizens and all U.S.-born adults do considerably better: 59 and 32 percent respectively did not complete high school. Similarly, unauthorized migrants are less likely to speak or understand English.
As for the employment and occupational concentration by gender (Table 2), fifty-seven percent of working-aged unauthorized migrant women are in the labor force, compared with about the same percent of similar LPRs, but 74 percent of naturalized citizens and 77 percent of the U.S. born. Conversely, 36 percent of all working-age unauthorized migrant women are engaged primarily in child rearing, figures much higher than the naturalized and the U.S. born. Overall, male labor-force participation rates are considerably higher, with a gender gap that is most pronounced among unauthorized migrants. The rate of labor-force participation among male unauthorized migrants is 98 percent, the highest among all categories of male migrants.

The unemployment rates (Table 2) point to disparities across nativity and legal-citizenship groups. For women, the unemployment rates for unauthorized migrants, LPRs, naturalized immigrants, and all U.S.-born citizens are 7.5 percent, 5.7 percent, 6.1 percent, and 2.9 percent, respectively. The corresponding rates among men are 7.6 percent (unauthorized migrants), 6.2 percent (LPRs), 4.2 percent (naturalized), and 4.1 percent (U.S.-born). While these rates are undoubtedly inflated because wave 2 of the SIPP was conducted during the Great Recession, the cross-group comparisons nevertheless suggest that unauthorized migrants shoulder a disproportionate share of insecurity in the labor market. Even among the employed, unauthorized migrants are disproportionately concentrated in low-paying jobs that often lack benefits and avenues for upward mobility (Kalleberg 2011). Compared with LPRs and citizens, unauthorized migrant women are heavily concentrated in “buildings cleaning” and “grounds maintenance,” food services” (primarily cooking), and “production” (primarily textile and apparel workers) (Table 2). Among men, nearly 32 percent of unauthorized migrant workers are employed in “construction” jobs compared to 31 percent, 23 percent, and 10 percent of LPRs, naturalized immigrants, and U.S.-born citizens, respectively. And like their female counterparts,
Unauthorized Mexican migrant men are also heavily represented in “buildings cleaning” and “grounds maintenance” and “food services” occupations.

Table 2. Employment Status and Occupations among Adults in the United States, Ages 25-64, by Nativity and Immigrant Legal / Citizenship Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In the Labor Force</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>97.8</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>87.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in the Labor Force</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disabled</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In School</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caring for Children</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managerial, Professional &amp; Technical</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare Support</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Preparation &amp; Serving</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building &amp; Grounds Cleaning &amp; Maint.</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Care &amp; Service</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales &amp; Clerical</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming, Fishing &amp; Forestry</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction &amp; Extraction</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Installation, Maintenance &amp; Repair</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production, Transport. &amp; Material Moving</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Employer-Provided Health Insurance</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>74.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Union Members</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2008 SIPP, Wave 2 (Fielded between January and April, 2009)

2. Indicators of labor market integration.

Since these occupations consist of shift work, often paid by the hour, without paid leave, the income of workers depends mostly on the number of hours worked (Berhardt et al 2009; Holzer et al 2011). Since working is the fundamental rationale driving labor migration, one might expect unauthorized migrants to report higher average numbers of work-hours than other types of workers, especially among men, given their very high rate of participation in the labor force. However, the opposite is true. We plot the average number of hours worked per week for immigrant and U.S.-born workers separately by gender, in Figure 6. For each of the types of workers compared, the unadjusted mean is simply the gender-specific group average. The adjusted mean is the average number of hours worked when holding constant the demographic and human capital factors reported in Table 1 and occupation from Table 2. On average, both female (34.3 hours) and male (37.2) unauthorized migrants work fewer than 40 hours per week, and among males, average significantly fewer hours than LPRs and U.S. citizens. Although the mean number of hours worked by unauthorized male migrants increases when adjusting for
background factors, the gap in work intensity between unauthorized migrants and other types of workers remains significant.

**Figure 6. Hours Worked per Week among Mexican/Central American Immigrants by Legal Status as Compared with All U.S.-Born Workers**

Not only are unauthorized migrants working fewer hours, they also earn less in hourly wages (Figure 7). The wages of unauthorized migrant men and women are, respectively, about 67 percent and 66 percent lower than those of U.S.-born workers. Differences in demographic factors, human capital and occupation account for a substantial proportion of the wage gap between unauthorized migrant and U.S.-born workers, though even after adjusting for these differences, the earnings of unauthorized migrants remain about 12 percent lower. The earnings of LPRs are also lower than those of U.S.-born workers (by 31 percent for women and 35 percent for men), but this gap is almost entirely explained by background factors among women, and reduced to about an 8 percent disadvantage among LPR men. The adjusted wages of naturalized males and females actually slightly exceed those of natives.
These statistics highlight the hardships faced by unauthorized Mexican migrants, as well as those faced by Mexican legal permanent residents. This is not surprising since a sizeable proportion of LPRs from Mexico (about 35 percent based on data from the New Immigrant Survey, according to Jasso et al 2008) began as unauthorized migrants before converting to LPR status. The considerable disadvantages associated with being a non-citizen among these Mexicans, however, barely exist among those who are naturalized, once demographic factors are controlled. For the naturalized, after taking education, occupation, age, and region into account, hourly wages are actually slightly higher among both men and women than they are for all native-born persons. Even looking at educational differences between the naturalized and all native-borns, no difference remains when only gender, age and region-of-the-country are controlled. In short, among naturalized Mexicans, after controlling for basic demographic background factors, differences in either wages or education disappear. This pattern seems more consistent with the membership model of immigrant integration than with either the classic
assimilation or racialization models. After controlling for such factors, the former would expect a pattern of gradually decreasing gaps in education and wages across the migration status categories, and the latter would expect remaining differences for all of the migration status categories compared to all native-born persons. Unauthorized migration status (and often even legal permanent resident status) thus appears to be associated with the greatest degree of disadvantage among the Mexican migrants; and, crucially, their offspring suffer the strongest educational disadvantage.

**Parental Migration Status and Children’s Education**

Although numerous case studies portray the heart-rending difficulties the unauthorized and their children face in navigating school and work (Gonzales and Chavez 2012; Dreby 2012; Gonzalez 2011; Suarez-Orozco et al 2011), little research has addressed the question of how unauthorized status might harm the children and grandchildren of immigrants, especially their schooling. Here we examine evidence that parental pathways to legalization do matter. As noted above, Mexican immigrants are by far the largest U.S.-immigrant group. Because so many come without papers, Mexican-origin children account for a large majority of the children in the United States with an unauthorized immigrant parent. According to current estimates, 70 percent of the 5.5 million children of unauthorized immigrants in the United States have a Mexican-born parent (Passel and Cohn 2011). These estimates imply that in 2010 more than half of the 7.3 million children of Mexican immigrants residing in the country had an unauthorized parent (King et al. 2010; Passel and Cohn 2011). Moreover, most children of unauthorized parents, about 80 percent as of 2009, are born in the United States and thus are U.S. citizens (Passel and Cohn 2009). Even though U.S.-born children of immigrants presumably enjoy access to the same education and jobs as any other citizen, their parents’ migration-status histories reflect their first membership experiences in their families of socialization with the host society (Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009). Such experiences may have lasting effects on second- and third-generation children. While targeted policies like the Dream Act may address the situations of children who are themselves unauthorized, policies directed at the unauthorized population as a whole can affect both immigrants and their native-born children.

Mexican immigrants are distinctive in terms of the variety of pathways to legal status and citizenship. More than other groups, Mexican migrants to the United States have traditionally circulated back and forth between the two countries (Cornelius 1992; Portes and Bach 1985; Massey et al. 2002). Circular migrants often change their orientations, gradually becoming permanent migrants (Roberts 1995), in a process that may occur over many years (Menjivar 2006; Roberts, Frank and Lozano-Ascencio 1999). As migrants move from sojourners to settlers (Chávez 1988), their frames of reference shift from the society of origin toward the society of destination. Thus, when poor, unskilled laborers (especially males), who initially migrate for temporary employment, find permanent work, they often seek ways to legalize. The family reunification provisions of U.S. immigration laws encourage the development of complex family-based strategies for achieving legalization (Curiel 2004; Glick 2010; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994).

How might such legal-status trajectories relate to educational attainment among their children? Numerous studies besides the results presented above have documented the deleterious effects of being unauthorized, especially in the labor market (Massey and Gentsch 2012; Gentsch and Massey 2011; Hall, Greenman and Farkas 2010; Donato et al 2008). Recent studies have also found negative psychological consequences for the children of unauthorized
immigrants, including stress and other anxieties that inhibit learning and cognitive development (Yoshikawa and Kholoptseva 2013). Such factors may also limit children’s educational attainment, the crucial precursor of mobility in the United States (Hout 2012). Differences in levels of schooling substantially explain nativity differences in employment and earnings between many immigrant groups and whites (Duncan, Hotz and Trejo 2006; Smith and Edmonston 1997), illustrating why education is crucial for Mexican-Americans (Telles and Ortiz 2008).

1. Parental migration-status trajectories.

Because of high rates of unauthorized status in the first generation, many Mexican immigrants and their children exist on the margins of society, and their incorporation takes longer than that of other immigrant groups (Bean and Stevens 2003; Brown 2007; Bean et al. 2011). Theoretically, this marginality may derive from either the mother or the father or both being unauthorized. We explore here how combinations of parents’ legal status trajectories matter for children’s education. These are defined by each parent’s nativity/entry/legalization/citizenship status at two points in time — at entry and at the later time of data collection. Parental trajectories across these points vary considerably within and across couples, both because immigrant parents may not have arrived together in the United States and because the costs of legalization and naturalization force the family to choose which parent should legalize first.

As previously noted, scarcely any national-level or even other data sets provide information on both unauthorized Mexican migration status for immigrants and their adult children. But one recent study in metropolitan Los Angeles, the Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA) survey (Bean et al. 2012; Rumbaut et al. 2004), included a large sample of second-generation Mexican respondents ages 20-40. The study was not national in scope, but offers enormously valuable information for a random sample of second-generation young adults in the U.S. city with the largest number of Mexican immigrants in the country. While the term “second-generation” typically refers to persons born in the United States with at least one immigrant parent, the IIMMLA sample also includes immigrants who arrived in the United States as children before 15 years of age. We use this information. Very few of these respondents were themselves unauthorized, and their status does not affect the research results shown below. The IIMMLA data include information about the migration status of each parent when that person first entered the United States, as well as parents’ legal and citizenship status at the time of the interview. The answers enable the comparison of migration statuses for each parent at time-of-entry and at time-of-interview. In some cases respondents either had never known one of their parents or did not know their parents’ initial migration status. Other parents had never lived in the United States. Still others had come as unauthorized entrants and then had become legal permanent residents. Some of these eventually naturalized.

The percentages of parents in the various trajectories used are shown in Table 3. Mexican parents are highly likely to have been unauthorized when they came to the country: 34.2 percent of Mexican mothers and 32.8 percent of Mexican fathers in the sample were unauthorized at entry. Because a high proportion of Mexican immigrant parents at any moment may still be making the transition from temporary to permanent immigrant, and because U.S. immigration policy is so complicated that it encourages multiple legal entry strategies (Council on Foreign Relations 2009), Mexicans more than other country-of-origin groups show multiple,
parental mixed-status combinations of entry and legalization/citizenship statuses. Here we examine how these various parental mixed-status categories relate to children’s educational attainment. We do this by gauging the extent to which children's schooling varies by parents' combination of migration status categories, controlling for parents’ antecedent factors and respondent’s other characteristics (see Bean et al. 2011, for details).

2. Patterns of parental trajectory combinations.

The members of the Mexican-immigrant generation and their children show characteristics typical of their form of migration. For example, nearly three decades after they migrated to the United States, the Mexican parents still have mostly not finished high school (averaging only a little more than eight-and-a-half years of schooling) (see Table 4). The Mexican-American young adult respondents, by contrast, are much better educated than their parents, having completed 13 years of schooling on average. Many of these Mexican-Americans did not speak English at home while growing up (although most also learned English), and nearly three-fourths lived with both parents. Also, a noticeable proportion of their parents had returned to Mexico after migrating for at least six months, a pattern consistent with sojourner migration (Chávez 1988; Massey et al. 1987).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trajectory</th>
<th>Mothers</th>
<th>Fathers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Migrated to U.S.</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorized to Naturalized</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorized to LPR</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unauthorized (or Unknown) to Naturalized</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unauthorized (or Unknown) to LPR</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unauthorized (or Unknown) to Unauthorized</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Born</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Immigrant Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA); Adapted from Bean et al. (2011)

* These trajectories include some mothers or fathers who after entry spent some time as an unauthorized migrant but whose entry status was unknown by the respondent. They became LPRs and in most instances naturalized. Most likely, these persons entered initially as students or tourists, overstayed their visas, subsequently were able to adjust to LPR status and finally naturalized.
The parents of the second generation are characterized by seven migration-status trajectory combinations. These show considerable diversity in mother/father migration-status patterns. For example, two of the combinations involve either all of the fathers (but not all of the mothers) being citizens (either being born in the U.S. or having naturalized), or all of the mothers (but not all of the fathers) being citizens. We label these Father-Citizens and Mother-Citizens, respectively. Twenty-four and 13.9 percent of the Mexican parental combinations fall into these groups (Figure 8). Also, two additional combinations involve both parents becoming legal permanent residents with many (slightly less than half) having naturalized, although not quickly. In one of these groups, almost all of the parents had entered legally, and in the other almost none of them had. We term these the Legal Permanent Residents (LPRs) (17 percent) and the Unauthorized Entrants Who Legalized (17.1 percent). Two somewhat idiosyncratic classes also emerge, again with mother-father differentiation, each showing substantial unauthorized entry and subsequent universal attainment of legal permanent resident status with some naturalization. But in each of these classes, only one parent had achieved legal status, either the father or the mother. These groups are Fathers Unauthorized Mothers Legalized (4.5 percent) and Mothers Unauthorized Fathers Legalized (14.1 percent). The remaining group (9.3 percent of the sample) consists of parents who either had entered or remained unauthorized, or parents whose status was unknown (Mother Unauthorized and Father Unauthorized).

3. How trajectory combinations affect children’s education.

To ascertain how the parental combinations affect the education of their children, we first assess how parents’ backgrounds were related to their combination by estimating a statistical model that regresses the trajectory combination on variables characterizing the mother’s and father’s background. These background indicators include each parent’s education and occupation in Mexico; the region of origin in Mexico; whether the parent had returned to
Mexico; and whether the parents had lived together for most of the respondent's childhood. The results reveal patterns consistent with the mixed-trajectories of the combinations. For example, when parents (especially fathers) are better educated, never worked in Mexico as laborers, both lived with the child while the child was growing up, and had not returned to Mexico, parents are more likely to be in the Mother-Citizens or Father-Citizens combinations.

We next assess how the parental combinations relate to the schooling of the adult children of the immigrants by regressing the second-generation respondent’s education (measured as years of schooling) on the seven parental mixed-trajectory combinations, with those whose parents both remained unauthorized deleted as the reference group. The regression coefficients from these models reflect the education premium to the adult children of immigrant associated with their parents holding a certain combination of legal status. We first estimate a model without any covariates, or controls. In this unadjusted case, children who had at least one legal-immigrant parent showed a significant educational advantage relative to the children whose parents who remained unauthorized or whose status was unknown. This premium runs to more than two-and-a-half years of schooling for those in the Father-Citizens group (first column, Table 5). Results are then statistically adjusted for differences in background factors (shown in the second column of Table 5). After such controls, five of the six groups still exhibit at least a full year or more of education than those whose parents who remained unauthorized. Most important, however, the differences are not fully explainable by the adjustments. Although a considerable portion of the schooling premium (averaging roughly 50 percent across the groups) can be accounted for by other kinds of influence, these background differences, about one-half to two-thirds of the average education difference still stands.
Table 5. Regression Models Showing Relationships between Parents Mixed-Status Categories and Respondents' Years of Schooling

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unadjusted</th>
<th>Adjusted^a</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. All Categories</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father Citizens (FC)</td>
<td>2.60 ***</td>
<td>1.15 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother Citizens (MC)</td>
<td>2.47 ***</td>
<td>1.53 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorized Entry and LPR (AEL)</td>
<td>2.19 ***</td>
<td>1.10 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unauthorized Entry and LPR (UEL)</td>
<td>2.31 ***</td>
<td>1.36 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father Unauthorized, Mother Legal (FUML)</td>
<td>2.03 ***</td>
<td>1.16 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother Unauthorized, Father Legal (MUFL)</td>
<td>0.87 **</td>
<td>-0.36 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Mother Unauthorized, Father Unauthorized [MUFU] omitted)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-Value</td>
<td>17.78 ***</td>
<td>18.03 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **B. With categories collapsed** |            |            |
| Categories containing legal or citizen mothers | 2.04 *** | 1.24 *** |
| (Unauthorized mothers omitted) |            |            |

* p-value < .10; ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01

^a For panel A, the educational premiums shown are adjusted for parents' and respondents' background characteristics and for observed selectivity (the chances that certain kinds of parents are more likely to end up in one trajectory combination compared with others). In panel B, the education premium is also adjusted for these as well as for unobserved selectivity using an instrumental variables approach.

One combination stands out for the schooling advantage it conveys to offspring: the Mother-Citizens group. Upon close inspection, however, we note that this group is distinctive. Two-thirds of the mothers in the group are native-born. The other third entered the country as LPRs (none illegally) and all quickly naturalized. And while many of these mothers (40 percent) married unauthorized males, a figure that testifies both to the ubiquity of unauthorized Mexican male labor migration and to the fact that when such migrants marry natives they gain eligibility for “green card” status, it is not surprising that adult children with parents like these show the highest levels of education. With so many native-born mothers, this group starts from such a high mobility level that it provides an upper-bound benchmark of how parent’s advantages become transmitted to their children. But because so many of the mothers are not immigrants, and because we are interested in what happens to the children of immigrants, we limit our attention to the members of the other parental groups.

Looking at the schooling premium results in Table 5 (panel A), we note that the predominant difference across the trajectory combinations hinges on whether the mother has legal status or not. All of the respondents whose parents are in groups with legal mothers show considerably more schooling than those whose parents are in the groups with unauthorized mothers. The gross schooling difference for the offspring of these two sets of mothers is
considerably more than two years (Table 5, panel B). When background statistical adjustments are introduced, the differences shrink to about 1.5 years but do not disappear. The educational advantage resulting from mother’s legalization thus does not appear to derive substantially from other kinds of differences between these two kinds of mothers. However, there remains the possibility that the association between mother’s legalization and children’s education could still be spurious, i.e. correlated with something not observed in the research, such as parents’ levels of initiative in seeking legalization.

To assess this, we apply an instrumental variables approach to gauge the extent to which such factors might be accounting for the premium (see Bean et al. 2011). Recall that respondents whose parents are in the group in which mothers attained legal-permanent residence status show an unadjusted schooling advantage of about two years compared to those whose mothers were unauthorized. The estimate of this difference, after adjusting for multiple background factors, is about one-and-one-half years of schooling. Applying the instrumental variables strategy reduces the premium further to about one-and-one-quarter (1.24) years (Table 5, panel B). But a substantial difference of nearly one-and-one-quarter years of schooling still persists. In short, the influence on education of unobserved factors captured by the instrumental variables approach does not appear to eliminate the educational advantage associated with mother’s having achieved legal status.

4. Implications for Third-Generation Schooling

Parental unauthorized status may also handicap third-generation (or grandchild) educational attainment. To what extent do the human capital and labor market disadvantages of unauthorized migrants carry over into later generations? Specifically, how much does the legacy of grandparental unauthorized status linger into the third generation? Bean and colleagues (2013) have estimated how much of the schooling difference between third-generation Mexican origin young adults in Los Angeles and native whites is attributable to grandparental unauthorized status. For males and females examined separately, the answer is about 35 to 40 percent. Thus, for a schooling gap of 1.1 years between third generation males (and here third generation means the third-only generation not the third plus, that is, third or later generations) and non-Hispanic white males, about 0.4 of a year is explained by the legacy effects of grandparental unauthorized status. Stated differently, were it not for many third-generation Mexican Americans having unauthorized grandparents (specifically unauthorized-entry grandmothers who stayed unauthorized), a smaller schooling difference (about 0.7 of a year) between third-only generation Mexican Americans and third-only generation non-Hispanic whites would be expected instead of the substantially larger difference (1.1 years) observed in the IIMMLA data. In short, clear pathways to legalization can be expected to boost appreciably Mexican American educational attainment even as late as the third generation.
V. Conclusions and Policy Implications

The sections above document the origins, extent, and consequences of unauthorized migration status for the offspring of Mexican immigrants in the United States. In particular, we assess the implications of unauthorized status for educational attainment, among both the migrants themselves and their children (including those born in the United States) and grandchildren. How significant are these educational disadvantages for Mexican American integration more broadly? The answer depends in part on the number of unauthorized Mexicans immigrants in the country and on how many children they have. Clearly, the greater the number of such migrants and the more children they have, the more widespread the integration challenge. From about 1970 through IRCA’s passage in 1986 and up to the onset of the "Great Recession" in 2008, unauthorized migration from Mexico has steadily increased, especially during the boom years of the 1990s and early 2000s. The most recent estimates indicate about 6.5 million unauthorized Mexicans living in the United States in 2011. Their children, some born in Mexico but most in this country, number about 3.85 million (Passel, Cohn and Gonzalez-Barrera 2012). In terms of sheer numbers, the scope of the challenge to integration is considerable. Moreover, these numbers may undercount the Mexican unauthorized population somewhat due to “coverage error” of the Mexican-born in official government surveys (Van Hook et al. 2013).10

10 Recent research suggests coverage error for the Mexican-born population in the U.S. Census and other government surveys has probably been somewhat higher than previously thought, particularly during periods of prosperity and increasing unauthorized flows. Because coverage error is a crucial element in the predominant estimation technique, the residual method, used to gauge unauthorized Mexican migration, it is significant for unauthorized estimates. Van Hook et al (2013) examine birth, death and net migration data (for both Mexico and the United States for three time intervals) to estimate the coverage of the Mexican-born population. They use multiple methods and multiple time points to gain perspective on the problem. The results provide evidence of under-coverage of the Mexican-born population, in the range of 5-10 percentage points greater than previously used estimates. This, of course, implies that the under-coverage of the unauthorized segment of the Mexican-born population, because it is harder to capture, is probably somewhat higher still. For present purposes, the statistics cited above about the magnitude of unauthorized migrant stocks and flows should be viewed as lower-bound indications of the degree of unauthorized Mexican migration to the United States over the past couple of decades.

Also, visa and other overstays among Mexicans seem highly likely to have risen in recent decades. Research by Bachmeier et al (2011) documents the substantial increases in both the number of non-immigrants from Mexico (the population where overstays emerge) and the number of Border Crossing cards (cards authorizing Mexicans to cross the border to work in border areas). In recent years Mexicans have used tourist or other visas or Border Crossing cards to enter the United States for longer-term stays (Hernandez-Leon 2008). This implies that rates of visa and other overstays have probably risen in recent years. Unfortunately, data on overstays and overstay rates are next to non-existent, with the best research on the subject dating from more than twenty years ago (Warren 1990). Bachmeier et al (2012), however, demonstrate that even if overstay rates had declined, the number of Mexican overstays has probably risen anyway because the size of the population from which overstays come (here we include those with
Unauthorized entry status and the subsequent lack of opportunities to legalize among Mexican immigrants carry significant negative implications for the success of their children and grandchildren. Our analyses show that in contexts without clear-cut and easily navigable bases through which less-skilled labor migrants can obtain legal entry and residence, Mexican immigrants must traverse myriad and complex (and often incomplete) trajectories to full societal membership (Leach et al. 2011), often never attaining legal residency, let alone citizenship. This forces the immigrants and their children to live in the shadows and matters for educational outcomes in the second and third generations. At present, unauthorized migrants have few pathways to legalization and a long wait, up to 5 years, when a pathway becomes available. Without immigration reform, a greater proportion of the unauthorized population will remain unauthorized longer than their predecessors who came during the 1960s and 1970s. If the United States does not provide pathways to legalization, or if it institutes difficult or punitive pathways (i.e., those that include long wait times, large fines for having been unauthorized, sizeable fees for legalizing, or prohibitively high thresholds in general that discourage applications), then the size of the group will grow given the availability of U.S. work owing to the relative small number of natives to do less-skilled work. This would mean the educational disadvantages and inequalities plaguing Mexican immigrants compared to others will persist.

In addition, children will continue to suffer from their parents’ and grandparents’ unauthorized status. The unauthorized status of mothers alone appears to reduce children’s schooling by about a one-and-a-quarter years, all else equal. The children of legal Mexican immigrants averaged 13 years of education, so a reduction of 1.25 years marks the difference between attending some college and not finishing high school. Without a high school diploma, Americans earn about half a million dollars less over their lifetimes and die about seven years earlier than those with some college (Julian and Kominski 2011; Meara, Richards, and Cutler 2008). The disadvantage to the third generation would presumably be proportionately less, but nonetheless non-trivial.

All of this raises the question of what causes these disadvantages. In particular, to what extent do they derive from discrimination? Bean et al (2013) argue that current research results imply that poverty explains much of the handicap, but they also note that one cannot rule out the possibility that ethnoracial discrimination accounts for at least some of the educational differences between higher-generation Mexican Americans and non-Hispanic whites. However, their findings suggest a different kind of discrimination than ethnoracial discrimination drives an important part of Mexican American educational disadvantage, namely discrimination against unauthorized immigrants and their children. The parental status of “unauthorized,” which reverberates even upon the U.S.-born second and third generations, explains much of the gap in attainment between third-generation Mexican Americans and whites. Without opportunities for

Border Crossing cards) has increased so drastically. Because overstays are not only unauthorized residents, but also persons who have violated the terms of a legal entry document, they will probably not respond to government surveys. In short, the trend of increased reliance on such documents for entry may also contribute to a rise in coverage error for the Mexican-born population.

11 Over the past two decades, the waiting time for Mexican applicants to obtain legal permanent residence through the family reunification provisions has gone from two years to five years (Bachmeier et al. 2011; U.S. Department of State 2011).
legalization this gap will continue. Later-generation gaps in Mexican American educational attainment may derive just as much, if not more, from discrimination directed toward first-generation unauthorized migrants and toward their children, perhaps in schools than from that directed toward later-generation Mexican Americans per se. In short, it may be the lack of initial societal membership and its legacy effects as much as native prejudice against later-generation Mexican Americans that handicaps their education attainment.

Our findings indicate the crucial role that opportunities for legalization play in the success and failure of Mexican Americans. The disadvantages of remaining unauthorized are evident: legal status alone exerts its own positive force on second and third generation education. The conclusion: pathways to legalization will help overcome the risk of an expanding underclass of Mexican Americans. Since most children of unauthorized immigrants are born in the United States, our analysis also suggests that legislation providing the possibility of entry into full societal membership helps not only the immigrants themselves but also their children and their children’s children. Evidence shows that those unauthorized entrants who do legalize do also overcome many of the disadvantages confronting them, as do their children. Because parents’ socioeconomic status has sizeable effects on children’s education (Fischer and Hout 2006), the positive influence of such membership in the immigrant generation is likely to carry over to later generations as well.
References


